Article 2: Whether there is only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ or two? It seems that there is not only one:
1. For, Augustine says in the book "Against Felicianus" (c.xi) "In the mediator of God and of man, the Son of God was one thing and the son of man another". But, nothing that is one in suppositum or according to hypostasis differs from one another. Therefore, in Christ there is not only one suppositum or hypostasis.
2. Further, Augustine says in the book On the Trinity that each [of the natures] in Christ is God on account of God who receives, and each is man on account of the man received. But nothing that is one in suppositum or according to the hypostasis is two, in such a way that it may be called both. Therefore, there is not only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ.
3. Further, the human nature in Christ is a certain substance. But, it was not a universal substance, because a universal substance does not exist beyond the mind. Therefore, it was a particular substance. But, a particular substance is a hypostasis. Therefore, the human nature in Christ was a hypostasis. But the human nature in Christ is something beyond the hypostasis of the Word of God; and thus there are many hypostases in Christ.
4. Further, this name "man" is said univocally of Christ and of Peter. But when it is said of Peter it entails nothing other than something composed of a rational soul and a body. Therefore, it also [entails this] when it is said of Christ. But, beyond the soul and the body, in Christ there is the hypostasis or the suppositum of the Word of God. Therefore, in Christ the hypostasis or suppositum of the human nature is one thing and that of the divine nature is another. And, thus, there is not only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ.
5. Further, nothing infinite can be contained under a finite nature. But, the suppositum or hypostasis of the Word of God possesses infinity. Therefore, it cannot be contained under a human nature which is finite. But, every suppositum is contained under that nature whose suppositum it is. Therefore, the suppositum which is the Word of God cannot be the suppositum of a human nature, but there must be some other suppositum. Therefore, there is some other suppositum in Christ beyond the suppositum which is the Word of God. Therefore, there are two supposita or hypostases in Christ.
6. Further, just as a genus is related to the species, so the species is related to an individual. But, the same species cannot be in different genera. Therefore, one individual cannot be in diverse species. But, the hypostasis is an individual substance, as is the suppositum. Therefore, there cannot be one hypostasis or suppositum of the human and divine natures, as these do not [belong to] one species.
7. Further, just as there is one nature in three persons in the Trinity, so there are two natures in one person in Christ. But, the three persons are one on account of a unity of nature, according to John 10:30: "I and the Father are one". Therefore, Christ is two on account of the duality of natures. But, nothing which is one in [its] suppositum or according to [its] hypostasis, can be called two. Therefore, Christ is not one in [his] suppositum or according to [his] hypostasis.
8. Further, Christ has something in common with the Father insofar as he is the Son of God, and insofar as he is the son of man, he has nothing in common with the Father. Therefore, in Christ the Son of God is one thing and the son of man is another, so he is not one in suppositum or according to the hypostasis.
9. Further, what is incommunicable of itself [i.e. by virtue of its nature] does not seem to be able to become communicable by itself. Just as, what is impossible of itself cannot become possible, as the Averroes says in X Metaph. But, insofar as the human nature is in Christ it is incommunicable of itself, since it is something particular. Therefore, it cannot be communicated to the suppositum of the divine nature; so the suppositum of the human and of the divine nature cannot be the same.
10. Each thing is resolved into those things out of which it consists. Therefore, if it were granted, through some impossibility, that the Word of God set aside the human nature, then the human nature would have its own hypostasis and suppositum. Therefore, in the united state [i.e. in the hypostatic union] it has its own hypostasis or suppositum united. Therefore, there is not only one hypostasis or one suppositum here. (Translator's note: The argument of the objection is that if there would be two supposita when the natures are seperated, then there are two when they are united. This is relevant to the medieval debate about the ontological status Christ's human nature would have if God disolved the hypostatic union at some time after uniting the human nature to the Divine nature).
11. Further, nature is not more dependent upon the suppositum than the suppositum is upon the nature. But the suppositum of the human nature could not be assumed by the Word of God, without the human nature itself being assumed. Therefore, neither could [the Word of God] assume human nature without also assuming the suppositum of the human nature. But, the thing assuming is not the assumed (Cf. Leonine text of Quodlibet IX,1 for references on this statement). Therefore, the suppositum of the human nature is not the suppositum of the Word of God, and therefore there are two supposita in Christ.
12. The soul and the body were not less powerful or dignified in Christ than in us. But, in us a hypostasis or suppositum is constituted from the composition of the soul and the body. Therefore, this also happens in Christ. But, the suppositum or hypostasis of the Word of God, which is eternal, [cannot be so constituted] since the aforesaid union is temporal. Therefore, there are two supposita or hypostases in Christ.
13. Further, there are three substances in Christ: body, soul and God. But the soul is not the suppositum of the body. Therefore, God is not the suppositum of the human nature.
14. Further, according to Porphyry, an aggregation of properties which cannot be found in another thing produces individuation. But, in Christ there was an aggregation of properties pertaining to the human nature, which cannot be found in another. Therefore, they would have produced the individuation of the Word of God which does not receive accidents. Therefore, there is another individual or suppositum in Christ than the Word of God. Therefore, there are two supposita in Christ.
15. Further, those things without some proportional relationship are not able to be one. But, there is no proportion [between] the divine nature, which is infinite, and the human, which is finite. Therefore, one hypostasis or one suppositum cannot be brought about from two natures.
16. Further, generation is terminated in the suppositum; for a particular is what is generated. But, there is a two-fold nativity in Christ. Namely, a temporal and an eternal one. Therefore there is a two-fold suppositum in Christ, and not merely one.
17. Further, the Word of God assumed a body and a soul not, indeed, as separated, but as united. But the suppositum of the human nature is nothing other than the soul and the body as united. Therefore, in Christ there is another suppositum beyond the suppositum of the Word of God.
18. The same thing cannot be both simple and composite. But, the suppositum of the human nature is composite, since the human nature is composed. For the suppositum cannot be more simple than the nature whose suppositum it is. Therefore, since the suppositum of the Divine nature is simple, there will be a suppositum in Christ besides the suppositum of the divine nature.
To the contrary, 1. is what Damascene says in book III On the Orthodox Faith: "we know that there is one hypostasis in the Lord Jesus Christ."
2. Further, [in] those things which differ in suppositum, one is not predicated of another. Therefore, if the suppositum of man and of God were different in Christ, it could not be said that man is God or that God is man; which is an error. Therefore, the suppositum of man and God do not differ in Christ.
I answer that, certain men wanting to avoid the heresy of Nestorius, i.e. the heresy of positing two persons in Christ, posited one person in Christ, but two hypostases or supposita. They said that this man, pointing to Christ,is a suppositum and a hypostasis of the human nature, but not of the divine nature; because of the fact that he is called "this man", nothing else is entailed than a certain particular substance composed from a soul and flesh. Yet, they say that a human hypostasis or suppositum pertains to the person of the Word, because it was assumed by the Word. And this is the opinion which is posited first in III Sentences, distinction VII. But, in the first place, those who posited this were ignorant of the proper word. For a hypostasis is nothing other than an individual substance, which is also signified by the name "suppositum". Now Boethius says, in the book On the Two Natures that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. So, therefore, it is obvious that it there cannot be a hypostasis of a rational nature, unless it is a person. Now it is clear that the human nature is a rational nature; hence, if there is a proper hypostasis or proper suppositum of the human nature in Christ beyond the hypostasis or suppositum of the Word of God, it follows that there is a proper person of the human nature in Christ beyond the hypostasis of the Word. And, thus, this position would not differ from the position of Nestorius. Second, because if it is granted that the person adds to a hypostasis in a rational nature some property pertaining to dignity, just as all wearing a mask are said to be like one having some dignity, it would follow that the union of the human nature to the Word was not brought about except in something accidental, namely, in some property pertaining to dignity: which is what Nestorius also posited. (St. Thomas' account of person here relies on the traditional etymology of person given by Boethius cit. loc.). Hence, it must be known that this heresy was condemned in the fifth Council carried out at Constantinople where it is read (in the following words): "If anyone tries to introduce two subsistences into the mystery of Christ or to argue that two persons are said to be one person according to dignity and honor and adoration, as Theodorus and Nestorius wrote foolishly; let them be anathema. For the Holy Trinity did not receive a person or subsistence cast away in the one incarnation of the Holy Trinity from the Word of God. Therefore, in order that it may be known what must be conceded and what denied in these matters, it is necessary to consider which of the names pertain to individuation, whether they are names of first imposition, such as 'person' and 'hypostasis', which signify things themselves, or whether they are names of second imposition, such as 'individual', 'suppositum', and others of this kind, which signify the intention of individuality. Some of these pertain only to the genus of substance, such as 'suppositum' and 'hypostasis', which are not said of accidents, and person in a rational nature, and also a thing of nature according to the understanding of St. Hillary. But, others pertain to individuation in every genus, such as 'individual', 'particular' and 'singular', which are also said of accidents. Now, it is proper to a substance that it subsists through itself and in itself (per se et in se); but it is the character of an accident to be in another. And thus, those names which pertain to the individuation of a substance, only have a place in those things which subsist through themselves and in themselves. And for this reason also these names are not said of the parts of substances, since they are not in themselves but in a whole, although they are not in a subject. Yet, the names pertaining to individuation as much in substances as in accidents can fittingly be said of those things. For it cannot be said that this hand is a person, or a hypostasis or a suppositum; although it can be said that it is some particular, singular or individual. For even if a hand pertains to the genus of substance, yet because it is not a completed substance, subsisting in itself, it is not called a hypostasis or a suppositum or a person. Thus, therefore, since the human nature in Christ does not subsist separately through itself but exists in another, i.e. in the hypostasis of the Word, (indeed not as an accident in a subject, nor properly as a part in a whole, but through an ineffable assumption), thus the human nature in Christ can indeed be called some individual or particular or singular, yet it cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, just as it cannot be called a person. Hence, it remains that in Christ there is only one hypostasis or suppositum, namely the Divine Word.
1. Human and divine things are said of Christ; and if it is asked what they are said of, [the answer is] one and the same thing. But, if one considers that according to which they are predicated, [this] is one thing and another, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, cap.vii, since divine things are predicated of Christ according to the divine nature, but human things are predicated of Him according to the human nature. Therefore, when it is said that in Christ the Son of God is one thing and the son of man another, this otherness must not be referred to what both are predicated of, that is one suppositum of each filiation, but to that according to which predication takes place. And, thus, Augustine in the same place adds "I say 'other' [aliud] on account of a distinction of substance," i.e. of nature, "not other [alius] on account of the unity of person."
2. In fact, the divine nature is predicated of Christ, but the human nature cannot be predicated of him, just as it cannot be predicated of Peter, with whom [Christ] is univocally a man (On account of the real distinction between being and essence, it is false to say "Peter is his humanity" or "Peter is human nature"). Hence, it cannot be said that Christ is two or both, although there are two natures. But, a suppositum of a human nature is indeed predicated of Christ; but it does not combine in number with the suppositum of the divine nature, as was shown. Hence it remains that when Christ is called both, it is understood materially, just as when it is said that walls and a roof are a house, because both coincide in one house. Hence, Augustine also says, in the book Against Felicianus that one and the same man is called both body and soul. Or it can be said that what is called "both" must be referred to the number of names signifying the two natures. For the man Christ is called both God and man, just as God the Word is called both God and man. And this is why both are called God, on account of receiving God, since, of course, this name 'God' is predicated both of God and of man; and also both are called man on account of receiving man, because this name 'man' is predicated of both.
3. It does not suffice for the character of a hypostasis or suppositum that something is a particular in the genus of substance; but, further, it is required that it be complete and subsisting in itself as was said.
4. Equivocation and univocality are found inasmuch as the nature (ratio) of the name is the same or different. For the nature of a name what the definition signifies (This refers to Metaphys. 1012a24-25. In other places St. Thomas usually states this as: "ratio quam significat nomen est definitio." Cf. S.T. I, a. 13, 1); and thus equivocation and univocality are found according to the signification, and not according to the supposita. And thus, this name "man" is said univocally of Christ and of Peter, because it signifies one nature in both, namely, human, composed from a body and a soul; but, in Christ it [i.e. the term 'man'] supposits an eternal suppositum in Christ, which it does not supposit in Peter.
5. Being infinite belongs to the suppositum or hypostasis of the Word of God according to the divine nature; but, according to the human nature it belongs to it to be under a human nature. Hence Dionysius says that he was produced within our nature who substantially exceeds every order, according to every nature.
6. The name "species" signifies a nature, just as the name "genus" does; hence, if one species were in different genera, it would follow that one nature was two natures. But "individual" entails something which does not pertain to the nature; and, thus, it is not contrary to the character of an individual, that the same individual is the suppositum of two natures.
7. The divine nature is entirely the same as all three of the persons in reality; and thus the three persons can be called one being (esse). But, the human nature is not entirely the same as its suppositum in reality, and so it is not predicated of it, and so thus Christ cannot be said to be two on account of the two natures. (Cf. ad 2)
8. The Son of God has the divine nature in common with the Father, but not the hypostasis or the person; now the son of man does not have either the hypostasis or the nature in common with God the Father. Hence it does not follow from this that there is a distinction in person between the Son of God and the son of man, but only a distinction of nature.
9. The human nature assumed by the Word, inasmuch as it is individual, has the property that it cannot be in many things. And in this respect it is called incommunicable. But from that fact that it is a nature, it has the property of being in some suppositum.
10. As long as the human nature is united to the Word of God, it does not have its own suppositum or hypostasis beyond the person of the Word, because it does not exist in itself. But if it were separated from the Word, it would have, not only its own hypostasis or suppositum, but also its own person; because it would now exist per se. Just as also a part of a composite body, as long as it is undivided from the whole, is [i.e. exists per se] only potentially, not actually; but this is only brought about by separation.
11. Nature is included in the suppositum, but not conversely. And thus the suppositum could not be assumed without the nature. But, it was able to happen conversely.
12. The union of the soul and the body in Christ is more worthy than in us because it is not terminated in a created suppositum, but in the eternal suppositum of the Word of God.
13. The soul is united to the body as its form for constituting the human nature, but the divinity is not united to the humanity in Christ in this way; because the union was not brought about in the nature as was said above. And, thus, the nature [ratioof the two cases] is not the same.
14. The aggregation of his own accidents sufficiently proves the individuation of the human nature in Christ; but it does not have the character of a suppositum or a hypostasis because it does not exist per se.
15. The union of the human nature to the person or the hypostasis of the Word in Christ is not brought about in this way, that it is made equal to [the person of the Word] as if including it or as though the person of the Word exceeds it according to some fixed proportion, since the person of the Word still exceeds the human nature infinitely. Yet, [this] infinite difference does not exclude the person of God joining the human nature to itself in the unity of the hypostasis in an ineffable way. Nay rather, the infinite power of the one assuming works more effectively towards a greater union.
16. Generation is indeed terminated in the suppositum as to what is generated, but in the nature as to that which is received through generation. Hence, form is called the terminus of generation. And since generations and motions are distinguished according to their terms, hence there are two nativities of Christ according to the two natures, but one nativity according to the unity of the suppositum.
17. The united soul and body constitute a suppositum and a hypostasis, if what is composed from both exists per se; which does not happen in this case.
18. Christ is simple according to the divine nature, but composite according to the human nature, as is evident from Dionysius in chapter one of The Divine Names.
