RELIGIOUS ARE CONDEMNED FOR GOING TO LAW
WE will now consider the arguments brought forward to prove that religious ought not to go to law, nor to allow themselves to be defended by force of arms.
1. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians (vi. 7), we find the following passage: "There is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you not, rather, take wrong? Why do you not, rather, suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" On these words, the Gloss observes: "It beseems perfect men simply to ask for what belongs to them, avoiding contention or legal proceedings." Hence, as religious are in a state of perfection, they ought not to contend with anyone.
2. Our Lord says, (Matt. v. 40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him." "These three precepts," remarks the Gloss, "embody the perfection of justice." Hence, religious, who profess to lead a life of perfection, ought not to go to law; they ought rather to suffer themselves to be despoiled of their goods.
3. Again, we read, (Luke vi. 29), "him that taketh away from thee thy cloak forbid not . . . of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again." The Gloss says: "This rule respecting our garments, applies, likewise, to our other possessions." Religious, therefore, who are specially bound to the observance of these precepts, ought neither to prevent others from robbing them, nor to ask for their property to be returned.
4. Our Lord gave the following order to His Apostles: "Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, going forth out of that house, or city, shake off the dust from your feet" (Matt. x. 14). The same precept is recorded by St. Luke (ix. 5). From these words we see, that Apostles, and Apostolic and perfect men, ought not to litigate if they are not received into a town, or hamlet, or a society.
5. "If any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom nor the church of God" (1 Cor. xi. 16). They, therefore, who institute legal proceedings, depart from the Apostolic rule of perfection.
6. "Charity seeketh not her own," the Apostle writes, (1 Cor. xiii. 5), or as the Gloss explains, "requires not that her own property should be returned to her." Therefore, men who go to law to secure the restitution of their goods, have not charity.
7. St. Gregory (13 lib. Moral.), says: "He, that, for the sake of some earthly possession, disagrees with another, shows that he loves a material good better than his neighbour. This is contrary to the order of charity." They, then, who disturb their neighbour's peace, in order to recover their own property, sin against charity.
8. St. Jerome gives the following rule: "As long as threefold truth be preserved, anything should be done, or left undone, to avoid scandal." Now, a man can, without any injury to the threefold truth, suffer himself to be despoiled of his goods; and, if he, in order to recover them, institute a lawsuit, to the disturbance and scandal of his neighbour, he is acting against charity. Food is essential for the maintenance of life; but, we may abstain from food, in order to avoid scandalising our neighbour. "If meat scandalise my brother I will never eat flesh" (1 Cor. viii. 13). If, then, in order to avoid giving scandal, we are to refrain from so necessary a thing as food, we ought, with far greater reason, to renounce any other temporal good, rather than disturb or scandalise our neighbour.
On the other hand, we can adduce proofs that holy men are at times justified in availing themselves of the protection of the law.
1. St. Paul, when in danger of being delivered to the Jews, appealed to the hearing of Augustus (Acts xxv.), i.e., he appealed to the Roman law. An appeal is to go to a higher judgment. Therefore, perfect men may go to law.
2. We know, by the example of the same saint, that it is at times lawful for apostolic men to be defended by armed force. For, in the Acts of the Apostles (xxiii.) we read, that St. Paul procured his rescue from the snares of his enemies, by means of an army.
3. We know, further, that it is permissible for holy men sometimes to defend themselves, especially in the case of an ecclesiastical judgment. For, when Paul and Barnabas were at Antioch, no small contest arose, between them and those who taught the brethren that they must be circumcised. Then Paul and Barnabas went up to the Apostles, to Jerusalem, about this question. St. Paul, alluding to this discussion, speaks of the "false brethren, unawares brought in, who came in privately to spy our liberty, which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might bring us into servitude. To whom we yielded not by subjection, no, not for an hour" (Galat. ii. 4). Hence, religious, and perfect men, may appeal to an ecclesiastical court, in defence of their liberty.
4. St. Gregory expressly says (31 lib. Moral.), "that religious may defend their property by legal means." On the words of Job (chap. x. 16), "he hath laboured in vain," St. Gregory says: "When the care of our material property imposes upon us the necessity for travelling, we must, if we are despoiled of our possessions, at times endure our loss. At other times, we must, while taking every pains to preserve charity, prevent such robbery. We should act thus, not only to secure our own property, but, still more, to prevent those who would fain pillage us, from losing their souls. Hence, in defending our possessions against rapine, our chief care ought to be, not so much to guard ourselves against loss, as to save our enemies from committing sin.
5. St. Gregory, likewise, commenting on the words of Job (xxix. 25), "he goeth forward to meet armed men," says, "we are generally left in peace and quiet, if we care not to confront the wicked, for the sake of justice. But, if our heart be inflamed with desire for eternal life, and our mind be truly enlightened, we shall, as far as circumstances permit, or the cause require, throw ourselves into the breach, in defence of righteousness. We shall go forth to intercept the wicked in their misdeeds, even though they do not seek us out. For, when unjust men aim their blows at the virtue that we love in others, they wound us also, even though they may seem to venerate our person." Hence, we see, that it is the duty of perfect men to defend others who may be attacked, even though they themselves be not provoked.
6. It is a charitable office to deliver the oppressed from their oppressors. "I broke the jaws of the wicked man, and out of his teeth I took away the prey" (Job xxix. 17). "Deliver them that are led to death" (Prov. xxiv. 11). "Rescue the poor; and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner" (Ps. lxxxi. 4). Now, we are bound to perform charitable offices, primarily towards those most closely connected with us. Hence, as religious are most closely bound to their religious brethren, they ought, in charity, to oppose such as oppress their order. By this, and by all the preceding arguments, we learn, that religious, not only may, but ought to, resist the violence and artifices of their enemies.
We must remember that the assailants of religious orders attack them, sometimes in spiritual, and sometimes in temporal matters. When religious are oppressed in what concerns their spiritual rights, they ought to resist their oppressors with all their might, especially when the questions involved affect, not only themselves, but others. For, religious embrace the religious life, solely in order to be free to devote themselves to spiritual interests. If their spiritual liberty be curtailed, their object in becoming religious, is frustrated. Consequently, as it is a point of perfection for them to carry out that object, it is, likewise, a point of perfection for them, to resist all the obstacles which may be placed in the way of its attainment.
If religious be attacked as to their material interests, perfection demands, that, so long as their injury be of a private and personal nature, they should bear it patiently, as St. Gregory reminds us; lest, by resistance, they incite their enemies to violence. If, however, the damage inflicted on them, affect, not only their own, but the common welfare, (even in temporal matters), they ought, as far as possible, to resist their oppressors. It is not perfection but indolence and cowardice, to endure such oppression, when it might be resisted. For, as we have just said, everyone is bound in charity to defend his neighbour from injury as far as he is able to do so, according to the words of the Book of Proverbs (xxiv. 11): "Deliver them that are led to death," etc.
We will now proceed to examine the objections brought against our proposition.
1. By the words of St. Paul, quoted in the first objection, some things are forbidden to all men; others are forbidden to the perfect only. All men, as we know by the Gloss, are forbidden to plead a cause before a heathen tribunal; or to assert their rights, either by contention, or by fraud. Perfect men are forbidden to go to law, in order to obtain the restoration of their property. This rule applies, however, as Gratian tells us, (XIX. quaest. I. cap. Episcopus), to the restoration of private property. It is as lawful for them to recover common possessions, as it is for them to hold them. For, their common property belongs, not to themselves, but to the Church. Therefore, when they sue for its restitution, they are seeking to recover what they hold for the Church. This Gloss is not authentic but magisterial. It is taken from St. Augustine, who holds that it is allowable and pardonable for imperfect men to go to law; but, that such a course is not becoming in the perfect. But, if it be not lawful for those in a state of perfection to appeal to a legal tribunal, such a course cannot be permissible for bishops; since the episcopal state is one of higher perfection than is the religious. Otherwise, an appointment to a bishopric would not be promotion for a religious.
The fact that a man has embraced a state of perfection does not render things unlawful for him which before were lawful; unless by vow he has bound himself to refrain from them. Hence, it is no more unlawful for a man to go to law after he has become a religious, than it was before he embraced the religious state; unless indeed, by instituting legal proceedings, he should violate his vow of poverty, or should occasion scandal. Litigation would be an infraction of the vow of poverty, were a religious to contend for some private property, since, by his vow, the possession of such property is interdicted to him. It may be added, and perhaps with truth, that the words of the Gloss, to which reference has been made, do not apply to a state of perfection, such as is the religious state. For, religious have no personal possessions; and hence the Gloss could not say, absolutely, that they might claim their own property. The words of the Gloss must, rather, be understood to refer to the perfect in charity, i.e., to those who possess perfect charity, in whatsoever state of life they may be. Although they do not sin by making a legal claim to their property, they, nevertheless, by so doing, diminish the perfection of their charity. Hence, the Gloss does not say that it is forbidden for perfect men to go to law; but that it is unbecoming in them to do so. But, in certain cases, it is not even unbecoming in them to institute legal proceedings.
(a) The first of such cases, is, when a dispute has arisen concerning a spiritual matter. Thus, we read in the Acts that when dissension arose at Antioch, on the question of circumcision, Paul and Barnabas went to Jerusalem, to submit the point to the Apostles (Acts xv.). Again, St. Paul speaks of "false brethren, unawares brought in" (Galat. ii. 4).
(b) The second case is, that in which contention arises on some matter, (even though it be a temporal concern), which may be a cause of spiritual harm. St. Paul, although he longed "to be dissolved and to be with Christ," (Philipp. i.), appealed to the Roman law for release, when he saw that his death, or imprisonment, would be an obstacle to the spreading of the Gospel.
(c) The third case, is that, in which material loss may accrue to another, especially to the poor. We defraud others, if, through our negligence, we suffer them to be robbed. If they are under our charge, our fault becomes more grievous. By such negligence, we do not offer to God a perfect sacrifice. For, "he that offereth sacrifice of the goods of the poor, is as one that sacrificeth the son, in the presence of his father" (Eccles. xxxiv. 24).
(d) The fourth case is, when the contention involves our neighbour's spiritual welfare, in as much as he would lose his soul were he to keep the property of another. Hence, St. Gregory, on the words of Job (xxxix. 16), "he hath laboured in vain," says: "At times, it is our duty to bear, with patience, the robbery of our goods; at other times, we must, charitably, resist those who cheat us. This we do, not from self interest, but, lest, through their dishonesty, they should lose their souls" (31 lib. Moral.).
(e) The fifth case is when the example of dishonesty would deprave many, "Because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear" (Eccles. viii. 11).
2 and 3. We answer to the second and third objections, that, as the Gloss says, "the perfection of justice is established in three precepts." First, "If one shall strike thee on the right cheek, offer him the other." Secondly, "If anyone will contend with thee in judgment and take thy coat from thee, let go thy cloak also." Thirdly, "Whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him another two." The third precept is not to be understood literally; for, we do not read that it was so interpreted, either by Christ, or by His disciples. If anyone force us one mile, we must be prepared, if need be, to go another with him." Again, St. Augustine, speaking of the first of these three precepts, says, in his book "De mendacio," that it is to be understood to signify, that a man must be prepared, for the sake of truth, to suffer, not only buffets, but any torments, in a spirit of charity to them that inflict them. Literal obedience to the precept is not enjoined; since, neither Our Lord, nor St. Paul turned the other cheek. The third precept must be understood in the same sense, to wit, that a man must be ready to endure any material loss, in the cause of righteousness and charity. But, as we have before said, cases arise, in which, without any prejudice either to charity or truth, we are justified in legally asserting our claims to property.
4. Our Lord ordered His Apostles to shake the dust from their feet, as a witness against such as refused to receive them. "Shake off the dust from your feet, as a testimony to them" (Matt. x. 14). The Gloss, commenting on the words, "shake off the dust," says: "Do so, as a witness of the travail which you have fruitlessly endured on their behalf." This shall be an appeal to the Divine judgment. That this is what Our Lord meant, we know by His words: "Amen, I say to you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city" (Matt. x. 15). By these words, Our Lord instructs His disciples, to depart from those that will not receive them. For, they, like infidels, are reserved for the final judgment of God. St. Paul says of unbelievers: "Them that are without, God will judge" (1 Cor. v. 13). Those that are within, are committed to the judgment of the Church. Hence, if any man desire to be received into the Church, and they that belong to the fold refuse to communicate with him, he should appeal, not to the judgment of God, but to the tribunal of the Church.
5. Contention is forbidden to all such as are weak in faith. The words of St. Paul (1 Cor. vi.), "Already indeed there is plainly a fault," are thus explained by the Gloss, "The audacious clamour of contention, wars against the truth." The same explanation is given of the words in the Epistle to the Romans (i. 29), "murder, contention." Hence, they who appeal for justice, without noisy assertion of their claim, are not contentious.
6. It is not true, that none can, without a violation of charity, demand the restitution of their goods. What is true, is, that when avarice leads a man to demand such restitution, he is not acting in charity. On the words, "charity seeketh not her own," the Gloss says: "Charity seeketh not her own; for she does not love money." However, as we have seen from a passage of St. Gregory, already quoted, zeal for fraternal correction, may, at times, stimulate a man to demand the restoration of his property.
7. If a man go to law, he need not, necessarily, be in discord with his neighbour. Although peace of heart should not be lost for the sake of any earthly gain, it does not follow, that it is never permissible to make a legal claim to our property. Peace of mind may be preserved in a law court, as on a battle field. Otherwise, war would be always unlawful.
8. A man who justly claims the restitution of his goods, does not actively give scandal. If scandal be taken at his action, he is merely the passive cause of such scandal. There are two kinds of scandal. There is a Pharisaical scandal, by which men, out of malice, take scandal at their neighbour, and cause scandal to him. When Our Lord was told that the Pharisees were scandalized at Him, He said: "Let them alone: they are blind, and leaders of the blind" (Matt. xv. 14). There is, likewise, the scandal taken by weak and ignorant persons. When possible, we must avoid giving this scandal; but we must not do anything wrong out of fear of occasioning it. Now, it is wrong to suffer the property of the Church to be pillaged; and, even at the risk of giving scandal, we must resist such injustice. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury defended the rights of the Church, at the sacrifice of his life, making no account of the scandal taken by the King of England. Even if he could, without sin, have suffered the Church to be robbed, the fear of being a passive cause of scandal, would not have been sufficient cause to justify him in permitting such pillage to take place. It is, also, possible to obviate giving scandal to weaker brethren, by speaking to them gently, and pointing out that it is really more to our neighbour's advantage to check him in a course of injustice, than it would be to suffer him, by indulgence, to fall into a habit of dishonesty. Furthermore, a man is more strictly bound to preserve himself from taking scandal than to avoid scandalizing others. Therefore, if he know, that unless he reclaim his own possessions, he will himself be scandalized, it is his duty to demand them.
9. Though it be true that food is essential to the preservation of life, this proposition does not apply to every kind of food. A man may abstain from one viand, and live on another. Hence, it may be better, for the sake of avoiding scandal, to refrain from one kind of food, rather than to abandon certain temporal possessions. For, by not requiring their restitution, we may, as has been said, occasion sin.