On the Morals of the Manichæans.

 St. AUGUSTIN:

 On the Morals of the Manichæans.

 Chapter 1.—The Supreme Good is that Which is Possessed of Supreme Existence.

 Chapter 2.—What Evil is. That Evil is that Which is Against Nature. In Allowing This, the Manichæans Refute Themselves.

 Chapter 3.—If Evil is Defined as that Which is Hurtful, This Implies Another Refutation of the Manichæans.

 Chapter 4.—The Difference Between What is Good in Itself and What is Good by Participation.

 Chapter 5.—If Evil is Defined to Be Corruption, This Completely Refutes the Manichæan Heresy.

 Chapter 6.—What Corruption Affects and What It is.

 Chapter 7.—The Goodness of God Prevents Corruption from Bringing Anything to Non-Existence. The Difference Between Creating and Forming.

 Chapter 8.—Evil is Not a Substance, But a Disagreement Hostile to Substance.

 Chapter 9.—The Manichæan Fictions About Things Good and Evil are Not Consistent with Themselves.

 Chapter 10.—Three Moral Symbols Devised by the Manichæans for No Good.

 Chapter 11.—The Value of the Symbol of the Mouth Among the Manichæans, Who are Found Guilty of Blaspheming God.

 Chapter 12.—Manichæan Subterfuge.

 Chapter 13.—Actions to Be Judged of from Their Motive, Not from Externals. Manichæan Abstinence to Be Tried by This Principle.

 Chapter 14.—Three Good Reasons for Abstaining from Certain Kinds of Food.

 Chapter 15.—Why the Manichæans Prohibit the Use of Flesh.

 Chapter 16.—Disclosure of the Monstrous Tenets of the Manichæans.

 Chapter 17.—Description of the Symbol of the Hands Among the Manichæans.

 Chapter 18.—Of the Symbol of the Breast, and of the Shameful Mysteries of the Manichæans.

 Chapter 19.—Crimes of the Manichæans.

 Chapter 20.—Disgraceful Conduct Discovered at Rome.

Chapter 4.—The Difference Between What is Good in Itself and What is Good by Participation.

6. Now, compare with this perplexity, from which you cannot escape, the consistency of the statements in the teaching of the Catholic Church, according to which there is one good which is good supremely and in itself, and not by the participation of any good, but by its own nature and essence; and another good which is good by participation, and by having something bestowed. Thus it has its being as good from the supreme good, which, however, is still self-contained, and loses nothing. This second kind of good is called a creature, which is liable to hurt through falling away. But of this falling away God is not the author, for He is author of existence and of being. Here we see the proper use of the word evil; for it is correctly applied not to essence, but to negation or loss. We see, too, what nature it is which is liable to hurt. This nature is not the chief evil, for when it is hurt it loses good; nor is it the chief good, for its falling away from good is because it is good not intrinsically, but by possessing the good. And a thing cannot be good by nature when it is spoken of as being made, which shows that the goodness was bestowed. Thus, on the one hand, God is the good, and all things which He has made are good, though not so good as He who made them. For what madman would venture to require that the works should equal the workman, the creatures the Creator? What more do you want? Could you wish for anything plainer than this?