GRACE: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St. Thomas

 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

 Chapter II: QUESTION 109 THE NECESSITY OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V.

 ARTICLE VI.

 ARTICLE VII.

 ARTICLE VIII.

 ARTICLE IX.

 ARTICLE X.

 Chapter III: QUESTION 110 THE GRACE OF GOD WITH RESPECT TO ITS ESSENCE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II

 ARTICLE III. WHETHER GRACE IS IDENTICAL WITH VIRTUE, PARTICULARLY WITH CHARITY

 ARTICLE IV. WHETHER HABITUAL GRACE IS IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL AS IN A SUBJECT

 Chapter IV: QUESTION 111 THE DIVISIONS OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V. WHETHER GRACE GRATIS DATA IS SUPERIOR TO SANCTIFYING GRACE

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 Chapter V: I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: STATE OF THE QUESTION

 Chapter VI: SUFFICIENT GRACE

 Chapter VII: EFFICACIOUS GRACE 

 Chapter VIII: EXCURSUS ON EFFICACIOUS GRACE

 Chapter IX: QUESTION 112   THE CAUSE OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I. WHETHER GOD ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF GRACE

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV. WHETHER GRACE IS GREATER IN ONE MAN THAN IN ANOTHER

 ARTICLE V. WHETHER MAN CAN KNOW THAT HE POSSESSES GRACE

 Chapter X: QUESTION 113 THE EFFECTS OF GRACE

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V.

 ARTICLE VI.

 ARTICLE VII.

 ARTICLE VIII.

 ARTICLE IX.

 ARTICLE X.

 Chapter XI: QUESTION 114 MERIT

 ARTICLE I.

 ARTICLE II.

 ARTICLE III.

 ARTICLE IV.

 ARTICLE V.

 ARTICLE VI.

 ARTICLE VII.

 ARTICLE VIII.

 ARTICLE IX.

 ARTICLE X.

 Chapter XII: RECAPITULATION AND SUPPLEMENT

 APPENDIX: WHETHER AVERSION FROM THE SUPERNATURAL END CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT AVERSION FROM THE NATURAL END

ARTICLE V.

WHETHER THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE WICKED REQUIRES A MOVEMENT OF THE FREE WILL IN RELATION TO SIN

State of the question. It seems that charity toward God should suffice, without hatred for sin, since I. charity covers a multitude of sins; 2. he who stretches out toward what is before should not look back upon what is behind, according to St. Paul; and 3. man cannot remember all his sins.

The reply, however, is that an act of contrition or hatred of sin is required for the justification of an adult in sin.

Proof from the declaration of the Church, particularly in view of the quotation previously cited from the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, chap. 6; Denz., no. 798): “They are disposed for justice when, aroused by divine grace and assisted . . . they are moved against sin by a certain hatred and detestation”; also canon 9. This definition is based on several scriptural texts. In the argument Sed contra, St. Thomas quotes Ps. 31:5: “I said I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin.”

Theological proof. The justification of sinners is a movement of the mind from the state of sin to the state of justice. But the mind cannot freely approach justice without freely withdrawing from sin by detestation of it. Therefore the justification of sinners requires not only the desire of tending toward God and justice, but the hatred of sin or injustice. Hence faith alone does not justify. 

In other words, there can be no free approach to the terminus toward which one is moving without a free departure from the terminus away from which one is moving; or, there is no desire for good without flight from evil or aversion for evil, according to the words of the Psalmist: “You that love the Lord, hate evil” (96:10). Cajetan observes that from the motion of hatred for evil and the motion of affection for good there is formed, as it were, a single, complete motion of the will from evil to good. (Cf. a. 7 ad 2.)

Reply to first objection. It pertains to charity to love God and, consequently, to hate sin or offense against God; hence charity controls penitence. Cf. the treatise on penance and article 8 of the present question on the order of these acts and also of attrition and contri-tion.

Reply to second objection. Man ought not to look back on past sins to love them but rather to detest them.

Reply to third objection. Man should detest all the sins he has committed, including those he has forgotten, for he would hate these also if they were present to his memory.