Justin’s Hortatory Address to the Greeks
Chapter I.—Reasons for addressing the Greeks.
Chapter II—The poets are unfit to be religious teachers.
Chapter III.—Opinions of the school of Thales.
Chapter IV.—Opinions of Pythagoras and Epicurus.
Chapter V.—Opinions of Plato and Aristotle.
Chapter VI.—Further disagreements between Plato and Aristotle.
Chapter VII.—Inconsistencies of Plato’s doctrine.
Chapter VIII.—Antiquity, inspiration, and harmony of Christian teachers.
Chapter IX.—The antiquity of Moses proved by Greek writers.
Chapter X—Training and inspiration of Moses.
Chapter XI.—Heathen oracles testify of Moses.
Chapter XII.—Antiquity of Moses proved.
Chapter XIII.—History of the Septuagint.
Chapter XIV.—A warning appeal to the Greeks.
Chapter XV.—Testimony of Orpheus to monotheism.
Chapter XVI.—Testimony of the Sibyl.
Chapter XVII.—Testimony of Homer.
Chapter XVIII.—Testimony of Sophocles.
Chapter XIX.—Testimony of Pythagoras.
Chapter XX.—Testimony of Plato.
Chapter XXI.—The namelessness of God.
Chapter XXII.—Studied ambiguity of Plato.
Chapter XXIII.—Plato’s self-contradiction.
Chapter XXIV.—Agreement of Plato and Homer.
Chapter XXV.—Plato’s knowledge of God’s eternity.
Chapter XXVI.—Plato indebted to the prophets.
Chapter XXVII.—Plato’s knowledge of the judgment.
Chapter XXVIII.—Homer’s obligations to the sacred writers.
Chapter XXIX.—Origin of Plato’s doctrine of form.
Chapter XXX.—Homer’s knowledge of man’s origin.
Chapter XXXI.—Further proof of Plato’s acquaintance with Scripture.
Chapter XXXII.—Plato’s doctrine of the heavenly gift.
Chapter XXXIII.—Plato’s idea of the beginning of time drawn from Moses.
Chapter XXXIV.—Whence men attributed to God human form.
Chapter XXXV.—Appeal to the Greeks.
But, perhaps, some who are unwilling to abandon the doctrines of polytheism, will say that to these fashioned gods the maker said, “Since ye have been produced, ye are not immortal, nor at all imperishable; yet shall ye not perish nor succumb to the fatality of death, because you have obtained my will,49 That is, “my will to the contrary.” See Plato, Tim., p. 41 [cap 13]. which is a still greater and mightier bond.” Here Plato, through fear of the adherents of polytheism, introduces his “maker” uttering words which contradict himself. For having formerly stated that he said that everything which is produced is perishable, he now introduces him saying the very opposite; and he does not see that it is thus absolutely impossible for him to escape the charge of falsehood. For he either at first uttered what is false when he said that everything which is produced is perishable, or now, when he propounds the very opposite to what he had formerly said. For if, according to his former definition, it is absolutely necessary that every created thing be perishable, how can he consistently make that possible which is absolutely impossible? So that Plato seems to grant an empty and impossible prerogative to his “maker,” when he propounds that those who were once perishable because made from matter should again, by his intervention, become imperishable and enduring. For it is quite natural that the power of matter, which, according to Plato’s opinion, is uncreated, and contemporary and coæval with the maker, should resist his will. For he who has not created has no power, in respect of that which is uncreated, so that it is not possible that it (matter), being free, can be controlled by any external necessity. Wherefore Plato himself, in consideration of this, has written thus: “It is necessary to affirm that God cannot suffer violence.”
Ἀλλ' ἴσως τινές, τῶν τῆς πολυθεότητος δογμάτων ἀποστῆναι μὴ βουλόμενοι, αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῖς δημιουργηθεῖσι θεοῖς ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι φήσουσιν: Ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὔτε μὴν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε οὔτε τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας, τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως, μείζονος ἔτι δεσμοῦ καὶ ἰσχυροτέρου, λαχόντες. Ἐνταῦθα ὁ Πλάτων, τοὺς τὴν πολυθεότητα ἀσπαζομένους δεδιώς, ἐναντία ἑαυτῷ τὸν κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸν εἰσάγει λέγοντα. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον φθαρτὸν πρότερον εἰρηκέναι αὐτὸν φήσας νῦν τἀναντία αὐτὸν εἰσάγει λέγοντα, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὕτω δυνατὸν τὸ τῆς ψευδολογίας ἐκφυγεῖν ἔγκλημα: ἢ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον εἰρηκὼς πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον φθαρτὸν ψεύδεται, ἢ νῦν τἀναντία τοῖς πρότερον περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρημένοις ἐπαγγελλόμενος. Εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸ γενητὸν φθαρτὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὅρον, πῶς ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι δυνατόν; Ὥστε μάτην ἔοικεν ὁ Πλάτων ἀδύνατα χαρίζεσθαι τῷ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργῷ, τοὺς ἅπαξ διὰ τὸ ἐξ ὕλης γεγενῆσθαι φθαρτοὺς καὶ λυτοὺς γενομένους αὖθις δι' αὐτοῦ ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἀλύτους ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἔσεσθαι. Τὴν γὰρ τῆς ὕλης δύναμιν, ἀγένητον καὶ ἰσόχρονον καὶ ἡλικιῶτιν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οὖσαν, ἀντιστατεῖν εἰκὸς τῇ αὐτοῦ βουλήσει: τῷ γὰρ μὴ πεποιηκότι οὐδεμία ἐξουσία πρὸς τὸ μὴ γεγονός, ὥστε οὐδὲ βιασθῆναι αὐτὴν δυνατόν, τῆς ἔξωθεν πάσης ἀνάγκης ἐλευθέραν οὖσαν. Διὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων εἰς ταῦτα ἀφορῶν οὕτω γέγραφεν: Ἀνάγκη δὲ οὐδὲ θεὸν λέγεσθαι δυνατὸν βιάζεσθαι.