Article 3: "Whether Christ is one or two in the neuter?" It seems that he is two in the neuter:
Objection 1: For Augustine says in On the Trinity, I, ch. 7: Since the form of God took the form of man, both are God and both are man. But to the extent that he is only one he cannot be called "both". Therefore, Christ is not merely one, but two.
Objection 2: Further, just as there is one nature in the three divine persons, so there are two natures in the one person of Christ. But, the three divine persons are called one because of a unity of nature. Therefore Christ must be called two because of the two natures.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in Against Felicianus I, ch.11: the Son of God is one thing, the son of man another. But, wherever there is one thing and another, there are two things. Therefore, insofar as Christ is the Son of God and the son of man, he is two.
Objection 4: Further, that which is one in the suppositum becomes different from itself successively because of diverse accidents; just as Socrates as an old man is different from himself as a boy. But just as an accidental difference makes something other, so a substantial difference makes another thing. Therefore if the same suppositum can be changed from one substantial difference to another it would be one thing and another thing. Therefore, for the same reason, if the same suppositum has two substantial differences at the same time, it will be one thing and another thing at the same time. But to have two natures is to have two substantial differences; because a nature is the specific difference informing each and everything as Boethius says in Concerning the Two Natures. Therefore, Christ is one thing and another thing at the same time, thus he is two things at once.
Objection 5: Further, each thing is that which is truly predicated of it. But, this term "man" predicates one thing of Christ and this term "God" another thing. For each name predicates what it signifies. For just as this name white signifies nothing other than a quality according to the Philosopher; so this name man signifies nothing other than humanity which is different from divinity, which this name "God" signifies. Therefore, Christ is one thing and another thing, and thus he is two.
Objection 6: But, it was said that this term "man" includes in its own signification the suppositum of humanity, which is not different from the divine suppositum. And thus, Christ, insofar as he is God and man is not one thing and another. But to the contrary, it is not required for the diversity of some things that they be diverse according to everything which is in them; but, it suffices if they are diverse in any way. For a man and an ass indeed agree in being animals, but they differ by the differentia rational and irrational. In order, therefore, that the term "man" should predicate one thing of Christ and the name "God" another thing, it suffices if the nature signified is one thing and another thing, although the suppositum is the same.
Objection 7: Further, Christ, inasmuch as he is God, is one thing by an uncreated unity; but inasmuch as he is man he is another individual thing by a created unity. But created and uncreated unities are two unities. Therefore, Christ is two.
Objection 8: Further, it follows: Christ is only one; therefore he is this thing and not another. From the denial of the consequent: it follows if it cannot be said that Christ is a man and not something else, then what cannot be said is that Christ is only one. But this is false: Christ is only a man. Therefore, Christ is a man and something else; and thus he is two.
Objection 9: Further, this proposition, Christ is God and man, is an ambiguous proposition, since it has a conjoint predicate. But every such proposition predicates many things. Therefore, Christ is not merely one, but many.
Objection 10: Further, according to the Philosopher in 10 Metaphys. 15-6, from many things, one of which is in potency and the other is not, does not come one thing, but many things. Hence when I say " man is a two-footed animal", something one is predicated of man; but not when it is said "Socrates is a white musician". But humanity and divinity are not related as potency and act. Therefore, when it is said Christ is God and man there is not one thing posited, but many things. And thus Christ is not one but two.
Objection 11: A suppositum is called that which is subsisting. But the manner (ratio) of subsisting for the son of man and the Son of God is different. Therefore they are one suppositum and another. And thus Christ is not one but two.
Objection 12: Further, a difference leads to plurality. But there is the greatest difference between man and God. Therefore, Christ is surely two.
Objection 13: Further, nothing one can share in incompatible properties. But incompatible properties belong to Christ; just as to be eternal and to be born in time, to be infinite and to be circumscribed in a place, and other things of this kind. Therefore, Christ is not one, but two.
Objection 14: Further, Christ is a man. But, a man is humanity, because the essence of a thing is identical with the thing whose essence it is, as is said in book VII of the Metaphys. Therefore, Christ is his own humanity. He is also divinity. Therefore, since humanity is not divinity, it follows that Christ is not one, but two.
To the contrary -
1. Christ is not two persons, nor two hypostases, nor two supposita, as is clear from the aforesaid; neither is he two natures, because the human nature is not predicated of Christ. Therefore, Christ is not two.
2. Further, according to Boethius Concerning Unity, each and every thing is because it is one in number. Therefore, if Christ is not one, it follows that he is not a being.
3. Further, those things which are predicated mutually of each other are not pluralized. But, man and God are predicated of one another in Christ. Therefore, Christ is not two insofar as he is God and man.
4. Further, the union of the human and divine natures in Christ is greater than the union of an accident to a subject as is stated above. [a. 1] But, an accident and its subject are one in number, according to the Philosopher [5 Metaphys., com. 7] Therefore, much more is Christ one insofar as he is God and man.
5. Further, Athanasius says of Christ: "Although he is God and man, nevertheless he is not two, but he is one Christ".
6. Further, what is made one, is one; just as what is made white is white. But according to Hugh in the book On the Sacraments [II,1, cc., 4 and 9], the Word of God was made one with man. Therefore, Christ, existing as God and man, is one.
7. Further, unity is that by which each and every thing is called one. But, after the unity of the Trinity the greatest unity is of the Word incarnate. Therefore, he [i.e. Christ] is entirely one.
I answer that, a word formulated in the masculine gender is customarily referred to the person; and thus it is clear that Christ is not two in the masculine, but one; since there are not two persons in Christ, but one. But, certain authors, positing one person in Christ, posited two supposita or hypostases, one of the Son of God and another of the son of man (Cf. S.T. III, q. 2, a. 3). Hence, although they did not say that Christ is two in the masculine because of the unity of person, still they said that he was two in the neuter because of the duality of supposita. But, because this opinion too is contrary to the truth of the faith, as was said above; thus, leaving aside this opinion, we must consider whether, supposing that in Christ there is one hypostasis and one suppositum, Christ ought to be called two in the neuter or one. For a clear understanding of this, we must consider that what has unity is called 'one' denominatively, just as a white thing is what has whiteness, or what is a subject for it. And for the same reason 'many' is said denominatively from a multitude, and two from a duality. But, since one (unum) is convertible with being (ente), so according as it is an accidental and a substantial being (esse), something is called one or many either according to an accidental form or according to a substantial form. Indeed, something which is a subject for diverse accidental forms is called many, either successively or simultaneously, according to the accidental forms. Successively, indeed, as when Socrates sitting is different from Socrates standing; hence, Socrates, insofar as he is first standing and later sitting, is many things successively. Simultaneously, on the other hand, as when Socrates, insofar as he is white and musical, is many. However, a two-footed animal, which is predicated of Socrates, is one and not many, since one of them is compared to the other as potency is to act, as is said in VIII Metaphy. [text. 15-6] (i.e. being two-footed is a way of being an animal, whereas being white is not a way of being musical. Cf.Aquinas, In Metaph. Marietti, 8, lect. 5, 1755 A. Cf. obj. 10.ys). Now white and musical are not related to each other in this way; and thus Socrates insofar as he is white and musical is many, indeed not simply, but in a certain respect (Cf. obj. 10). This is because it is according to accidents that something is said to be in a certain respect, and not simply. But something that is a being is called one or many simply, according to substance. But according to the Philosopher, in V Metaphy., [text. 15] (Reference? Cf. X.L.3., 1979. #903?), substance is said in two ways, namely: the suppositum, which is not predicated of another; and the form, or nature of the species which is predicated of the suppositum. And indeed in mere creatures these are not one and many at the same time. For the essence of different supposita is not one in number, nor again is some one suppositum found in pure creatures having two natural substances. But this singular is in Christ [i.e. one suppositum and two natures]; but first [type of] singular is in the three divine persons [i.e. one essence, dietas, and three supposita]. Therefore, it is clear that Christ can in some measure be called one, since he is one suppositum; and in some way many, or two, because he has two natures - much more so than Socrates, of whom one is predicated insofar as he is one in subject; many, inasmuch as he is white and musical. But, we should consider which of these is said simply and which in a qualified way. Therefore, it must be known that something is said to be such a thing simply and properly which is such according to itself. But, something is said to be such according to itself is according to a whole, more than according to a part; because a part is not the same as a whole simply. Now the term "ipsum", since it is reciprocal, is a relative term of identity. And thus what belongs to something according to the whole, belongs to it more simply than what belongs to it only according to a part. Hence, if it is appropriate for something to belong to another according to both whole and part, then if it belongs to it only according to the part, it is said to belong to it in a certain respect, and not simply. Just as if an Ethiopian who has white teeth is called white. It is quite otherwise for something which can be attributed only according to a part; as when someone is called curly simply if he has curly hair. But it is clear that the suppositum is signified through the manner of a whole, but the nature through the manner of a formal part, as is obvious from the aforesaid. Thus, although one and many can be referred both to the suppositum and the nature, it is clear that if some one suppositum has many substantial natures, it will be one simply and many in a certain respect. A sign of this is that those things which differ in suppositum and are one in that which pertains to the nature per se, are indeed many simply, but one in genus or species. And thus, from the contrary, if one suppositum has many natures it will be one simply and many in a certain respect. Since, therefore, Christ is one suppositum having two natures, he will be one simply and two in a certain respect.
1. What Augustine says, "both are God and both are man", must not be referred to a duality of supposita in the sense that Christ would be called two simply; but to a duality of natures through the two names of the things signified: which are "God" and "man", since, of course, human and divine things are predicated of both God and man.
2. Each of the divine persons is entirely identical with the divine essence in reality, nor is anything added to the divine person over and above the divine nature which could produce any substantial diversity. And thus since the three persons agree in the divine nature, they are one simply. But the human nature is not related to the divine person in a similar way; hence the reasoning is not the same.
3. In Christ, the son of man is said to be one thing and the son of God another, because each name predicates a different nature; not because there is a different suppositum [for each nature], from which it would follow that Christ is two simply. For since the human and the divine suppositum would be different, it would be necessary that they differ substantially.
4. Diverse forms inhering, whether in the same or diverse times, do not make another thing simply, if the same suppositum remains [they only produce many things simply] on account of the suppositum; when the suppositum is diverse.
5. In this name "white" [album] [both] whiteness is understood and the subject of whiteness (Reading "nomine" for Marietti's "homine"). But, whiteness is understood determinately, the subject of whiteness is understood indeterminately. For when we say "white", we understand something informed by whiteness; but, that does not determine what it is [quid sit], in the way that the form is determined. So also, when I say man, or something else said substantially, "having humanity" is understood. But, since something is determined to a species by its essence or nature, but not through its accidents, by the name "man" is determinately understood that which has humanity, more than having whiteness is understood in the name "white". And since that which is understood determinately through a name is the thing properly signified by the name, the name "man" signifies the suppositum of humanity more than the name "white" signifies the subject of whiteness. Although the name "man" does not signify humanity's suppositum insofar as it is determined in its own singularity; but [it does so] only insofar as it is determined to the nature of a species. Therefore, since the suppositum of the human and divine nature in Christ according as it is taken in its discrete singularity separately, is one and the same thing in two determined natures, He is indeed one thing simply according to himself, but he is two in a certain respect, namely, insofar as he has two natures.
6. For something to be other, it is not necessary that it be distinguished according as it is a whole, but for it to be other simply, it is necessary that it be distinguished according to itself.
7. From the fact that a created unity is not an uncreated unity, it cannot be concluded that Christ is two; but that he subsists in a two-fold unity, just as he subsists in a two-fold nature.
8. If Christ were one thing, that is a man, and not other than man; it would follow that he would be completely one, that is both according to nature and according to the suppositum. But, by the fact that Christ is one thing, that is a man, and another thing, that is God, it follows that he is two according to nature, but he is not two entirely and simply, on account of the unity of the suppositum.
9. It is not necessary for that of which many things are predicated in a proposition with conjoint predicate to be many simply. Otherwise Socrates would be many things simply, if he were white and musical. And thus it is not necessary if Christ is God and man that he is two simply.
10. One thing according to nature is not made out of the human and divine natures. Yet, they come together in one suppositum because Christ is one.
11. Just as it is not necessary that Christ is two sons, on account of the fact that in one way he was born from the Father and in another way from [his] mother; so also, it is not necessary that he be two according to the suppositum, on account of a different manner of subsisting by which he subsists insofar as he is God and insofar as he is man.
12. The greatest difference is that between the human nature and the divine nature, this shows that there cannot be one nature of God and man; but it does not follow from this that there cannot be one suppositum of both natures.
13. Nothing prevents contraries and incompatible differences being present in the same thing in different ways: just as a man is incorruptible with respect to the soul and corruptible with respect to the body. And so too certain incompatible things belong to Christ according to the human and divine nature.
14. This is false: a man is humanity; for what is signified through both is not entirely the same. Since as the Philosopher says, in book VII of the Metaphys. that which is, i.e. the essence of anything, is identical with the thing with regard to those things which are per se, but not with regard to those things which are accidentally. And thus, whatever is a thing to which something can pertain besides the nature of its own species, is not entirely identical with its essence. Now many things happen to a man beyond the essence of the species. Hence it is obvious that a man and humanity are not entirely the same. For "humanity" means that by which anything is a man and so it includes only those things which pertain to the essence of the species in its signification. But, "man" means the one who has humanity, in whom, indeed, there are many other things beyond the essence of the species (Cf. The account of suppositum in terms of what is beyond the essence in III, q. 2, a. 2).
