We can confirm our argument by material instances. Fire naturally imparts the sense of heat to those who touch it, with all its component parts6    Reading μορίοις (cf. the same word below) for μορίαν.; one part of it does not have the heat more intense, the other less intense; but as long as it is fire at all, it exhibits an invariable oneness with itself in an absolutely complete sameness of activity; if in any part it gets cooled at all, in that part it can no longer be called fire; for, with the change of its heat-giving activity into the reverse, its name also is changed. It is the same with water, with air, with every element that underlies the universe; there is one and the same description of the element, in each case, admitting of no ideas of excess or defect; water, for instance, cannot be called more or less water; as long as it maintains an equal standard of wetness, so long the term water will be realized by it; but when once it is changed in the direction of the opposite quality7    πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν ποιότητα. the name to be applied to it must be changed also. The yielding, buoyant, “nimble”8    nimble, κουφὸν; compare Macbeth, I. vi.   “The air   Nimbly and sweetly recommends itself   Unto our senses.” nature of the air, too, is to be seen in every part of it; while what is dense, heavy, downward gravitating, sinks out of the connotation of the very term “air.” So Deity, as long as it possesses perfection throughout all the properties that devotion9    Reading εὐσεβῶς. may attach to it, by virtue of this perfection in everything good does not belie its name; but if any one of those things that contribute to this idea of perfection is subtracted from it, the name of Deity is falsified in that particular, and does not apply to the subject any longer. It is equally impossible to apply to a dry substance the name of water, to that whose quality is a state of coolness the name of fire, to stiff and hard things the name of air, and to call that thing Divine which does not at once imply the idea of perfection; or rather the impossibility is greater in this last case.

Καθάπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν σωματικῶν ὑποδειγμάτων ἔστι τὸν λόγον πιστώσασθαι. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἐπίσης πᾶσι τοῖς συμπληροῦσιν αὐτὴν μορίοις τὴν θερμαντικὴν αἴσθησιν τοῖς ἁπτομένοις παρέχεται: καὶ οὐ τὸ μέν τι τῆς φλογὸς ὑπερτεταμένην, τὸ δὲ ὑφειμένην ἔχει τὴν θερμασίαν: ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ᾖ πῦρ, ὅλον διόλου τῇ ταὐτότητι τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀδιάστατον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἔχει. εἰ δέ τι κατά τι μέρος καταψυχθείη, οὐκέτι πῦρ κατὰ τὸ κατεψυγμένον ὀνομασθήσεται τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπαλλαγῇ τῆς θερμαντικῆς ἐνεργείας συμμεταποιουμένου καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος. ὡσαύτως καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ πάντων τῶν στοιχειωδῶς ὑποβεβλημένων εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑκάστου λόγος οὐ παραδεχόμενος πλεονασμὸν ἢ ἐλάττωσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ μᾶλλον ἢ ἔλαττον δύναται λέγεσθαι: ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐπίσης ὑγρὸν ᾖ, καὶ ἡ προσηγορία τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἀληθεύεται: εἰ δὲ μεταποιηθείη πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν ποιότητα, συνηλλοιώθη πάντως ἐπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος τὸ μαλακόν τε καὶ ἀνωφερὲς καὶ κοῦφον ἐπίσης πᾶσι τοῖς μορίοις ἐνθεωρεῖται: τὸ δὲ πυκνὸν καὶ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ εἰς γῆν ῥέον διαφεύγει τὸ καὶ ἀὴρ ὀνομάζεσθαι. οὕτως καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις, ἕως μὲν ἂν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν εὐσεβῶς θεωρουμένου νοήματος τὸ τέλειον ἔχῃ, ἐπαληθεύσει τὴν προσηγορίαν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τελειότητι: εἰ δὲ ὑποσπασθείη τι τῶν συντεινόντων εἰς τὸν τῆς τελειότητος λόγον, ψεύσεται κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα καὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόσει τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ: ἴσον γὰρ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ ἀδύνατον ξηρῷ σώματι τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπωνυμίαν ἁρμόσαι καὶ πῦρ προσαγορεῦσαι τὸ κατεψυγμένον ἐν τῇ ποιότητι καὶ τὸ στερρὸν καὶ ἀντίτυπον ἀέρα εἰπεῖν καὶ θεῖον ὀνομάσαι, ᾧ μὴ συνυπακούεται ἡ τῆς τελειότητος ἔννοια.