CHAPTER XXV

AN ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE BROUGHT FORWARD, TO PROVE THAT THE POWER OF AN ARCHDEACON OR PARISH PRIEST TO RESIGN HIS DUTIES IS NO HINDRANCE TO HIS BEING IN A STATE OF PERFECTION

WE must next point out, that they argue with great inconsistency, who say that archdeacons and parish priests, in spite of their being able to resign their office, are in a state of perfection, equal to that of the episcopate or of the religious life. With regard to this point, it must be remembered, that, whoever leaves a state of perfection for one less perfect, is considered an apostate. Hence St. Paul writes concerning widows, "For when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry; having damnation, because they have made void their first faith" (1 Tim. v. 11). On these words, the Gloss remarks, "Violation of a vow is damnable. Fidelity to a broken vow is, likewise, damnable. And they are in a state of damnation who make void their first promise of continence, and who, like the wife of Lot, look back; for this is apostasy." Hence, if archdeacons or parish priests were in a state of perfection, they would, by renouncing the archidiaconates or parishes, put themselves in a state of damnation by becoming apostates.

             Those who argue against us, maintain, first, that archdeacons and parish priests can embrace the religious life, not because the religious state is more perfect than that in which they have been living, but because it is safer. This, however, is eminently untrue. It is distinctly stated, XIX. quaest. I., that, "such of the clergy as desire to become religious, in order that, thus, they may be able to lead a better life, shall be permitted by their bishops to enter monasteries." Hence, it is clear, that their desire of embracing the religious state, must be on account of its greater perfection, not by reason of the security which it offers. Archdeacons and parish priests may not only resign their archidiaconates or parishes in order to go into monasteries, but they are free to resign them and stay in the world. This is done by those who become prebendaries of a cathedral. Likewise, if they be not in Holy Orders, they are free to marry. We thus have an incontestable proof, that they are not in a state of perfection.

             The second argument brought against us is, that if the inability of a religious man to leave his order be a proof that he is in a state of perfection, a married man must also be in a perfect state, because he may not forsake his wife. The absurdity of this reasoning is made clear by what we have already said. The religious life and the wedded life have this one circumstance in common, that they both entail a perpetual obligation. But while obligations of matrimony are not undertaken with a view to the accomplishment of works of perfection but to render a carnal debt, the ties of the religious life bind men solely to works of perfection, i.e., to poverty, chastity, and obedience. Hence, the religious state is one of perfection.

             The third argument is partly true and partly false. It embodies the proposition, that, as David laid aside his armour for a sling and stones, so, likewise, it is permissible for men to abandon a more perfect state for one more lowly. A religious may, by reason of his weakness, and with a dispensation, quit his order for one less severe. But the Church never allows a religious to leave the religious life for that of a secular priest, be it as archdeacon, or as parish priest. Hence, we see that there is far more difference between the excellence of the religious state and the state of the archidiaconate or of parish priests (if theirs is to be called a state), than there is between the superiority of the more severe religious orders, and that of the less rigorous ones.

             The fourth objection, to wit, that if immutability be essential to the perfection of a state, it cannot be permissible to pass from one state to another, is absolutely frivolous. It is lawful to pass from a lower to a higher state, but not vice versa (Extra de regularibus). For, a more perfect state embraces all that is contained in that which is less perfect; but the less perfect state does not contain what is included in a state of greater perfection. Therefore, a man who has bound himself to that which is less, cannot be blamed for embracing that which is greater.

             The fifth assertion, viz. that a bishop can recall one of his clergy from the religious life to resume the charge of his parish, is untrue, and is contrary to the sacred canons. The following words occur in Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Admonet, "You are strictly to forbid the priests belonging to your see, to enter, to hold, or to leave, without your permission, the churches of your diocese, coming under your jurisdiction. Should any priest dare to come to one of your churches without your license, he will incur canonical penalties." In like manner it is laid down (et de privileg. Cum et plantare) that, "Religious who are in churches which do not absolutely belong to them, must present to the bishops, for ordination, the priests who shall be responsible for the care of such churches. Further, they must render to such priests an account of the temporal concerns of these churches. Nor must they presume, without consulting the bishop, to remove these priests from their charge." These words are only tantamount to saying, that parish priests, who, without consulting their bishop, resign their cures, render themselves liable to canonical penalties. But it is illogical to apply this general rule to a particular case, and to say, that priests cannot leave their parishes to enter religion. For in XIX. quaest. I. cap. Duae, it is expressly stated, that, "even against the desire of their bishop, secular priests may quit their churches and enter monasteries." Hence the words which occur in VII. quaest. I. Episcopus de loco, etc., manifestly apply to the passing of the clergy from one church to another, not from the secular to the religious life.

             The sixth objection does not touch the point in question. It is urged, that religious pass from the religious life to a secular church, to which the cure of souls is attached. This is true. But they do not, in undertaking charge of a church, abandon the religious state. For it is established by XVI. quaest. I. De monachis, that "they, who, having lived a long while in religion, are admitted to Holy Orders, do not, on that account, relinquish their former state." But an archdeacon or parish priest can resign his office, and embrace the religious life; since, he is thereby passing from a less to a more perfect state under the guidance of the Divine Spirit (XIX. quaest. I. Duae).

             The seventh argument is too foolish to need an answer. It is urged, that because a man who was in charity can fall from charity, therefore, it does not follow that he who falls from a state of perfection, was not in a state of perfection. No one falls from charity except by sin; and by sin, likewise, a man falls from a state of perfection. For as men are bound by a common law to the love of charity, they are also bound to a state of perfection by particular vows.

             The eighth proposition, viz., that by ecclesiastical constitution no bishop can become a religious without the permission of the Pope, from the practice of the Church is evidently untrue. The obstacle is, rather, on account of the perpetual obligation whereby bishops bind themselves to the care of their flocks. Hence St. Paul says (1 Cor. ix. 16), "A necessity lieth upon me; for woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel." He adds the cause of this necessity, when he says, "For whereas I was free unto all, I made myself the servant of all." Hence this prohibition is not laid down in the decretals as a statute, but as a fact, approved by reason.

             The ninth objection is worthless. It is certain, as a general rule, that no one who has not received Holy Orders according to the ecclesiastical statute, is eligible to a bishopric, an archidiaconate, or to the care of a parish. But the Pope has, in this matter, power of granting dispensation, a power which at times he exercises. In such a case those in charge of an archidiaconate or parish, or even of an episcopal see, can resign their office, and marry. By so doing they are not breaking any contract. A religious, however, who marries, breaks his vow, or contract, of celibacy.