ARTICLE X.

WHETHER MAN I N THE STATE OF GRACE REQUIRES THE HELP OF GRACE TO PERSEVERE

State of the question. We are not concerned here with perseverance taken as a virtue inclining one to elicit the intention of persevering lo I the consequent will. And the antecedent will never produces any good, even the (cf. IIa IIae, q. 137) nor with the intention of persevering itself, but with the actual exercise of perseverance in good conducive to salvation until the end of one’s life. That this is the sense in which it is used is evident from the body of the article, at the very beginning of which St. Thomas eliminates the consideration of the acquired virtue of perseverance, discussed by Aristotle, and of the infused virtue of temperance, annexed to fortitude, which are infused with sanctifying grace. Here it is rather a question “of the continuation in good until the end of life.”

Moreover, perseverance thus defined is capable of a twofold acceptation: 1. the enduring continuation in grace and good works until death, as attained to by many predestined adults; and 2. the coincidence of habitual grace and death, without prolonged continuation, as occurs in children who die after their baptism 20 and also in adults who die shortly after obtaining justification, 21 for example, the good thief; and thus it becomes the grace of a happy death.

Reply. To the question thus stated, the Church, as we shall presently see, replies that a special gift of perseverance is required. But in what does this special gift consist? Is it a habitual gift or an actual grace? This is the statement of the question which is quite complex. Let us examine: 1. the errors involved, 2. the teaching of Holy Scripture and the Church, 3. St. Thomas’ conclusion, and 4. the problems to be solved.

I. ERRORS ON THIS SUBJECT

The Pelagians, at least in the beginning, attributed perseverance to the powers of nature alone. The Semi-Pelagians maintained that grace was required for it, but not a special gift distinct from sanctifying grace, and, according to them, grace is given to those who possess the beginning of salvation through their natural effort. Hence the grace of final perseverance is always given to those who persevere in this natural effort. In opposition to them, St. Augustine proved that the gift of final perseverance is a special gift and not subject to merit. Certain theologians, such as Duval and Vega, hold that a special gift is required for perseverance which is active and protracted over a long period of time, but not for a brief perseverance during which no special difficulties occur

II. THE TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE AND THE CHURCH

In Scripture our perseverance in good until the end is attributed to God. “I set the Lord always in my sight: for He is at my right hand, that I be not moved” (Ps. 15:8). “Perfect Thou my goings in Thy paths: that my footsteps be not moved” (Ps. 165). “Be Thou my helper, forsake me not; do not Thou despise me” (Ps. 26:g). Likewise Ps. 37:22. “When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me” (Ps. 70:g). “And unto old age and gray hairs: O God, forsake me not” (Ps. 70:18). Christ says to His disciples in the Garden of Gethsemane: “Watch ye, and pray that ye enter not into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak” (Matt. 26:41). “And now I am not in the world, and these are in the world, and I come to Thee. Holy Father, keep them in Thy name whom Thou hast given Me; that they may be one, as We also are” (John 17:11). “He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall” (I Cor. 10:12). “With fear and trembling work out your salvation. For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will” (Phil. 2:12 f.).

The doctrine of the Church. It is of faith that final perseverance is something gratuitous, not due to the powers of nature, and more a gift distinct from the grace of justification. This was defined against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians whom St. Augustine specifically refuted in his book on the gift of perseverance.

Cf. Denz., no. 132, the letter of Pope Celestine I: “No one, even among the baptized, is sufliciently restored by grace to triumph over the wiles of the devil and overcome the temptations of the flesh unlessby the daily help of God he receives perseverance in the frequent practice of good.”

Also the Council of Orange, can. 10 (Denz., no. 183): “The help of God, even for the redeemed and sanctified, is ever to be implored, that they may come to a good end or continue in good works.” (Likewise can. 25, Denz., no. 200.)

The Council of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 16, Denz., no. 826) declares: “If anyone should say with absolute and infallible certainty that he surely will have the great gift of perseverance to the end, unless he learns it from special revelation, let him be anathema.” Likewise (can. 22, Denz., no. 832): “If anyone should say either that a justified soul can persevere in the justice it has received without the special help of God, or that with it it cannot do so, let him be anathema.”

Father Hugon (De gratia, p. 286) asks whether this canon also includes perseverance for a short space of time (for instance, between justification shortly before death and death itself) and passive perseverance (of infants dying after baptism). The Council does not distinguish; several authorities consider that a real distinction is not to be excluded from the sense of the definition. At least, it is of faith that for the active perseverance of adults over a long period of time a special aid is required distinct from habitual grace.

Among the Fathers, Augustine in particular is cited (De dono perseverantiae, chap. 2); he refutes the objections of the Pelagians, to which may be added those which are presented by St. Thomas at the beginning of the article, as follows:

1. Perseverance in virtue is something less than the virtue of perseverance itself which can be acquired by repeated acts. 2. Christian perseverance is a certain moral virtue, annexed to fortitude, and infused at the same time as grace. 3. Adam in the state of innocence would have been able to persevere, but those who are justified by Christ are not in a less perfect state with respect to grace.

Against these difficulties, St. Thomas explains, in the body of the present article, that the term “perseverance” is used in a threefold sense:

1. Acquired perseverance, described by Aristotle (Ethics, Bk. VII, chap. 7). This is a moral virtue attached to fortitude which consists in a certain firmness of the reason and will, so that a man may nqt be dissuaded from the path of virtue by the onslaught of melancholy. This perseverance maintains itself against such an onslaught as continence does against the temptations of the flesh. Cf. IIa IIae, q. 137, a. 2 ad 2.

2. The infused virtue of perseverance. By this virtue man has the intention of persevering in good until the end. But many had this intention during their lives and yet, in fact, did not persevere to the end. This virtue gives the power of persisting in the first act in spite of the difficulty which arises from the long duration of the act itself. Cf. IIa IIae, q. 137, a. 3 and 4.

3. Perseverance in the sense of a continuation of a certain good work until the end of one’s life. For this, the just man requires a special grace, not habitual but actual, directing and protecting him against the impelling force of temptation. This follows from the preceding article in which it was proved that the just man needs the help of actual grace to do good and avoid evil and therefore, with still greater reason, to do good and avoid evil until the end of his life. This is the perseverance of which we are now speaking. 22

Similarly, in IIa IIae, q. 137, a. 4, the question, whether perseverance requires the help of grace, is answered thus: 1. the infused virtue of perseverance presupposes habitual grace; 2. for the act of perseverance lasting until death “man requires not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God preserving a man in good unti the end of life.” “Since, with free will, man himself is changeable, and this condition is not altered by habitual grace in the present life, it is not within the power of free will, even restored by grace, to remain fixed in the good, although it is in its power to choose to do so. For the most part, election falls within our power, but not execution” (ibid.) .

III.       ST. THOMAS’ CONCLUSION

The conclusion is thus proved. The just man requires the help of actual grace to do the good necessary for salvation and to avoid evil (preceding article).

But perseverance is the continuation of a certain good work until the end of life.

Therefore, for this perseverance until the end a special actual grace is required, distinct from habitual grace and even from the preceding actual graces, such, that is, as precede the moment of death. (Cf. ad 3.)

This argument thus proposed is metaphysical: no one is preserved in good works until death unless specially preserved by God. Some authors state this argument in a slightly different way, so that its metaphysical necessity is less evident. They say that for perseverance until the end there is a great threefold difficulty for the surmounting of which a special actual gift is required. Thus they rather proceed inductively.

It is a great threefold difficulty: 1. to shun evil, 2. to fulfill every commandment continually and enduringly, and 3. to have death coincide with grace, or to die at the opportune time. But all these taken together require a special favor from God, distinct from habitual grace. Since man cannot, without additional help, overcome temptations and elicit supernatural acts, for still greater reason does he require aid to practice these until the end. Moreover, only God, who is master of grace and of death, can cause grace to coincide with death; in doing so He manifests a special providence toward the elect. Therefore final perseverance (at least such as endures for a long time before death) requires a special favor distinct from habitual grace. This point, at least, in the question, is of faith and is confirmed by this argument based upon still higher principles of faith. This argument is good, but is better formulated by St. Thomas, inasmuch as he shows more clearly why an utterly special actual gift is required for surmounting this great difficulty in fact, that is, preservation in good.

IV. DOUBTS

First doubt. Whether a special grace, distinct from ordinary, actual helps, is required for long-continued, active final perseverance.

At present theologians generally reply in the affirmative, which is thus proved by the following arguments. a) From authority, since Christ prayed especially for the perseverance of His disciples, who were already just: “Holy Father, keep them” (John 17:11-15). Likewise the Church thus prays in particular: “Enable us always to obey Thy commandments” (Tuesday after the Second Sunday of Lent). “Never permit me to be separated from Thee” (prayer before Communion). The Council of Trent calls the gift of perseverance, “that great, special gift.” b) From theological argument. (Cf. ad 3.) Long- continued, active final perseverance, that is, with our cooperation, demands not only sufficient grace, but efficacious grace, nay rather the most important of all efficacious graces which consummates the state of wayfarer and brings about an infallible coincidence between the state of grace and death. This efficacious grace confers the final act of the wayfarer connected with the attainment of the final end and therefore proceeds from a very special infusion by which God is the mover. And this, too, certainly depends upon the merits of Christ who merited for us all the graces, both sufficient and efficacious, which we receive and also all the effects of our predestination.

Second doubt. Whether a special gift distinct from the ordinary aids is required for final perseverance over a short space of time, either in adults or in infants who die soon after their justification. At present most theologians generally reply in the affirmative. 

a) Since this seems to be the obvious meaning of the Councils of Orange and Trent (Denz., nos. 183, 200, 806, 826, 832, 805 ff.), although this was not expressly defined. The Council of Orange declared (no. 183). “The help of God is to be implored even by the redeemed and sanctified, that they may arrive at a good end or may continue long in good works.” In speaking thus, as Billuart remarks, the Council distinguishes perseverance taken as a continuation of good over a long period of time, and for both of these require a special help which is to be implored even by those who are living a holy life. Likewise the Council of Trent requires a special help for perseverance simply and without any limitations.

b) Theological argument. The very special effect of predestination, which has an infallible relationship to glory, is a very particular gift. But the coincidence of grace with death is an effect of this kind, conferred only on the prefestinate. Therefore it is a very special gift, surpassing ordinary aids, which are attributed to ordinary providence.

This is confirmed from the consideration of death. Death may come about, for those who persevere, in a twofold manner: 1. Beyond the natural course of events, according to divine decree, the time of death is hastened or delayed; then it is manifestly a special favor. 2. Or it occurs according to the natural order, but even then providence had this special gift does not require internal actual grace but consists in an external grace, that is, in a special providence by virtue of which the infant dies when in the state of grace. And this indicates a special care on the part of providence had disposed natural events from all eternity so that they would bring about death at an opportune time, when a man is in the state of grace. And this indicates a special care on the part of providence, which extends to all things, ordains means to their end, and in particular to the glory of God and of the elect. Therefore the coincidence of the state of grace with death is a special favor from God, who alone can cause these two to coincide, since He is the master of grace and of death. At least, this disposition of circumstances is in some respects a special favor; this is admitted by Molina when he maintains that God foresees through mediate knowledge that, if a certain person at the moment of death were placed in such and such circumstances, he would elicit an act of contrition. (Cf. Concordia, ed. cit., p. 548)

Third doubt. In what does this special gift of final perseverance consist? A distinction must be made between adults and infants.

a) In baptized children who die before attaining the use of reason, this special gift does not require internal actual grace but consists in an external grace, that is, in a special providence by virture of which the infant dies when in the state of grace.

b) In adults, however, the gift of final perseverance does not consist in any one indivisible thing, but comprises a great many, thus: 1. on the part of God it is the special providence causing grace to coincide with death; 2. on the part of man it consists in a series of helps by which he is preserved from temptation, or overcomes temptations, or, if he falls, he rises again at the opportune time; finally, it includes the last efficacious grace, connecting the last meritorious act with the end, which, as it is an efficacious grace, is called by antonomasia “the great and signal gift of God.”

But whether this last grace is intrinsically efficacious, as the Thomists hold, or extrinsic through the prevision of the scientia media, Billuart (diss. III, a. 10) cites texts from Scripture and from St. Augustine in which it is attributed to the grace of final perseverance that man does persevere. “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” (I Cor. 4:7.) Therefore election “is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy” (Rom. 9:16). That is, divine election does not depend on the will or the effort of man, but on God who shows mercy. “For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish” (Phil. 2:13).

St. Augustine’s references to the subject include the following: They receive “grace which is not rejected by any hard heart, since it is first granted to them to have their hardness of heart taken away” (De praedestinatione sanctorum, chap. 8). “God has the wills of men in His power to a greater extent than they themselves have” (De correptione et gratia, chap. 14). “We are speaking of that perseverance which perseveres until the end; if it is granted, one perseveres until the end; but if one does not persevere until the end, it is not granted” (De dono perseverantiae, chap. 6). “Therefore the weakness of the human will is assisted, so that it may be moved invariably and in- evitably by divine grace, and hence, although weak, it may not fail nor be overcome by any adversity” (De correptione et gratia, chap. 12). Cf. R. de Journel, Enchir. patr., no. 1958; read also the reply to the third objection of the present article.

The question is whether this grace is efficacious because God wills it to be so or because man wills to render it so. In the answer to the third objection St. Thomas says: “By the grace of Christ many receive the gift of grace by which they can persevere and also it is further granted to them that they do persevere.” Hence if, of two equally obdurate sinners, one is converted rather than the other, this is the effect of a special mercy toward him, With still greater reason, if anyone perseveres in good throughout the whole of his life, this is the effect of a special mercy of God toward him.

Fourth doubt. Whether perseverance was a very special gift for the angels. The Jansenists reply negatively, both for angels and for man in the state of innocence. The answer of St. Thomas and the generality of theologians is affirmative. Cf. III C. Gentes, chap. 155, and IIa IIae, q. 137, a. 4.

a) The foregoing arguments are also valid for the angels and for man in the state of innocence, in whom free will was capable of defection.

b) Moreover, for the angels, final perseverance is the proper effect of predestination, and not all the angels were predestined. Further, this is implied by the Council of Orange (Denz., no. 192) when it declares: “Human nature, even had it remained in that state of integrity in which it was created, would by no means have preserved itself without the aid of its Creator.” And St. Augustine, in The City of God (Bk. XIII, chap. 9 ) maintains: “If in both cases (the angels) were created equally good, some fell through bad will, while others, receiving more help, attained that fullness of beatitude, whence they were made absolutely certain that they will never fall.”

Fifth doubt. Whether the gift of final perseverance is identical with the gift of confirmation in grace. Cf. Salmanticenses, De gratia, q. 110, disp. III, dub. XI, no. 259. The answer is in the negative, since the gift of final perseverance is common to all the predestinate, but not the gift of confirmation in grace, which was conferred upon the apostles on the day of Pentecost and upon souls that arrived at the intimate union with God which is called the transforming union. In what respects do they differ? In this: the gift of confirmation in grace preserves one from mortal sin and also generally from deliberate venial sin, according to the mode in which it is given, that is, by a certain participation in the impeccability of the blessed, and the intrinsic gift requires to be completed by the extrinsic protection of God. Hence this gift of confirmation in grace adds something over and above the gift of persererance, namely, something intrinsic and habitual which prevents sin, almost binding the power to preserve it from sin, on the other hand, the gift of final perseverance does not necessarily demand anything more than the conjunction of the state of grace with death.  

REFUTATIONS OF OBJECTIONS

First objection. Final perseverance is the coincidence of grace with death. But shortly before death, the justified man with the ordinary helps can persever for a considerable time in goodness until his death. Therefore final perseverance is not a special help.

Reply. I distinguish the major: final perseverance is the coincidence of grace with death, willed in virture of itself by God for the efficacious purpose of glory: granted; a fortuitous and accidental coincidence: denied. I likewise distinguish the minor: for a moderately long time until the accidental conjunction of grace and death: granted; for a definite interval of time until the conjunction of habitual grace with death willed in virtue of itself by God: denied.

Second objection. To those who possess grace, glory is due. Therefore with still greater reason is the help due to them for the continuation of grace with glory.

Reply. I deny the conclusion, for, although glory is due to a man who possess grace, as long as he remains in grace, it is not however due to him that he be invariably preserved in grace until death, since he is of an erratic, defectible nature.

Third objection. According to the Council of Trent, “God does not abandon a soul that is once justified unless He is first abandoned by it” (Denz., no. 804). But if, in order to persevere, the just man requires special help, which God denies to many of the just, He would desert him before being deserted by him. Therefore.

Reply. The sense of the major is: God does not abandon by with dreawing the efficacious actual grace, unless man first resists sufficient grace. But to ask why God does not give to all the just efficacious grace, by means of which they many not neglect sufficient grace. But to aks why God does not give to all the just efficacious grace, by means of which they may not neglect sufficient grace. But to ask why God does not give to all the just efficacious grace, by means of which they may not neglect sufficient grace, by means of which they may not neglect sufficient grace, is equivalent to asking why he permits sin in one defectible soul rather than in another, whereupon the answer, in the words of St. Augustine (de dono perseverantiae, chap. 9), is that “in this respect the judgment of God is inscrutable”; and further, in his commentary on St.  John 6:44, “No man can come to Me, except the Father, who sent Me, draw him,” he adds: “Why does He draw one and not another?  Do not judge if you do not wish to err; but accept and understand: if you are not yet drawn, pray that you may be drawn.” Cf. St. Thomas on John 6:44. Hence we should pray in the words of the Mass, before the Communion: “Grant me ever to adhere to Thy commandments and never permit me to be separated from Thee.”23

Further, according to the Council of Trent (Denz., no. 806): “The gift of perseverance . . . can be possessed only by the one who is able to make him who stands, stand (Rom. 14:4), that he may persevere standing, and to raise up him who falls.” Cf. below (q.114, a. 9 ) on the gift of perseverance which cannot be the object of merit, but which can be obtained by virtue of humble, persevering, impetratory prayer in union with the prayer of Christ, the High Priest of the Sacrifice of the Mass. How advantageous it is, then, to celebrate or hear Mass in order to obtain the grace of a happy death, as Benedict XV declared!

This terminates the question of the necessity of grace for knowing natural and supernatural truth, for doing natural and supernatural good, for avoiding evil, and for persevering unto the end. 

1 Thus the Council of Orange (can. 22, Denz., no. 195): “No one has anything of his own but lying and sin. But if man has something of truth and justice, it comes from that source after which we should thirst in this desert land.” At  least natural  concurrence is required. 2 In simultaneous concurrence, admitted by Molina, God and the secondary cause I are like two men rowing a boat, that is, like two coordinated causes. On the contrary, for St. Thomas, God’s premotion and the secondary cause thus moved are two causes of which the second is subordinated to the supreme first cause, with reference both to causality and to being.

3 “If anyone should say . . . that bad works as well as good are done by God, and not merely by His permission,. . . let him be anathema.”

4 Beitr ge zur Geschichte der Phil. des Mittelalters, Münster, 1908. (ed. C1.Baeumker). 5 The excess of Jansenism is found to a certain extent in the argument proposed by Pascal as “the wager,” in which he says: a choice must be made between the Christian life which is set before us as the way to heaven, and the life of the libertine which is said to be the way of damnation. Some might add a third alternative: natural virtue. But in practice, the argument proposed by Pascal holds good, since the fullness of natural virtue is not present in fallen nature without grace. 6 It is a question of the consequent power. Cf. Salmanticenses, De gratia, disp. II, dub. IV, no. 135, where other important Thomists are quoted; cf. also John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart. 7 Cf. Molina, Concordia, Paris ed., 1876, pp. 31, 34, 68 A,, 73, 255. 8 Ibid., PP. 43, 73, 564. 9 St. Thomas’ first conclusion on the necessity of grace to fulfill substantially all the precepts of the natural law is commonly accepted by theologians, although it was formerly denied by Scotus (II, d.28, .1), Gabriele, and Durandus; to deny it would be rash or erroneous and savors of Pelagianism. Cf. Hugon, De gratia, p. 259. 10 St. Chrysostom, in his fifth homily on the Epistle to the Romans, declares: “The Apostle refers not to the idolatrous Greeks but to those who by worshiping God and obeying the natural law, practiced all those things that pertain to piety, even prior to the Jewish observances; such were those who lived with Melchisedech, such was Job, such were the Ninivites, such finally was Cornelius.” St. Chrysostom, in his thirteenth homily on the same Epistle, commenting on the words “miserable man that I am,” teaches that the law without grace does not suffice. Thirteenth homily on the same Epistle, commenting on the words “miserable man that I am,” teaches that the law without grace does not suffice. 11 The Semi Pelagians held that the preparation for grace could be made naturally in three ways: 1) by positively disposing oneself for grace; 2) by meriting it, at least de congruo; or 3) by asking it through prayer.   12 Molina holds: To him who does what in him lies by his natural powers in easier matters, and by the powers of medicinal grace (which is natural from the standpoint of its being) in more difficult matters, God does not deny actual grace and, eventually, He grants sanctifying grace, on account of the covenant entered into with Christ, Molina does not give sufficient attention to the fact that man alone, by himself, can set up some obstacle, but he cannot, by himself, avoid setting up an obstacle, for this latter is a good act proceeding from the source of all good: “What hast thou that thou hast not received?” 13 Pius IX declares (Denz., no. 1677): “Those who labor under invincible ignorance in regard to our most holy religion, and who observe conscientiously (this presupposes the help of grace) the natural law whose precepts are inscribed by God in all hearts, and are ready to obey God, can lead an honorable, righteous life, by virtue of the operation of divine light and grace, and arrive at eternal life.” Pius IX has no recourse to the Molinistic pact, but speaks as does St. Thomas. 14 According to the Council of Orange (can. 4, Denz., no. 177): “If anyone maintains that God waits upon our will in order to cleanse us from sin, and does not rather acknowledge that even our willing to be cleansed is brought about in us through the infusion and operation of the Holy Ghost, such a one is resisting the same Holy Ghost.” And yet, according to Molina’s theory, God waits upon our will, that is, our natural effort, which He foresees by scientia media, and which is produced simultaneously with only the concurrence of God, before the conferring of prevenient actual grace. Thus this natural effort precedes prevenient grace itself, and thus it seems to be the first step to salvation, which is therefore natural. On the contrary, it is God who knocks first, according to the words of the Apocalypse (320): “I stand at the gate and knock.” 15 Man alone of himself can resist grace (and this is sin permitted by God), but “not to resist grace” is itself a good which proceeds from God who preserves him in good whereas He might have permitted resistance. Cf. our La prédestination des saints et la grâce, 1936, p. 381. 16 Here the words of Aristotle are cited: “In unexpected circumstances a man acts according to a preconceived objective and a pre-existing habit”; hence one who is in the state of mortal sin cannot long remain without mortal sin, especially in sudden temptation. Even if he should wish to act rationally, he cannot long maintain this intention on account of his habitually bad disposition. 17 Molina, Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 8, p. 36; also quoted by Billot, De virt. infusis, 1905, P. 176. 18 This cannot all be regarded as applying to habitual grace, which is not a subsequent but a permanent aid; hence it must refer to actual grace.

19 Cf. De malo, q.6, a. 1 ad 3. “In all things divine providence works infallibly, and yet effects to proceed from contingent causes dependently to the extent that God moves all things proportionately, each according to its own mode.”

For, as St. Thomas declares (Ia, 4.19, a.6 ad): “Whatever God wills absolutely is done, even if what He wills antecedently is not done.” But all the good which takes place here and now, even the least, was from eternity tile object of the consequent divine will, which concerns, as stated in the same place, not the absolute good, as it were abstractly, with which the antecedent will deals, but the good here and now clothed in all its circumstances; for no good comes about except by the intention of slightest and easiest here and now, except by virtue of the accompanying consequent will, which is concerned with the good regarded here and now and infallibly produces it. Cf. our La prédestination des saints et la grâce, 1936, pp. 381-94. In thus explaining metaphysically the distinction of Damascene, reconciling it with the dogmas of divine omnipotence and predestination, St. Thomas shows the supreme, fundamental distinction between efficacious grace, which proceeds from the consequent will of God, and sufficient grace, which proceeds from His antecedent will. 20 Then it is final passive perseverance, requiring no cooperation, since an infant is not capable of cooperation. 21 Then it is perseverance not only passive but active, including at least a certain brief cooperation. 22 Cf. Tabulam auream, s.v. Perseverantia. 23 It is obvious that the divine withdrawal of efficacious grace is a punishment, and as a punishment it presupposes at least an initial fault or resistance to sufficient grace.  And on the other hand, even an initial fault presupposes the divine permission of it.  To confuse this divine permission with a divine refusal or with the withdrawal of efficacious grace is to set the punishment before the fault, and this is the cruelty which is found in Calvinism, condemned at the Council of Trent.

Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, Chapter Three Rev. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.