Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the…

 St. AUGUSTIN:

 Concerning the Nature of Good,

 Chapter 1.—God the Highest and Unchangeable Good, from Whom are All Other Good Things, Spiritual and Corporeal.

 Chapter 2.—How This May Suffice for Correcting the Manichæans.

 Chapter 3.—Measure, Form, and Order, Generic Goods in Things Made by God.

 Chapter 4.—Evil is Corruption of Measure, Form, or Order.

 Chapter 5.—The Corrupted Nature of a More Excellent Order Sometimes Better Than an Inferior Nature Even Uncorrupted.

 Chapter 6.—Nature Which Cannot Be Corrupted is the Highest Good That Which Can, is Some Good.

 Chapter 7.—The Corruption of Rational Spirits is on the One Hand Voluntary, on the Other Penal.

 Chapter 8.—From the Corruption and Destruction of Inferior Things is the Beauty of the Universe.

 Chapter 9.—Punishment is Constituted for the Sinning Nature that It May Be Rightly Ordered.

 Chapter 10.—Natures Corruptible, Because Made of Nothing.

 Chapter 11.—God Cannot Suffer Harm, Nor Can Any Other Nature Except by His Permission.

 Chapter 12.—All Good Things are from God Alone.

 Chapter 13.—Individual Good Things, Whether Small or Great, are from God.

 Chapter 14.—Small Good Things in Comparison with Greater are Called by Contrary Names.

 Chapter 15.—In the Body of the Ape the Good of Beauty is Present, Though in a Less Degree.

 Chapter 16.—Privations in Things are Fittingly Ordered by God.

 Chapter 17.—Nature, in as Far as It is Nature, No Evil.

 Chapter 18.—Hyle, Which Was Called by the Ancients the Formless Material of Things, is Not an Evil.

 Chapter 19.—To Have True Existence is an Exclusive Prerogative of God.

 Chapter 20.—Pain Only in Good Natures.

 Therefore now by common usage things small and mean are said to have measure, because some measure remains in them, without which they would no longer

 Chapter 22.—Measure in Some Sense is Suitable to God Himself.

 Chapter 23.—Whence a Bad Measure, a Bad Form, a Bad Order May Sometimes Be Spoken of.

 Chapter 24.—It is Proved by the Testimonies of Scripture that God is Unchangeable. The Son of God Begotten, Not Made.

 Chapter 25.—This Last Expression Misunderstood by Some.

 Chapter 26.—That Creatures are Made of Nothing.

 Chapter 27.—From Him And Of Him Do Not Mean The Same Thing.

 Chapter 28.—Sin Not From God, But From The Will of Those Sinning.

 Chapter 29.—That God is Not Defiled by Our Sins.

 Chapter 30.—That Good Things, Even the Least, and Those that are Earthly, are by God.

 Chapter 31.—To Punish and to Forgive Sins Belong Equally to God.

 Chapter 32.—From God Also is the Very Power to Be Hurtful.

 Chapter 33.—That Evil Angels Have Been Made Evil, Not by God, But by Sinning.

 Chapter 34.—That Sin is Not the Striving for an Evil Nature, But the Desertion of a Better.

 Chapter 35.—The Tree Was Forbidden to Adam Not Because It Was Evil, But Because It Was Good for Man to Be Subject to God.

 Chapter 36.—No Creature of God is Evil, But to Abuse a Creature of God is Evil.

 Chapter 37.—God Makes Good Use of the Evil Deeds of Sinners.

 Chapter 38.—Eternal Fire Torturing the Wicked, Not Evil.

 Chapter 39.—Fire is Called Eternal, Not as God Is, But Because Without End.

 Chapter 40.—Neither Can God Suffer Hurt, Nor Any Other, Save by the Just Ordination of God.

 Chapter 41.—How Great Good Things the Manichæans Put in the Nature of Evil, and How Great Evil Things in the Nature of Good.

 Chapter 42.—Manichæan Blasphemies Concerning the Nature of God.

 Chapter 43.—Many Evils Before His Commingling with Evil are Attributed to the Nature of God by the Manichæans.

 Chapter 44.—Incredible Turpitudes in God Imagined by Manichæus.

 Chapter 45.—Certain Unspeakable Turpitudes Believed, Not Without Reason, Concerning the Manichæans Themselves.

 Chapter 46.—The Unspeakable Doctrine of the Fundamental Epistle.

 Chapter 47.—He Compels to the Perpetration of Horrible Turpitudes.

 Chapter 48.—Augustin Prays that the Manichæans May Be Restored to Their Senses.

Chapter 25.—This Last Expression Misunderstood by Some.

For no attention should be paid to the ravings of men who think that nothing should be understood to mean something, and moreover think to compel any one to vanity of this kind on the ground that nothing is placed at the end of the sentence. Therefore, they say, it was made, and because it was made, nothing is itself something. They have lost their senses by zeal in contradicting, and do not understand that it makes no difference whether it be said: "Without Him was made nothing," or "without Him nothing was made." For even if the order were the last mentioned, they could nevertheless say, that nothing is itself something because it was made. For in the case of what is in truth something, what difference does it make if it be said "Without him a house was made," so long as it is understood that something was made without him, which something is a house? So also because it is said: "Without Him was made nothing," since nothing is assuredly not anything, when it is truly and properly spoken, it makes no difference whether it be said: "Without Him was made nothing or Without Him nothing was made," or "nothing was made." But who cares to speak with men who can say of this very expression of mine "It makes no difference," "Therefore it makes some difference, for nothing itself is something?" But those whose brains are not addled, see it as a thing most manifest that this something is to be understood when it says "It makes no difference," as when I say "It matters in no respect." But these, if they should say to any one, "What hast thou done?" and he should reply that he has done nothing, would, according to this mode of disputation, falsely accuse him saying, "Thou hast done something, therefore, because thou hast done nothing; for nothing is itself something." But they have also the Lord Himself placing this word at the end of a sentence, when He says: "And in secret have I spoken nothing." 17 John xviii. 20. Let them read, therefore, and be silent.18 It is difficult for us to understand why Augustin should have thought it worth while to refute so elaborately an argument so puerile. But it is his way to be prolix in such matters.—A.H.N.