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Augustine of Hippo, On the Morals of the Manichæans
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On the Morals of the Manichæans.
On the Morals of the Manichæans.
Chapter 1.—The Supreme Good is that Which is Possessed of Supreme Existence.
Chapter 4.—The Difference Between What is Good in Itself and What is Good by Participation.
Chapter 5.—If Evil is Defined to Be Corruption, This Completely Refutes the Manichæan Heresy.
Chapter 6.—What Corruption Affects and What It is.
Chapter 8.—Evil is Not a Substance, But a Disagreement Hostile to Substance.
Chapter 9.—The Manichæan Fictions About Things Good and Evil are Not Consistent with Themselves.
Chapter 10.—Three Moral Symbols Devised by the Manichæans for No Good.
Chapter 12.—Manichæan Subterfuge.
Chapter 14.—Three Good Reasons for Abstaining from Certain Kinds of Food.
Chapter 15.—Why the Manichæans Prohibit the Use of Flesh.
Chapter 16.—Disclosure of the Monstrous Tenets of the Manichæans.
Chapter 17.—Description of the Symbol of the Hands Among the Manichæans.
Chapter 18.—Of the Symbol of the Breast, and of the Shameful Mysteries of the Manichæans.
Chapter 3.—If Evil is Defined as that Which is Hurtful, This Implies Another Refutation of the Manichæans.
5. Let us then inquire more carefully, and, if possible, more plainly. I ask you again, What is evil? If you say it is that which is hurtful, here, too, you will not answer amiss. But consider, I pray you; be on your guard, I beg of you; be so good as to lay aside party spirit, and make the inquiry for the sake of finding the truth, not of getting the better of it. Whatever is hurtful takes away some good from that to which it is hurtful; for without the loss of good there can be no hurt. What, I appeal to you, can be plainer than this? what more intelligible? What else is required for complete demonstration to one of average understanding, if he is not perverse? But, if this is granted, the consequence seems plain. In that race which you take for the chief evil, nothing can be liable to be hurt, since there is no good in it. But if, as you assert, there are two natures,—the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness; since you make the kingdom of light to be God, attributing to it an uncompounded nature,3 [It is probable that Mani thought of the Kingdom of Light pantheistically, and that the principles personified in his mythological system were the result of efforts on his part to connect the infinite with the finite.—A.H.N.] so that it has no part inferior to another, you must grant, however decidedly in opposition to yourselves, you must grant, nevertheless, that this nature, which you not only do not deny to be the chief good, but spend all your strength in trying to show that it is so, is immutable, incorruptible, impenetrable, inviolable, for otherwise it would not be the chief good; for the chief good is that than which there is nothing better, and for such a nature to be hurt is impossible. Again, if, as has been shown, to hurt is to deprive of good, there can be no hurt to the kingdom of darkness, for there is no good in it. And as the kingdom of light cannot be hurt, as it is inviolable, what can the evil you speak of be hurtful to?