In III Sent. D.6, q. 2, a.3: "Whether there is
not only one being (esse) in Christ?"
Utrum in Christo non sit tantum unum esse.
Whether there is not only one being in Christ.
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sit tantum unum esse.
Omnis enim forma substantialis dat esse. Sed anima est forma substantialis.
Ergo dat esse. Sed non dat esse divinae personae, quia hoc est aeternum. Ergo
dat aliud esse: ergo in Christo non tantum est unum esse.
Obj. 1: It seems that there is not only one being in Christ. For every substantial
form gives being. But the soul is a substantial form. Therefore it gives being.
But it does not give the being of the divine person, since this is eternal.
Therefore it gives another being: therefore there is not only one being in Christ.
Praeterea, unum est esse Filii Dei et Patris. Si ergo unum est esse huius hominis
et Filii Dei, unum erit esse huius hominis et Dei Patris. Sed nulla est maior
unio quam ea quae est aliquorum secundum esse unum. Ergo humanitas est unita
Deo Patri.
Obj. 2: Further, there is one being of the Son of God and of the Father. Therefore,
if the being of this man and of the Son of God is one thing, then the being
of this man and of the Father will be one. But there is no greater union than
that which is of things according to one being. Therefore, humanity was united
to God the Father.
Praeterea, in divinis non est esse nisi essentiale. Si ergo unio humanae naturae
ad divinam facta est in esse Filii Dei, facta est in essentia: quod est impossibile.
Obj. 3: Further, in divine persons there is no being except essential being.
Therefore if the union of the human nature to the divine took place in the being
of the Son of God, it took place in the essence, which is impossible.
Praeterea, definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Sed homo secundum eamdem
definitionem praedicatur de Christo et de Petro. Ergo est idem esse humanitas
illius hominis cum esse Petri secundum speciem. Sed esse Filii Dei non est idem
specie cum esse Petri. Ergo in Christo non est tantum unum esse.
Obj. 4: Further, a phrase indicating what it is to be. But "man" is predicated
of Christ and of Peter according to the same definition. Therefore, the human
being of this man is the same as that of Peter according to the species. But
the being of the Son of God is not the same species as the being of Peter. Therefore
there is not only one being in Christ.
Praeterea, de quocumque responderi potest ad quaestionem factam per an est,
habet proprium esse. Sed haec quaestio fit non tantum de persona, sed etiam
de natura. Ergo esse non tantum est personae, sed etiam naturae. In Christo
autem sunt duae naturae. Ergo in Christo sunt duo esse.
Obj. 5: Further, Of whatever can produce an [affirmative] answer to the question
"Is it?" has its own being. But this question is asked not only of the person,
but also of the nature. Therefore being is not only of the person, but of the
nature. But there are two natures in Christ. Therefore there is a two-fold being
in Christ.
Sed contra, omne quod habet per se esse, est subsistens. Si ergo in Christo
est duplex esse, sunt ibi duo subsistentia: ergo duae hypostases: quod supra
improbatum est.
To the Contrary, everything which has being per se, is a subsisting thing. If
therefore there is a two-fold being in Christ, there are two subsisting things
there; therefore there are two hypostases: which was disproved above.
Praeterea, quaecumque differunt secundum esse, unum eorum non praedicatur de
altero. Sed Deus est homo, et e converso. Ergo est esse unum Dei et hominis.
Further, [regarding] wherever things differ according to being, one of them
is not predicated of the other. But God is man and conversely. Therefore, there
is one being of God and man.
Praeterea, unius non est nisi unum esse. Sed Christus est unum, ut dictum est.
Ergo habet unum esse tantum.
Further, of one thing there is only one being. But Christ is one thing, as was
said. Therefore he has only one being.
Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum 5 Metaph., esse duobus modis dicitur.
Uno modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est
copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, ens est praedicatum accidentale;
et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente, quae coniungit praedicatum cum subiecto,
ut dicit Philosophus in 6 Metaph. Unde de hoc non est hic quaestio. Alio modo
dicitur esse, quod pertinet ad naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum
decem genera; et hoc quidem esse est in re, et est actus entis resultans ex
principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis.
I answer that, according to the Philosopher 5 Metaphys. Text 6, being is said
in two ways. In one way it signifies the truth of a proposition, insofar as
it is a copula; and thus as Averroes says in the same place, a being [ens] is
an accidental predicate; and this is not being [esse] in reality, but in the
mind, which joins the predicate with the subject, as the Philosopher says in
6 Metaphys. Text 6. Hence the present question does not concern this. In another
way we use the term being as it pertains to the nature of a thing, insofar as
it falls under the ten categories; and this indeed is being in reality, and
is the act of a being resulting from the principles of the thing, just as to
light is the act of lighting.
Aliquando tamen sumitur esse pro essentia, secundum quam res est: quia per actus
consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus. Loquendo
igitur de esse secundum quod est actus entis, sic dico, quod secundum secundam
opinionem oportet ponere tantum unum esse; secundum alias autem duas oportet
ponere duo esse. Ens enim subsistens, est quod habet esse tamquam eius quod
est, quamvis sit naturae vel formae tamquam eius quo est: unde nec natura rei
nec partes eius proprie di ur esse, si esse praedicto modo accipiatur; similiter
autem nec accidentia, sed suppositum completum, quod est secundum omnia illa.
Unde etiam Philosophus dicit in 2 Metaph., quod accidens magis proprie est entis
quam ens. Prima ergo opinio, quae ponit duo subsistentia, ponit duo esse substantialia;
similiter tertia opinio, quia ponit quod partes humanae naturae adveniunt divinae
personae accidentaliter, ponit duo esse, unum substantiale, et aliud accidentale;
secunda vero opinio, quia ponit unum subsistens, et ponit humanitatem non accidentaliter
advenire divinae personae, oportet quod ponat unum esse. Impossibile est enim
quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens:
unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile
est quod dicatur unum. Sed non est inconveniens quod esse unius subsistentis
sit per respectum ad plura, sicut esse petri est unum, habens tamen respectum
ad diversa principia constituentia ipsum: et similiter suo modo unum esse Christi
habet duos respectus, unum ad naturam humanam, alterum ad divinam.
Yet, sometimes being is used for the essence, according as it is a thing, since
their principles [s.c. of things] are customarily signified through acts, such
as potency or habit. Therefore, speaking of being insofar as it is the act of
a being, thus I say, that according to the second opinion it is necessary to
posit only one being; but according to the others it is necessary to posit a
two-fold being. For a subsisting being [ens], is what has being [esse] as if
this is its "that which is" [quod est], although it [s.c. the divine esse] is
of a nature or form, as if this is its "that by which it is" [quo est]. Hence,
neither the nature of a thing nor its parts are properly said to be [esse],
if "to be" [esse] is taken in the aforesaid manner; likewise neither are accidents,
but the complete supposit, [i.e.] that which is in virtue of all of these things.
Hence, also the Philosopher says in 2 Metaphys., 3, that an accident is more
properly of a being, than a being. Therefore,
the first opinion, which posits two subsistences posits a two-fold substantial
being. Likewise the third opinion, since it posits that the parts of the human
nature come to the divine person accidentally, posits a two-fold being, one
substantial, and the other accidental. But the second opinion, since it posits
one subsisting thing, and that humanity does not come to the divine person accidentally,
must posit one being. For it is impossible that something one should have a
two-fold substantial being, since one [unum] is founded upon a being [ens]:
hence if there are several beings [esse], according to which something is called
a being simply, it is impossible that it be called one thing. But it is suitable
that the being of one subsisting thing be related to many, just as Peter's being
is one thing, yet it is related to the diverse principles constituting him:
and likewise in its own way, Christ's one being has two relations, one to the
human nature, the other to the divine.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod forma facit esse; non ita quod illud esse sit
materiae aut formae, sed subsistentis. Quando ergo compositum ex materia et
forma est per se subsistens, acquiritur ex forma illi composito esse absolutum
per se; quando autem non est per se subsistens, non acquiritur per formam esse
illi composito; sed subsistenti cui hoc adiungitur, acquiritur respectus secundum
esse ad hoc quod ei additur: sicut si ponamus hominem nasci sine manu, et manum
per se separatim fieri, et postea ei miraculose coniungi, constat quod forma
manus causabit esse manus per se subsistentis: sed postquam coniungitur homini,
non acquiritur ex forma manus aliquod esse manui, quia manus non habet esse
proprium; sed acquiritur homini respectus ad manum secundum suum esse. Ita etiam
dico, quod anima in Christo non acquirit proprium esse humanae naturae; sed
Filio Dei acquirit respectum secundum suum esse ad naturam humanam, qui tamen
respectus non est aliquid secundum rem in divina persona, sed aliquid secundum
rationem, ut dictum est de unione, supra, dist. 2, qu. 2, art. 2, quaestiunc.
3, ad 3.
Reply 1: Form produces being; not so that that being is of matter or of form,
but of a subsisting thing. Therefore when a thing composed from matter and form
is subsisting per se, absolute being per se is acquired by that composite from
the form. But when it is not subsisting per se, being is not acquired by that
composite through the form; but by virtue of the subsisting thing to which it
is adjoined, it acquires a relation according to being to this thing which is
added to it: just as if we posit that a man is born without a hand, and a hand
by itself is separately formed, and later it is miraculously joined to him,
it is obvious that the form of a hand will cause the being of a hand which is
a subsistent thing per se: but after it is joined to a man, no being is acquired
from the hand's form by the hand, since a hand does not have its own being,
but a relationship to the and according to his being [esse] is acquired by the
man. So too I say that the soul in Christ does not acquire its own being of
a human nature: but from the son of God it acquires a relation according to
its being to the human nature, yet this relation is not something really in
the divine person, but only something according to reason as was said above
of the union d. 2, q. 2, a. 2 sub-quest. 3 ad 3.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliud est de Deo et de omnibus aliis rebus: quia
in Deo ipsa essentia subsistens est, unde sibi secundum se debetur esse; immo
ipsa est suum esse subsistens: unde essentia a persona non differt secundum
rem: et ideo esse essentiae est etiam personae; et tamen persona et essentia
ratione differunt. Quamvis ergo unum sit esse, potest tamen esse considerari
vel prout est essentiae; et sic non unitur humanitas in esse divino, unde non
unitur Patri: vel potest considerari prout est personae; et sic unitur in esse
divino.
Reply 2: [The being] of God is different from [the being] of all other things:
since in God his essence is subsisting, hence for him being must be according
to himself; nay rather he is his own subsisting being: hence essence does not
really differ from person: and thus the essential being is also personal being;
and yet person and essence differ by reason. Therefore although there is one
being, still being can be considered either as just as it is essential, and
thus humanity is not united to the divine being, hence it is not united to the
Father: or it can be considered just as it is personal.; and in this way it
is united to the divine being.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium.
And through this the solution to the third objection is obvious.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Philosophus accipit ibi esse pro essentia, vel quidditate,
quam signat definitio.
Reply 4: The Philosopher here takes being for essence, or quiddity, which the
definition signifies.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa obiectio procedit de esse secundum quod signat
veritatem propositionis: sic enim potest dici non tantum de his quae sunt in
re, sed de his quae sunt in intellectu: de quibus potest locutio formari.
Reply 5: That objection proceeds from being insofar as it signifies the truth
of a proposition: for this can be said not only of those things which are in
reality, but of those things which are in the intellect, about which we can
form a statement.
© Mr. Jason Lewis Andrew West (jlawest@watarts.uwaterloo.ca)
The Aquinas Translation Project (http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)
