In III Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 3

Utrum unio sit facta in persona, et si Christus est una persona. Ad tertium sic proceditur. "Whether the union was brought about in the person, and if Christ is one person?" Videtur quod in Christo non sit una tantum persona, et sic non sit unio facta in persona. Nulla enim natura invenitur sine illis quae per se consequuntur ad naturam illam. Sed personalitas per se consequitur naturam humanam, et similiter divinam. Ergo utraque natura tenet suam personalitatem. 1. It would seem that there is not only one person in Christ and, thus, the union was not brought about in the person. For no nature is found without those things which result from that nature per se. But, personality results from the human nature per se, and likewise as regards the divine nature. Therefore, each nature has its own personality. Praeterea, natura humana est dignior in Christo quam in Petro. Sed personalitas ad dignitatem pertinet: unde in substantiis ignobilibus non invenitur persona. Ergo sicut humanitas Petri habet suam personalitatem, ita et humanitas Christi. 2. Further, the human nature is of a greater dignity in Christ than in Peter. But, personality pertains to dignity. Hence, a person is not found in inferior substances. Therefore, just as the humanity of Peter has its own personality, so too does the humanity of Christ. Praeterea, in persona non videtur aliquid esse nisi natura, et distinguentia suppositum naturae ab aliis suppositis. Sed naturae in Christo sunt diversae, et distinctiva diversa, quia per relationes aeternas distinguitur a Patre et Spiritu Sancto; per divisionem autem materiae et accidentium distinguitur ab aliis hominibus. Ergo est ibi duplex personalitas. 3. Further, nothing seems to be in a person except a nature and the things distinguishing the suppositum of the nature from other supposita. But, the natures in Christ are different, and [each nature] is distinctively diverse, because he is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit through eternal relations. Now, he is distinguished from other men by the division of matter and of accidents. Therefore, there is a two-fold personality there. Praeterea, maior est convenientia in persona quam in genere vel specie: quia illa est in aliquo quod secundum rem unum est, hoc autem est secundum rationem unum. Sed propter maximam distantiam naturae divinae et humanae non potest esse earum convenientia in genere vel in specie. Ergo multo minus possunt convenire in una persona. 4. Further, there is a greater agreement in a person than in a genus or species, because agreement in a person is in something which is one thing in reality, but agreement in a genus or species is one thing according to reason. But, on account of the great distance [between] the human and divine natures there cannot be an agreement of them in a genus or species. Much less, then, can they agree in one person. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in 5 metaph., quod ad diversitatem in genere sequitur diversitas in specie, et ad hanc diversitas secundum numerum. Sed in Christo invenitur diversitas secundum speciem: quia sunt diversae naturae secundum illam acceptionem qua natura dicitur unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Ergo etiam secundum numerum differentia invenitur. Sed ubi est eadem persona, est idem secundum numerum. Ergo in Christo non est una persona. 5. Further, the Philosopher says in 5 Metaphys. (l. 16), that diversity in a species follows on diversity in the genus and on this follows diversity according to number. But diversity according to species is found in Christ: because there are different natures [in him], according to that sense by which a nature is called the specific difference informing each and every thing. Therefore, a difference is also found according to number. But, where the person is the same, the thing is the same according to number. Therefore, there is not only one person in Christ. Praeterea, non est minor affinitas naturae ad personam quam formae ad materiam. Sed secundum diversitatem formarum est diversitas materiae: quia proprius actus fit in propria materia. Ergo secundum diversitatem naturarum est etiam diversitas in persona; et sic idem quod prius. 6. Further, there is no less an affinity between nature and person than between form and matter. But there is a difference of matter according to the difference of forms, because one's own act happens in one's own matter. Therefore, according to the diversity of natures there is also a diversity of persons; and thus the same conclusion as in the first objection follows. Sed contra, ea quae secundum personam differunt et naturam, quod dicitur de uno, non dicitur de altero. Sed ea quae sunt Dei, in Scripturis attribuuntur homini: Psalmus 86, 5: homo natus est in ea, et ipse fundavit eam Altissimus; et quae sunt hominis, attribuuntur Deo; 1 Corinth., 2, 8: nunquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Ergo Deus et homo conveniunt in persona. To the contrary, in those things which differ according to person and nature, what is said of one, is not said of the other. But things which are God's are attributed to man in the Scriptures: Ps. 86:5, Man was born in her, and the Most High established her; and those things which are man's are attributed to God; 1 Cor., 2:8: "They never would have crucified the Lord of glory". Therefore, God and man belong to [the same] person. Praeterea, quod attribuitur Filio et non Patri, convenit ei secundum id in quo a Patre distinguitur. Sed unio passive accepta convenit Filio, et non Patri. Ergo convenit ei secundum id in quo a Patre distinguitur. Sed hoc est in persona. Ergo unio facta est in persona. Further, what is attributed to the Son and not to the Father belongs to him according to that in which he is distinguished from the Father. But passively receiving the union belongs to the Son and not to the Father. Therefore, it belongs to him according to the thing which distinguishes him from the Father. But, this [distinguishing feature] is in the person, therefore, the union was brought about in the person. Praeterea, ad hoc quod fiat redemptio humani generis, oportet quod sit agens satisfactionem unus Deus qui potest, et homo qui debet, ut patet ex dictis in 1 dist., quaest. 1, art. 2. Sed nullo modo duae personae possunt esse unum agens. Ergo si sunt duae personae, nondum facta est satisfactio; et ita adhuc sumus in servitute peccati, quod est contra sacram Scripturam Novi Testamenti. Further, for the redemption of mankind, it is necessary that there be one agent who is God, capable [of making] satisfaction, and who is a man, owing satisfaction, as is obvious from the things said in 1 d., q. 1, a. 2. But two persons cannot be one agent in any way. Therefore, if there are two persons, satisfaction would not yet be accomplished; and thus we are still in slavery to sin, which is contrary to the sacred Scripture of the New Testament. Respondeo dicendum, quod Nestorius, qui ponit duas in Christo personas, ex hoc deceptus fuit, ut dicit Boetius, quia credidit idem esse personam et naturam; unde credidit, cum sint duae naturae in Christo, quod sint duae personae: et ex eodem fonte processit error Eutychetis, qui cum audivit unam personam in Christo, aestimavit unam naturam: et ex eodem fonte contra trinitatem processit error Arii et Sabellii. Sciendum est ergo, quod in quibusdam differunt natura et persona secundum rem, in quibusdam vero secundum rationem tantum. I answer that, Nestorius, who posited two persons in Christ, was deceived from this, as Boethius says, because he believed that person and nature are the same thing; hence, he believed that since there are two natures in Christ, there are two persons. And the error of Eutyches, who, since he heard that there was one person in Christ, judged that there was one nature, proceeded from the same source. And the error of Arius and Sabellius, against the Trinity, also proceeded from the same source. Therefore, it is necessary to know how person and nature differ in reality, and in which ways they differ only according to our idea (ratio) of them. Natura enim, secundum quod hic loquimur, est quidditas rei quam signat sua definitio; persona autem est hoc aliquid quod subsistit in natura illa. In simplicibus autem quae carent materia, ut dicit Avicenna, ipsum simplex est sua quidditas; quidditas vero compositi non est ipsum compositum: humanitas enim non est homo. Cuius ratio est, quia in significatione humanitatis, sive quidditatis, sive naturae, continentur tantum essentialia principia hominis, secundum quod homo est; non autem ea quae pertinent ad determinationem materiae, per quam natura individuatur, quae tantum continentur in significatione Socratis, quia per ea Socrates est hic, et divisus ab aliis: et ideo, quia humanitas non includit in sua significatione totum quod est in re subsistente in natura, cum sit quasi pars, non praedicatur: et quia non subsistit nisi quod est compositum, et pars habetur a suo toto, ideo anima non subsistit, sed Socrates, et ipse est habens humanitatem. For nature, as we speak here, is the quiddity of a thing which its definition signifies; but, a person is that something which subsists in that nature. Now in simple things, which lack matter, as Avicenna says, the simple thing is its own quiddity. But the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite: for humanity is not a man. The reason for this is that only the essential principles of a man, according to which he is a man, are contained in the signification of humanity, whether of the quiddity, or of the nature, but not those things which pertain to the determination of matter, through which a nature is individuated, [for] these are only contained in the signification of Socrates because through them Socrates is a "this", and is distinguished from other things. And thus, because humanity does not include in its own signification the whole that is in a thing subsisting in a nature, for it is as it were a part, [hence,] it is not predicated, and since nothing subsists unless it is a composite, and a part belongs to its whole, so, the soul does not subsist, but Socrates subsists, and he has humanity [i.e. he is the whole to which the parts belong]. Homo autem significat utrumque, et essentialia, et individuantia, sed diversimode: quia significat essentialia determinate, individuantia vero indeterminate haec vel illa: et ideo homo, cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate, et dicitur habens humanitatem; sed quia esse indistinctum est incompletum, quasi ens in potentia, ideo homo non subsistit, sed hic homo, cui convenit ratio personae. Est ergo ratio personae quod sit subsistens distinctum et omnia comprehendens quae in re sunt; natura autem essentialia tantum comprehendit. In simplicibus autem non differt re natura et persona: quia natura non recipitur in aliqua materia per quam individuetur, sed est per se subsistens: tamen inquantum considerantur essentialia rei, sic dicimus ibi naturam; inquantum autem invenitur ibi aliquid subsistens, sic dicimus ibi personam. Patet igitur quod ex quo de ratione personae est quod comprehendit omnia quae in re sunt, si aliquid est extra illud quod comprehendit persona, hoc non est unitum rei, nisi forte secundum similitudinem in genere vel in specie vel accidente: et ideo, ut Boetius dicit, si non est una persona in Christo, nulla unio facta est divinitatis et humanitatis, nisi secundum similitudinem gratiae; quod etiam Nestorius posuit: et hoc non est novum, nec Christo proprium; neque per eum redemptio fieri potuisset, nec ipse esset verus Deus, sed per participationem, sicut alii sancti. Unde simpliciter est concedendum, in Christo esse unam personam. Now, "man" signifies both the individual and the essential principles, but in diverse ways, because it signifies the essential principles determinately, but the individual ones indeterminately [as] these or those [i.e. the principles]. And thus, man, since it is a whole, can be predicated of Socrates, and he is said to have humanity; but, because an undetermined being is incomplete, as if [it were] a being in potency, thus man does not subsist, but this man, to whom the character of a person belongs. Therefore, it is the character of a person to be a distinct subsisting thing, embracing all things which are in reality. But, nature only includes the essential principles. But in simple things nature and person do not differ in reality; because nature [in these things] is not received in some matter which individuates it, but it [i.e. the nature] is subsisting through itself. Yet, insofar as the essential principles of a thing are considered, we use the term nature there; but, insofar as something subsisting is found there, we use the term person. Therefore, it is evident from the fact that the character of a person includes all things that exist in reality, if something is outside of that which person includes, this is not a united thing, unless perhaps according to a similarity in the genus or in species or in an accident. And thus, Boethius says, if there is not one person in Christ no union of the divinity and the humanity took place, except according to some similitude of grace; which even Nestorius posited. And this is not new nor unique to Christ; neither could the redemption take place this way, nor would he be true God, but only through participation, just as the other saints. Hence it must be conceded simply that there is one person in Christ. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod humana natura in Christo non est sine personalitate, sed est in persona una Verbi cum natura divina. Resp. 1: The human nature in Christ is not without personality, but it is in the one person of the Word with the divine nature. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc natura Christi maxime nobilis est quod est in persona divina. Resp. 2: Christ's human nature is most noble from the fact that it is in the divine person. Ad tertium dicendum, quod de ratione personae est quod comprehendat omnia essentialia, et proprietates individuantes simul coniunctorum; unde non sequitur quod si sint duae naturae et diversae proprietates, sint diversae personae. Si enim essent naturae cum suis proprietatibus seorsum positae, utrinque esset totalitas, quam requirit ratio personae, non est autem nisi una totalitas, quando coniunguntur; et ideo est una persona. Resp. 3: The character of a person includes all the essentials and the individuating properties of the conjoined things at the same time. Hence, it does not follow that if there were two natures and diverse properties, there would be two persons. For if the natures were posited separately with their own properties, each would be a totality, which requires the character of a person, but there is only one totality when they are joined; and thus there is one person. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ea quae differunt genere vel specie, differunt numero essentiae vel naturae; non autem oportet quod differant numero suppositi vel subiecti: quia ea quae secundum se considerata diversorum sunt generum vel specierum, in unum suppositum vel subiectum congregari possunt; sicut caro et os ad constituendum corpus, et albedo et longitudo in eodem subiecto sunt; et similiter quamvis divina natura et humana differant plus quam specie vel genere, in unam tamen personam uniri possunt. Resp. 4: Those things which differ in genus or species differ in the number of the essences or natures. But it is not necessary that they differ in the number of the supposita or subjects: because those things which are considered to be of different genera or species according to themselves can be gathered together into one suppositum or subject; just as flesh and bone are for constituting a body, and whiteness and length are in the same subject, and likewise, although the divine and human natures differ more than a genus or species do, yet they can be united into one person. Ad quintum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Boetius, species est totum esse individuorum, et etiam genus aliquo modo, ut dicit Avicenna, secundum quod indistincte significat totum: et quia natura humana non comprehendit totum esse Christi, ideo non habet in Christo naturam speciei; et ideo non sequitur quod in Christo sint diversae species. Vel dicendum, quod illud Philosophi est intelligendum quando naturae diversorum generum non coniunguntur: accidens enim et subiectum, quia coniunguntur (quamvis sint diversa genere), non faciunt numerum. Resp. 5: As Boethius says, (book 3 On Porphyr.chapter concerning species), the species is the entire being of individual things, and so too is the genus in some way, as Avicenna says, insofar as it indistinctly signifies a whole. And because the human nature does not embrace the whole being of Christ, thus, it does not posses the nature of a species in Christ; and thus it does not follow that there are diverse species in Christ. One can saythat this [teaching] of the Philosopher must be understood [to refer to] the case when natures of different genera are not joined. For an accident and a subject (although they are in a different genus) do not make a difference of number because they are joined. Ad sextum dicendum, quod forma adunatur materiae informando eam; et ideo oportet quod ad diversas formas diversae sint materiae dispositae; sed ad rationem personae requiritur tantum adunatio, quae potest esse etiam quantumcumque diversorum; et ideo non oportet quod diversae naturae habeant diversas personas. Resp. 6: Form unites to matter by informing it; and thus it is necessary that different material things be disposed to different forms. But, the charachter of a person needs only the sort of unity which can come about between very different things. Thus, it is not necessary that different natures have different persons.

© Mr. Jason Lewis Andrew West (jlawest@watarts.uwaterloo.ca)

The Aquinas Translation Project (http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)