ARTICLE V.

 WHETHER MAN CAN MERIT ETERNAL LIFE WITHOUT GRACE

After considering the observance of the divine commands in themselves, St. Thomas considers it in relation to eternal life. The question is here posed generally and indefinitely; later, in q. I 14, a. 1 2,3, here he is dealing with merit properly speaking, the question will be more particularly treated as to whether man without grace can merit de condigno eternal life. The answer is negative and is of faith, against the Pelagians.

1. It is proved from authority in the argument Sed contra (Rom. 6:23): “the grace of God life eternal,” which is thus explained by Augustine, here quoted: “that it may be understood that God, in His compassion, leads us unto eternal life.” St. Augustine is also quoted in the answer to the second objection. (Cf. Council of Orange, II, can. 7, Denz., no. 180; and Trent, Sess. VI, can. 2, Denz., no. 812.)

2. It is thus proved by theological reasons: Acts leading to an end must be proportionate to the end. But eternal life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature (cf. Ia IIae, q. 5, a. 5, on supernatural beatitude). Therefore man cannot by his natural powers produce works meritorious of eternal life. Read the answer to the third objection with respect to the distinction between final natural end and supernatural end (cf. Contra Gentes, Bk. III, chap. 147, and De veritate, q. 14, a. 2). These references are clear, and whatever is to be said on this subject is reserved for consideration in q. 114, a. 1 and 2, that is, whether man can merit anything de condigno, and so merit eternal life.