X. That the mind works by means of the senses.

1. As the mind then produces the music of reason by means of our instrumental construction, we are born rational, while, as I think, we should not have had the gift of reason if we had had to employ our lips to supply the need of the body—the heavy and toilsome part of the task of providing food. As things are, however, our hands appropriate this ministration to themselves, and leave the mouth available for the service of reason.

235    Here the Latin version begins chapter x. The title in the Bodleian ms. is:—“Of the five bodily senses.”. The operation of the instrument36    That is, of the mind, in connection with reason., however, is twofold; one for the production of sound, the other for the reception of concepts from without; and the one faculty does not blend with the other, but abides in the operation for which it was appointed by nature, not interfering with its neighbour either by the sense of hearing undertaking to speak, or by the speech undertaking to hear; for the latter is always uttering something, while the ear, as Solomon somewhere says, is not filled with continual hearing37    Cf. Eccles. i. 8. The quotation is not from the LXX.: it is perhaps not intended to be verbal..

3. That point as to our internal faculties which seems to me to be even in a special degree matter for wonder, is this:—what is the extent of that inner receptacle into which flows everything that is poured in by our hearing? who are the recorders of the sayings that are brought in by it? what sort of storehouses are there for the concepts that are being put in by our hearing? and how is it, that when many of them, of varied kinds, are pressing one upon another, there arises no confusion and error in the relative position of the things that are laid up there? And one may have the like feeling of wonder also with regard to the operation of sight; for by it also in like manner the mind apprehends those things which are external to the body, and draws to itself the images of phenomena, marking in itself the impressions of the things which are seen.

4. And just as if there were some extensive city receiving all comers by different entrances, all will not congregate at any particular place, but some will go to the market, some to the houses, others to the churches, or the streets, or lanes, or the theatres, each according to his own inclination,—some such city of our mind I seem to discern established in us, which the different entrances through the senses keep filling, while the mind, distinguishing and examining each of the things that enters, ranks them in their proper departments of knowledge.

5. And as, to follow the illustration of the city, it may often be that those who are of the same family and kindred do not enter by the same gate, coming in by different entrances, as it may happen, but are none the less, when they come within the circuit of the wall, brought together again, being on close terms with each other (and one may find the contrary happen; for those who are strangers and mutually unknown often take one entrance to the city, yet their community of entrance does not bind them together; for even when they are within they can be separated to join their own kindred); something of the same kind I seem to discern in the spacious territory of our mind; for often the knowledge which we gather from the different organs of sense is one, as the same object is divided into several parts in relation to the senses; and again, on the contrary, we may learn from some one sense many and varied things which have no affinity one with another.

6. For instance—for it is better to make our argument clear by illustration—let us suppose that we are making some inquiry into the property of tastes—what is sweet to the sense, and what is to be avoided by tasters. We find, then, by experience, both the bitterness of gall and the pleasant character of the quality of honey; but when these facts are known, the knowledge is one which is given to us (the same thing being introduced to our understanding in several ways) by taste, smell, hearing, and often by touch and sight. For when one sees honey, and hears its name, and receives it by taste, and recognizes its odour by smell, and tests it by touch, he recognizes the same thing by means of each of his senses.

7. On the other hand we get varied and multiform information by some one sense, for as hearing receives all sorts of sounds, and our visual perception exercises its operation by beholding things of different kinds—for it lights alike on black and white, and all things that are distinguished by contrariety of colour,—so with taste, with smell, with perception by touch; each implants in us by means of its own perceptive power the knowledge of things of every kind.

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ιʹ. Ὅτι διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ νοῦς ἐνεργεῖ.

Οὕτω τοίνυν τοῦ νοῦ διὰ τῆς ὀργανικῆς ταύτης κατασκευῆς ἐν ἡμῖν μουσουργοῦντος τὸν λόγον, λογικοὶ γεγόναμεν, οὐκ ἂν, ὡς οἶμαι, ἔχοντες τὴν τοῦ λόγου χάριν, εἰ τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ ἐπίπονον τῆς κατὰ τὴν βρῶσιν λατρείας τοῖς χείλεσι πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τοῦ σώματος ἐπορίζομεν. Νυνὶ δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην λειτουργίαν αἱ χεῖρες εἰς ἑαυτὰς μετενέγκασαι, εὔθετον τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ τοῦ λόγου τὸ στόμα κατέλιπον. Διπλῆ δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄργανον ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐργασίαν ἠχῆς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἔξωθεν νοημάτων, Καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυται πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν ἡ ἄλλη, ἀλλὰ παραμένει τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐφ' ᾗ ἐτάχθη παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦσα τῇ γείτονι, οὔτε τῆς ἀκοῆς λαλούσης, οὔτε τῆς φωνῆς ἀκουούσης. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀεί τι πάντως προΐεται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ δεχομένη διηνεκῶς οὐκ ἐμπίμπλαται, καθώς φησί που Σολομών: ὅ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἄξιον εἶναι καὶ θαυμάζεσθαι: τί τὸ πλάτος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἔνδοθεν χωρήματος, εἰς ὃ πάντα συῤῥεῖ τὰ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς εἰσχεόμενα; τίνες οἱ ὑπομνηματογράφοι τῶν εἰσαγομένων ἐν αὐτῇ λόγων; καὶ ποῖα δοχεῖα τῶν ἐντιθεμένων τῇ ἀκοῇ νοημάτων; καὶ πῶς, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀλλήλοις ἐπεμβαλλομένων, σύγχυσις καὶ πλάνη κατὰ τὴν ἐπάλληλον θέσιν τῶν ἐγκειμένων οὐ γίνεται; Τὸ ἴσον δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὄφεων ἐνεργείας θαυμάσειεν. Ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ διὰ τούτων ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἔξω τοῦ σώματος ἐπιδράσσεται, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκει τῶν φαινομένων τὰ εἴδωλα, τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν ὁρατῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καταγράφων. Καὶ ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολύχωρος εἴη πόλις ἐκ διαφόρων εἰσόδων τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν συμφοιτῶντας εἰσδεχομένη, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατά τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συνδραμόντες οἱ πάντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ οἰκήσεις, ἄλλοι κατὰ τὰς ἐκκλησίας, ἢ τὰς πλατείας, ἢ τοὺς στενωποὺς, ἢ τὰ θέατρα, κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἕκαστος γνώμην μεταχωροῦσι: τοιαύτην τινὰ βλέπω καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ πόλιν τὴν ἔνδοθεν ἐν ἡμῖν συνῳκισμένην, ἢν διάφοροι μὲν αἱ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴσοδοι καταπληροῦσιν: ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰσιόντων φιλοκρινῶν τε καὶ διεξετάζων ὁ νοῦς, τοῖς καταλλήλοις τῆς γνώσεως τόποις ἐναποτίθεται. Καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὑποδείγματος, ἔστι πολλάκις ὁμοφύλους τινὰς ὄντας καὶ συγγενεῖς μηδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς πύλης ἐντὸς γενέσθαι, ἄλλου κατ' ἄλλην εἴσοδον κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν εἰσδραμόντος, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον ἐντὸς τῆς περιβολῆς τοῦ τείχους γενόμενοι, πάλιν μετ' ἀλλήλων εἰσὶ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἰκείως ἔχοντες: καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν γινόμενον: οἱ γὰρ ἀπεξενωμένοι τε καὶ ἄγνωστοι ἀλλήλων μιᾷ χρῶνται πρὸς τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδῳ πολλάκις, ἀλλ' οὐ συνάπτει τούτους ἀλλήλοις ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἴσοδον κοινωνία: δύνανται γὰρ καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι διακριθῆναι πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον: τοιοῦτόν τι βλέπω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν νοῦν εὐρυχωρίας. Πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ ἐκ διαφόρων αἰσθητηρίων μία γνῶσις ἡμῖν συναγείρεται, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος πολυμερῶς πρὸς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μεριζομένου. Πάλιν δ' αὖ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἔστιν ἐκ μιᾶς τινος τῶν αἰσθήσεων πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα μαθεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. συμβαίνοντα: οἷον (κρεῖττον γὰρ ἐν ὑποδείγματι διασαφηνίσαι τὸν λόγον), προκείσθω ζητεῖσθαί τι περὶ χυμῶν ἰδιότητος, τί μὲν ἡδὺ πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν, τί δὲ φευκτὸν τοῖς γευομένοις ἐστίν. Οὐκοῦν εὑρέθη διὰ τῆς πείρας ἤ τε τῆς χολῆς πικρότης, καὶ τὸ προσηνὲς τῆς κατὰ τὸ μέλι ποιότητος. Διαφόρων δὲ ὄντων τούτων, μίαν εἰσάγει γνῶσιν τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα, πολυμερῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰσοικιζόμενον, ἢ γεύσει, ἢ ὀσφρήσει, ἢ ἀκοῇ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ, καὶ τῇ ὄψει. Καὶ γὰρ ἰδών τις τὸ μέλι, καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀκούσας, καὶ τῇ γεύσει λαβὼν, καὶ τὸν ἀτμὸν διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἐπιγνοὺς, καὶ τῇ ἀφῇ δοκιμάσας, τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δι' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐγνώρισε. Ποικίλα δὲ πάλιν καὶ πολυειδῆ διὰ μιᾶς τινος αἰσθήσεως διδασκόμεθα: τῆς τε ἀκοῆς παντοίας δεχομένης φωνὰς, τῆς τε διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀντιλήψεως ἀδιάκριτον ἐχούσης τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ἑτερογενῶν θεωρίας. Ὁμοίως γὰρ λευκῷ τε προσπίπτει, καὶ μέλανι, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διεστῶσι τῷ χρώματι. Οὕτως ἡ γεῦσις, οὕτως ἡ ὄσφρησις, οὕτως ἡ διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς κατανόησις, παντοδαπῶν πραγμάτων ἑκάστη διὰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀντιλήψεως τὴν γνῶσιν ἐντίθησιν.