CHAPTER XI

ARGUMENTS USED BY THOSE WHO MAINTAIN THAT MEN SHOULD NOT BIND THEMSELVES BY VOW TO EMBRACE THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

WE must next examine the views held by those who endeavour to prevent men from binding themselves by vow to become religious. Some there are who seek to detract from the merit of any vows, contending that it is better to perform good works without being bound by any obligation. They support their opinion by the following words of Prosper (Bk. II. de vita contemplativa): "We ought to fast and abstain, not as being bound thereto by necessity, lest, if we do these works unwillingly, we should be acting, not through devotion, but from constraint." Now, he that makes a vow to fast, subjects himself to the necessity of fasting; and this is the case with all other good works. Therefore, it would not seem expedient to make a vow to fast, or to enter religion, or to perform any other pious action. Those who hold this view maintain, likewise, that a good work loses in merit, in proportion to the necessity for its performance. Now, as a man who has vowed to enter religion, or to perform any other virtuous action, is bound to fulfil what he has promised to God, it is better and more praiseworthy, if he execute such a good work, without the obligation of a vow, rather than in the accomplishment of one. Those who argue thus, endeavour, likewise, in an especial manner, to prove that people should not be persuaded to enter religion on account of the obligation laid upon them by any vow or oath.

             They support their opinion by the statute of the Council of Toledo, wherein (Dist. XLV. cap. De Judaeis), we find these words: "Not unwilling, but willing souls, will be saved. For justice must be preserved intact. Man, of his own choice, obeyed the will of the serpent, and perished. Therefore, each man must be saved by the response of his own soul in believing, when the grace of God calls him to do so. Therefore men are to be converted, not by force, but by their own free will and choice." Now, these words apply far more forcibly to entrance into religious life, which is less necessary to salvation than is faith in the Christian religion. But those who enter religion on account of a vow or an oath, do so, not freely, but under constraint. Therefore, such obligation is not to be commended. The decree of Pope Urban, (XIX. quaest. II. cap. Duae sunt), is considered an argument in support of this opinion. The Pope says that they who enter religious life are led by a private law, which is the law of the Holy Ghost. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. iii. 17). Now, necessity, which constrains men by the obligation of a vow or oath, is opposed to liberty. Therefore, it is not seemly, that men should be obliged to embrace religious life, on account of any oath or vow.

             Another argument is drawn from the fall of those, who, having entered religion under the constraint of some obligation, have not persevered therein, but have returned to the world, and abandoned themselves, in despair, to vice of every kind. In them is fulfilled what Our Lord said to the Pharisees (Matt. xxiii. 15), "You go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves."

             It is further maintained, that some men who were under vow to go into religion, have not fulfilled their obligation, and have, nevertheless, become good bishops or archdeacons. Had they kept their vow, these good results would not have been obtained. It is also urged, that men must not be persuaded to embrace the religious state for the sake of any temporal advantages, such as gifts. The decree of Pope Boniface (I. quaest. II. cap. Quam pio) is quoted in confirmation of this proposition, for the Pope says: "Nowhere do we read that the disciples of the Lord, or their followers, were converted to the worship of God by gifts."

             It is further alleged that it leads men into unfaithfulness, to be bound, while still inexperienced, to the laborious obligations of religious life, such as the long morning office, trying vigils, fasts and disciplines. They are led like cattle to the slaughterhouse; and, as they do not fulfil what they have vowed to perform, these religious exercises are for them snares which entangle them in eternal death. Such obligations, it is urged, are unlawful as being contrary to the statute of Innocent IV., which provides a year of probation for candidates to religious life, and forbids anyone to be bound before the age of Fourteen years. This decree is in harmony with the rule of St. Benedict, which, also, appoints a year of probation for those who enter the order. It is declared, furthermore, to be peculiarly unlawful for youths under the age of puberty, to be bound to go into religion, for how can a youth accept obligations which may lawfully be made void by another? If any youths of tender years have bound themselves to become religious, they may be withheld from so doing by their parents or guardians. This is laid down in XX. quaest. 2, where it is declared, that, "if a maiden, under the age of twelve years, have taken the veil, her engagements may be annulled at the will of her parents or guardians." Thus, it is unlawful to bind, either by oath or vow, children, under the age of puberty, to the religious life.

             It is, further, laid down that none, under this age, can be bound to religious life, even though he or she should be capable of fraud. St. Bernard, in the preparation of regulars and of those who embrace the religious state, speaks thus on the decree of Pope Innocent III. which begins: Postulasti: "If thou desirest to know what to expect of them when they are under the age of thirteen or fourteen years, thou mayest be in doubt: for they may be capable of craft, and may make up in cunning what they lack in age." This has been proved in marriage, as we see Extra de Despon. impub. cap. A NOBIS, et cap. Tuae, and, as they have been able to bind themselves to the devil, they may also be able to bind themselves to God. But the Pope replies, that children under fourteen, may, after they have been received, serve in the Church, but they may not be bound under obligations. He that is capable of fraud, the Pope continues in his reply to Hugh, is bound to good, and if he has become a monk he is under the obligations of the monastic life, since he was able to bind himself to the devil. Innocent III. was of the same opinion, for, in this same decretal, he replies that entrance into religious life is a solemn engagement, if age is supplied by malice. This is also laid down in the old decretal, but it is of small import in our days.

             Those who argue against the propriety of persons being under an obligation to go into religion, quote the Summae of Raymund and Goffin. They also maintain (XXII. Quaest. V. cap. PUERI and cap. HONESTUM) that children under fourteen years of age ought not to be bound by oath; neither, by the same reasoning, can they be bound by vow to enter religious life. They say, further, that, as the word religion signifies either re-binding or re-electing according to St. Augustine (De Civit. Dei X.), therefore children, who are not bound and have made no choice, cannot be re-bound, nor can they repeat their choice. From all these arguments they conclude, that children, who embrace, or are constrained to embrace religious life, are much to be pitied for their folly.