50.  Now, if we were to speak gently to one of them, advancing, as follows, step by step in argument:  “Tell me, my good sir, do you call dancing anything, and flute-playing?” “Certainly,” they would say.  “What then of wisdom and being wise, which we venture to define as a knowledge of things divine and human?”  This also they will admit.  “Are then these accomplishments better than and superior to wisdom, or wisdom by far better than these?”  “Better even than all things,” I know well that they will say.  Up to this point they are judicious.  “Well, dancing and flute-playing require to be taught and learnt, a process which takes time, and much toil in the sweat of the brow, and sometimes the payment of fees, and entreaties for initiation, and long absence from home, and all else which must be done and borne for the acquisition of experience:  but as for wisdom, which is chief of all things, and holds in her embrace everything which is good, so that even God himself prefers this title to all the names which He is called; are we to suppose that it is a matter of such slight consequence, and so accessible, that we need but wish, and we would be wise?”  “It would be utter folly to do so.”  If we, or any learned and prudent man, were to say this to them, and try by degrees to cleanse them from their error, it would be sowing upon rocks,117    S. Luke viii. 6. and speaking to ears of men who will not hear:118    Ecclus. xxv. 9.  so far are they from being even wise enough to perceive their own ignorance.  And we may rightly, in my opinion, apply to them the saying of Solomon:  There is an evil which I have seen under the sun,119    Eccles. x. 5. a man wise in his own conceit;120    Prov. xxvi. 12. and a still greater evil is to charge with the instruction of others a man who is not even aware of his own ignorance.

Νʹ. Ἂν δέ τινι αὐτῶν λέγωμεν οὑτωσὶ πράως καὶ λογικῶς προβιβάζοντες: Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε, καλεῖς τι τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι, τό τε αὐλεῖν; Πάνυ γε εἴποιεν ἄν. Τί δαὶ σοφίαν τε καὶ σοφὸν εἶναι, τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην τιθέμεθα; Καὶ τοῦτο δώσουσι. Πότερον δὲ κρεῖττον εἶναι καὶ ὑψηλότερον, ταῦτα σοφίας, ἢ τούτων μακρῷ τὴν σοφίαν; Καὶ πάντων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι φήσουσι: καὶ μέχρι τούτων εἰσὶν εὐγνώμονες. Ἆρ' οὖν ὀρχήσεως μὲν καὶ αὐλήσεώς ἐστι διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις, καὶ χρόνου πρὸς τοῦτο δεῖ, καὶ ἱδρώτων συχνῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ μισθοὺς καταβαλεῖν ἔστιν ὅτε, καὶ προσαγωγῶν δεηθῆναι, καὶ ἀποδημῆσαι μακρότερα, καὶ τἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιῆσαι πάντα, τὰ δὲ παθεῖν, οἷς ἐμπειρία συλλέγεται: τὴν δὲ σοφίαν, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖ, καὶ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ καλὰ συλλαβοῦσα ἔχει, ὡς καὶ τὸν Θεὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἤ τι ἄλλο χαίρειν ἀκούοντα, ἐπειδὴ καλεῖται πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτω κοῦφόν τι καὶ πεπατημένον πρᾶγμα ὑποληψόμεθα, ὥστε θελῆσαι δεῖν μόνον καὶ εἶναι σοφόν; Πολλῆς τοῦτο τῆς ἀμαθείας. Ἂν ταῦτα λέγωμεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν τὴν πλάνην ἀνακαθαίρωμεν, ἤ τις ἄλλος τῶν εὐμαθεστέρων καὶ συνετωτέρων, τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο κατὰ πετρῶν σπείρειν, καὶ λαλεῖν εἰς ὦτα μὴ ἀκουόντων. Οὕτως οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτό εἰσι σοφοὶ, τὴν ἑαυτῶν γινώσκειν ἀπαιδευσίαν. Καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Σολομῶντος περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν: Ἔστι πονηρία, ἣν εἶδον ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον, ἄνδρα δόξαντα παρ' ἑαυτῷ σοφὸν εἶναι: καὶ ὃ τούτου πονηρότερον, παιδεύειν ἄλλους πεπιστευμένον τὸν μηδὲ τῆς οἰκείας ἀμαθείας ἐπαισθανόμενον.