GRACE: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St. Thomas

 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

 Chapter II: QUESTION 109 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V.

 ARTICLE VI.

 ARTICLE VII.

 ARTICLE VIII.

 ARTICLE IX.

 ARTICLE X.

 Chapter III: QUESTION 110 THE GRACE OF GOD WITH RESPECT TO ITS ESSENCE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III. WHETHER GRACE IS IDENTICAL WITH VIRTUE, PARTICULARLY WITH CHARITY

 ARTICLE IV. WHETHER HABITUAL GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT

 Chapter IV: QUESTION 111 THE DIVISIONS OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V. WHETHER GRACE GRATIS DATA IS SUPERIOR TO SANCTIFYING GRACE

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 Chapter V: I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: STATE OF THE QUESTION

 Chapter VI: SUFFICIENT GRACE

 Chapter VII: EFFICACIOUS GRACE 

 Chapter VIII: EXCURSUS ON EFFICACIOUS GRACE

 Chapter IX: QUESTION 112   THE CAUSE OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I. WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV. WHETHER GRACE IS GREATER IN ONE MAN THAN IN ANOTHER

 ARTICLE V. WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE POSSESSES GRACE

 Chapter X: QUESTION 113 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V.

 ARTICLE VI.

 ARTICLE VII.

 ARTICLE VIII.

 ARTICLE IX.

 ARTICLE X.

 Chapter XI: QUESTION 114 MERIT

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V.

 ARTICLE VI.

 ARTICLE VII.

 ARTICLE VIII.

 ARTICLE IX.

 ARTICLE X.

 Chapter XII: RECAPITULATION AND SUPPLEMENT

 APPENDIX: WHETHER AVERSION FROM THE SUPERNATURAL END CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT AVERSION FROM THE NATURAL END

ARTICLE IV. WHETHER HABITUAL GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT

State of the question. Those who say that grace is identical with charity hold grace to be attributable to the will and not immediately to the essence of the soul. Thus Scotus (II Sent., dist. 26), who adopted as his own doctrine St. Thomas’ objections, as he frequently did. 

St. Thomas’ conclusion: Habitual grace, inasmuch as it is presupposed by the infused virtues, is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, and not in any faculty.

Proof 1. Commonly, as found in the argument Sed contra: grace we are regenerated as children of God, according to Holy Scripture.” But generation has its term first in the essence and then in the powers. It is so in the natural order; why not in the supernatural order?

Proof 2. In particular, as a corollary of the preceding article, thus:

Every perfection of a rational faculty is a virtue or good operative habit.

But habitual grace is not a virtue, but is presupposed by the infused virtues (cf. preceding article).

Therefore habitual grace is not in the faculties of the soul but in the very essence of the soul presupposed by the faculties. 

Hence it is a participation in the divine nature by a certain regeneration or recreation, whereas charity is a participation by the will in divine love, and faith a participation of divine knowledge in the intellect, although all these infused habits are formally participations in the intimate life of God. But we are now considering them rather under their material aspect, that is, on the part of the subject in which they reside.

Reply to third objection. The soul is the subject of grace, since it resides in a species of intellectual nature, or in the intelligent soul, although the infused virtue of chastity is in the sensitive appetite. 

Confirmation. It would be unbecoming for the essence of the soul to be less perfected Supernaturally than its own faculties. The whole man would not be supernaturally complete, with respect both to being and to operation; and its radical vitality would not be elevated.  Such would be the result if Scotus’ teaching were true.

First corollary. Glory, taken as the root of the light of glory and of charity, is likewise in the essence of the soul; for it is grace consummated. It is also an entitative habit, for St. Thomas says in several places that habitual grace, the seed of glory, is a certain beginning of eternal life, for it is the same habit. On the contrary, infused faith, which is obscure, is not a certain beginning of the beatific vision. 

Second corollary. Grace is the radical principle of merit, but charity is its proximate principle.

Third corollary. Mortal sin, being the privation of sanctifying grace, is death to the soul in the essence of the soul, and in that it is a vicious habit or act it is in the will, or in some other faculty under the command of the will.

As a complement to this question of the essence of grace, two articles in the treatise De lege nova (Ia IIae, q. 106, a. I) should be read on whether the new law is written or set in the heart. The reply is as follows: “That which is most powerful in the law of the New Testament, and in which all its virtue consists, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through the faith of Christ. Therefore the new law is principally that very grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given to the faithful of Christ . . . Hence St. Paul declares that ‘the law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death’ (Rom. 8:2). . . . Therefore it may be said that the new law is primarily a law set in the heart, but secondarily it is a written law.”

Likewise the Summa (Ia IIae, q. 106, a. 2) declares that “the law of the Gospel (by means of what is primary in it) justifies.” And in the answer to the second objection (ibid.), St. Thomas states: “On account of what it is of itself [as habitual grace] it gives sufficient help to avoid sin,” that is, of itself it bestows the power not to sin, although as long as we are wayfarers the power to do the opposite remains in us. Again (IIIa, q. 8, a. 1, 2, 5), Christ as man merited for us all the graces we receive and He communicates them to us now as instrumental, physical cause of our divinization. (Cf. IIIa, q. 62, a. 5; q. 43, a. 2; q.48, a. 6.)

According to IIIa, q.62, a.2: “Sacramental grace adds, over and above [habitual] grace generally so called and above the virtues and gifts, a certain divine help toward the attainment of the end of the sacrament.” In the reply to the first objection of the same article St. Thomas maintains that “the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul sufficiently with respect to the general ordering of the acts of the soul (so it was in Adam before the Fall and in the angels in whom did not reside Christian grace strictly speaking, which was conferred upon men by Christ the Redeemer). But with respect to certain special effects which are demanded by a Christian life, sacramental grace is required.” Thus it may also be said that in the angels and in Adam before the Fall there resided supernatural grace, as a participation of the divine nature, but not however as Christian grace proceeding from Christ the Redeemer and forming souls in the image of Christ crucified. 

Sacramental grace is not a new infused habit really distinct from habitual grace, but it adds over and above ordinary grace a certain right to actual graces to be received at the appropriate time and corresponding to the special end of the sacraments; for example, the grace of holy orders confers the right to the actual graces necessary to celebrate Mass. And this moral right is a relationship which requires a real basis; the real basis is sacramental grace, properly speaking, inasmuch as it is really permanent in the soul. And the more probable opinion, as Thomists assert, is that it is a special mode and a special force of sanctifying grace, which overflow into the acts of the virtue. (Cf. St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 27, a. 5 ad 12.) Thus we speak of priestly charity, of priestly prudence. John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, Contenson, Hugon, Merkelbach, and several other Thomists accept this explanation.

Accordingly, as sanctifying grace is the principle of the sanctification of the just, whether men or angels, so is the sacramental grace of baptism the principle of Christian sanctification, and the sacramental grace of holy orders the principle of sanctification of priests, who are the ministers of Christ.

We must now compare habitual grace with the graces gratis datae and with actual graces.

1 Catechismus romanus, Pius V , Part II, no. 185: “But grace is a divine quality inhering in the soul, as a certain brilliance and light which removes all the stains from our souls and renders these souls more beautiful and dazzling.” 2 Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, Bk. I, chap. 100, and John of St. Thomas, Phil. nut., q.4, a.4: action, which properly belongs to the category of action, is transitive action producing a correlative passion in the patient; immanent action is reducible to the category of quality. 3 St. Thomas says (De verit., q.27, a.I ad 9): “Although by one act of mortal sin grace may be expelled, grace is not, however, expelled easily; for it is not easy for one who possesses grace to perform such an act, on account of the inclination in a contrary direction; thus the Philosopher says in his Ethics, Bk. V, chap. 6, that it is difficult for the just man to commit an injustice.”

4 Cf. Denz., no. 1021: “The elevation and exaltation of human nature to a participation in the divine nature was due to the integrity of its primary state and accordingly is called natural and not supernatural.” No. 1023: “Absurd is the opinion of those who say that man, from the beginning, was exalted by certain supernatural and gratuitous gifts above the condition of his nature, that he might seek God supernaturally by faith, hope, and charity.”

5 With regard to the testimony of the Fathers, cf. Rouet de Journel, Enchirid.  patristicum, index theologicus, no. 358.

6 0ur supernatural operations are said to be connatural inasmuch as they proceed from grace and the infused virtues as from a second nature in which we participate as in the manner of a permanent form.

7 Cf. on this subject our article: “La grâce est-elle une participation de la Déité telle qu’elle est en soi?” Revue thomiste, July, 1936, pp. 470-85. The reply is in the affirmative. Thus, in this question it is not necessary to ask what the formal constituent of divine nature is according to our way of conceiving it; whether it is subsistent being itself or intelligence itself, we are concerned with Deity as it is in itself, which is in some ways above being and above intelligence, according as it eminently and formally contains these simple perfections absolutely. Cf. Cajetan In lam, q.1, a.3, no. 4; q.1, a, 7, no. 1; q.13, a.5, nos. 7, 10ff.; q. 39, a.1, no. 7. 8 Rouet de Journel, Enchir. patristicum, index theologicus, no. 359 9 This secondary effect is not present in Christ, since He is already the natural Son of God. Cf. Ma. 9.23, a.4.

10 For an accidental form (as grace) perfects the subject into which it is received according to the mode and requirements of the latter, and in a diversity of subjects it produces diverse effects occasionally differing in species Thus grace does not produce in the angels virtues which moderate the passions, as it does in us. 11 Nor is Scotus’ distinction, “formal-actual,” admissible, which would be a medium between a real distinction and a rational distinction based on the reality, for there cannot be given a medium between a distinction existing before being considered by our mind and one which does not exist before being considered by the mind; there is no medium between two opposites. And the distinction which existed before being considered by our minds, however slight it may be, is nevertheless real.  

Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Chapter Four Rev. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.