LESSON XIV

Contingency in Things and the Roots of Contingency in Relation to

Singular Propositions About the Future in Contingent Matter

             18b 26 These absurd consequences and others like them result if of every affirmation and negation, whether in regard to universals taken universally or in regard to singulars, one of the opposites must be true and the other false: that nothing is indeterminate to either of two in things that come about but all are and take place of necessity; consequently, there will be no need to deliberate nor to take pains about something, as though if we were to do this, such a thing would follow and if we were not to do this, it would not follow.

             18b 33 For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years and another person saying it will not; and on the aforesaid supposition, whichever of these was truly said at that time will take place of necessity.

             18b 36 Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not; for it is evident that things either will take place or will not even if one person has not affirmed and the other denied it. For it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or will not be, whether in ten thousand years or any other space of time.

             Therefore, if throughout all time it was the case that one thing or the other was truly said, it would be necessary that this take place; and of every one of the things that takes place it was always the case that it would necessarily take place. For what anyone truly says will be, cannot not take place; and of that which takes place, it was always true to say that it would be.

             19a 6 But these things appear to be impossible; for we see that both our deliberation about doing something and our action are principles of future events;

             19a 9 and that universally in the things not always in act there is a potentiality to be and not to be. In these there is the possibility either of being or not being, and so they may either take place or not take place.

             19a 12 We can point to many clear instances of this. For example, this cloak could be cut in half, and yet might not be but wear out first; likewise it is possible that it not be cut in half, for it could not wear out first if it were not possible that it not be cut.

             19a 16 So it is, too, in other things that are said to take place according to this kind of potentiality.

             19a 18 It is evident, then, that not all things are or take place of necessity, but some are indeterminate to either of two, in which case the affirmation is no more true than the negation; others take place more in one way than another, as in that which takes place for the most part, and yet it is possible for the other one to take place and the more frequent one not.

             1. The Philosopher has shown--by leading the opposite position to what is unlikely--that in singular future enunciations truth or falsity is not determinately in one of the opposites, as it is in other enunciations. Now he is going to show that the unlikely things to which it has led are impossibilities. First he shows that the things that followed are impossibilities; then he concludes what the truth is, where he says, Now that which is, when it is, necessarily is, etc.

             2. With respect to the impossibilities that follow he first states the unlikely things that follow from the opposite position, then shows that these follow from the aforesaid position, where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc. Finally he shows that these are impossibilities where he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc.

             He says, then, concluding from the preceding reasoning, that these unlikely things follow--if the position is taken that of opposed enunciations one of the two must be determinately true and the other false in the same way in singular as in universal enunciations--namely, that in things that come about nothing is indeterminate to either of two, but all things are and take place of necessity. From this he infers two other unlikely things that follow. First, it will not be necessary to deliberate about anything; whereas he proved in III Ethicorum that counsel is not concerned with things that take place necessarily but only with contingent things, i.e., things which can be or not be.

             Secondly, all human actions that are for the sake of some end (for example, a business transaction to acquire riches) will be superfluous, because what we intend will take place whether we take pains to bring it about or not--if all things come about of necessity. This, however, is in opposition to the intention of men, for they seem to deliberate and to transact business with the intention that if they do this there will be such a result, but if they do something else, there will be another result.

             3. Where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc., he proves that the said unlikely things follow from the said position. First he shows that the unlikely things follow from the positing of a certain possibility; then he shows that the same unlikely things follow even if that possibility is not posited, where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc.

             He says, then, that it is not impossible that a thousand years before, when men neither knew nor ordained any of the things that are taking place now, a man said, "This will be," for example, that such a state would be overthrown, and another man said, "This will not be." But if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, one of them must have spoken the truth. Therefore one of them had to take place of necessity; and this same reasoning holds for all other things. Therefore everything takes place of necessity.

             4. Then he shows that the same thing follows if this possibility is not posited where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. It makes no difference in relation to the existence or outcome of things whether a person denies that this is going to take place when it is affirmed, or not; for as was previously said, the event will either take place or not whether the affirmation and denial have been made or not. That something is or is not does not result from a change in the course of things to correspond to our affirmation or denial, for the truth of our enunciation is not the cause of the existence of things, but rather the converse. Nor does it make any difference to the outcome of what is now being done whether it was affirmed or denied a thousand years before, or at any other time before. Therefore, if in all past time, the truth of enunciations was such that one of the opposites had to have been truly said and if upon the necessity of something being truly said it follows that this must be or take place, it will follow that everything that takes place is such that it takes place of necessity. The reason he assigns for this consequence is the following. If it is posited that someone truly says this will be, it is not possible that it will not be, just as having supposed that man is, he cannot not be a rational mortal animal. For to be truly said means that it is such as is said. Moreover, the relationship of what is said now to what will be is the same as the relationship of what was said previously to what is in the present or the past. Therefore, all things have necessarily happened, and they are necessarily happening, and they will necessarily happen, for of what is accomplished now, as existing in the present or in the past, it was always true to say that it would be.

             5. When he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc., he shows that what has been said is impossible. He shows this first by reason, secondly by sensible examples, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc.

             First he argues that the position taken is impossible in relation to human affairs, for clearly man seems to be the principle of the future things that he does insofar as he is the master of his own actions and has the power to act or not to act. Indeed, to reject this principle would be to do away with the whole order of human association and all the principles of moral philosophy. For men are attracted to good and withdrawn from evil by persuasion and threat, and by punishment and reward; but rejection of this principle would make these useless and thus nullify the whole of civil science.

             Here the Philosopher accepts it as an evident principle that man is the principle of future things. However, he is not the principle of future things unless he deliberates about a thing and then does it. In those things that men do without deliberation they do not have dominion over their acts, i.e., they do not judge freely about things to be done, but are moved to act by a kind of natural instinct such as is evident in the case of brute animals. Hence, the conclusion that it is not necessary for us to take pains about something or to deliberate is impossible; likewise what it followed from is impossible, i.e., that all things take place of necessity.

             6. Then he shows that this is also the case in other things where he says, and that universally in the things not always in act, there is a potentiality to be and not to be, etc. In natural things, too, it is evident that there are some things not always in act; it is therefore possible for them to be or not be, otherwise they would either always be or always not be. Now that which is not begins to be something by becoming it; as for example, that which is not white begins to be white by becoming white. But if it does not become white it continues not to be white. Therefore, in things that have the possibility of being and not being, there is also the possibility of becoming and not becoming. Such things neither are nor come to be of necessity but there is in them the kind of possibility which disposes them to becoming and not becoming, to being and not being.

             7. Next he shows the impossibility of what was said by examples perceptible to the senses, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc. Take a new garment for example. It is evident that it is possible to cut it, for nothing stands in the way of cutting it either on the part of the agent or the patient. He proves it is at once possible that it be cut and that it not be cut in the same way he has already proved that two opposed indefinite enunciations are at once true, i.e., by the assumption of contraries. Just as it is possible that the garment be cut, so it is possible that it wear out, i.e., be corrupted in the course of time. But if it wears out it is not cut. Therefore both are possible, i.e., that it be cut and that it not be cut. From this he concludes universally in regard to other future things which are not always in act, but are in potency, that not all are or take place of necessity; some are indeterminate to either of two, and therefore are not related any more to affirmation than to negation; there are others in which one possibility happens for the most part, although it is possible, but for the least part, that the other part be true, and not the part which happens for the most part.

             8. With regard to this question about the possible and the necessary, there have been different opinions, as Boethius says in his Commentary, and these will have to be considered. Some who distinguished them according to result--for example, Diodorus--said that the impossible is that which never will be, the necessary, that which always will be, and the possible, that which sometimes will be, sometimes not.

             The Stoics distinguished them according to exterior restraints. They said the necessary was that which could not be prevented from being true, the impossible, that which is always prevented from being true, and the possible, that which can be prevented or not be prevented.

             However, the distinctions in both of those cases seem to be inadequate. The first distinctions are a posteriori, for something is not necessary because it always will be, but rather, it always will be because it is necessary; this holds for the possible as well as the impossible. The second designation is taken from what is external and accidental, for something is not necessary because it does not have an impediment, but it does not have an impediment because it is necessary.

             Others distinguished these better by basing their distinction on the nature of things. They said that the necessary is that which in its nature is determined only to being, the impossible, that which is determined only to nonbeing, and the possible, that which is not altogether determined to either, whether related more to one than to another or related equally to both. The latter is known as that which is indeterminate to either of two.

             Boethius attributes these distinctions to Philo. However, this is clearly the opinion of Aristotle here, for he gives as the reason for the possibility and contingency in the things we do the fact that we deliberate, and in other things the fact that matter is in potency to either of two opposites.

             9. But this reasoning does not seem to be adequate either. While it is true that in corruptible bodies matter is in potency to being and nonbeing, and in celestial bodies there is potency to diverse location; nevertheless nothing happens contingently in celestial bodies, but only of necessity. Consequently, we have to say that the potentiality of matter to either of two, if we are speaking generally, does not suffice as a reason for contingency unless we add on the part of the active potency that it is not wholly determined to one; for if it is so determined to one that it cannot be impeded, it follows that it necessarily reduces into act the passive potency in the same mode.

             10. Considering this, some maintained that the very potency which is in natural things receives necessity from some cause determined to one. This cause they called fate. The Stoics, for example, held that fate was to be found in a series or interconnection of causes on the assumption that everything that happens has a cause; but when a cause has been posited the effect is posited of necessity, and if one per se cause does not suffice, many causes concurring for this take on the nature of one sufficient cause; so, they concluded, everything happens of necessity.

             11. Aristotle refutes this reasoning in VI Metaphysicae by destroying each of the assumed propositions. He says there that not everything that takes place has a cause, but only what is per se has a cause. What is accidental does not have a cause, for it is not properly being but is more like nonbeing, as Plato also held. Whence, to be musical has a cause and likewise to be white, but to be musical white does not have a cause; and the same is the case with all others of this kind.

             It is also false that when a cause has been posited--even a sufficient one--the effect must be posited, for not every cause (even if it is sufficient) is such that its effect cannot be impeded. For example, fire is a sufficient cause of the combustion of wood, but if water is poured on it the combustion is impeded.

             12. However, if both of the aforesaid propositions were true, it would follow infallibly that everything happens necessarily. For if every effect has a cause, then it would be possible to reduce an effect (which is going to take place in five days or whatever time) to some prior cause, and so on until it reaches a cause which is now in the present or already has been in the past. Moreover, if when the cause is posited it is necessary that the effect be posited, the necessity would reach through an order of causes all the way to the ultimate effect. For instance, if someone eats salty food, he will be thirsty; if he is thirsty, he will go outside to drink; if he goes outside to drink, he will be killed by robbers. Therefore, once he has eaten salty food, it is necessary that he be killed. To exclude this position, Aristotle shows that both of these propositions are false.

             13. However, some persons object to this on the grounds that everything accidental is reduced to something per se and therefore an effect that is accidental must be reduced to a per se cause.

             Those who argue in this way fail to take into account that the accidental is reduced to the per se inasmuch as it is accidental to that which is per se; for example, musical is accidental to Socrates, and every accident to some subject existing per se. Similarly, everything accidental in some effect is considered in relation to some per se effect, which effect, in relation to that which is per se, has a per se cause, but in relation to what is in it accidentally does not have a per se cause but an accidental one. The reason for this is that the effect must be proportionately referred to its cause, as is said in II Physicorum and in V Metaphysicae.

             14. Some, however, not considering the difference between accidental and per se effects, tried to reduce all the effects that come about in this world to some per se cause. They posited as this cause the power of the heavenly bodies and assumed fate to be dependent on this power--fate being, according to them, nothing else but the power of the position of the constellations.

             But such a cause cannot bring about necessity in all the things accomplished in this world, since many things come about from intellect and will, which are not subject per se and directly to the power of the heavenly bodies. For the intellect, or reason, and the will which is in reason, are not acts of a corporeal organ (as is proved in the treatise De anima and consequently cannot be directly subject to the power of the heavenly bodies, since a corporeal force, of itself, can only act on a corporeal thing. The sensitive powers, on the other hand, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, are accidentally subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. Hence, the Philosopher in his book De anima ascribes the opinion that the will of man is subject to the movement of the heavens to those who hold the position that the intellect does not differ from sense. The power of the heavenly bodies, however, does indirectly redound to the intellect and will inasmuch as the intellect and will use the sensitive powers. But clearly the passions of the sensitive powers do not induce necessity of reason and will, for the continent man has wrong desires but is not seduced by them, as is shown in VII Ethicorum. Therefore, we may conclude that the power of the heavenly bodies does not bring about necessity in the things done through reason and will.

             This is also the case in other corporeal effects of corruptible things, in which many things happen accidentally. What is accidental cannot be reduced to a per se cause in a natural power because the power of nature is directed to some one thing; but what is accidental is not one; whence it was said above that the enunciation "Socrates is a white musical being" is not one because it does not signify one thing. This is the reason the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia that many things of which the signs pre-exist in the heavenly bodies--for example in storm clouds and tempests--do not take place because they are accidentally impeded. And although this impediment considered as such is reduced to some celestial cause, the concurrence of these, since it is accidental, cannot be reduced to a cause acting naturally.

             15. However, what is accidental can be taken as one by the intellect. For example, "the white is musical," which as such is not one, the intellect takes as one, i.e., insofar as it forms one enunciation by composing. And in accordance with this it is possible to reduce what in itself happens accidentally and fortuitously to a preordaining intellect. For example, the meeting of two servants at a certain place may be accidental and fortuitous with respect to them, since neither knew the other would be there, but be per se intended by their master who sent each of them to encounter the other in a certain place.

             16. Accordingly, some have maintained that everything whatever that is effected in this world--even the things that seem fortuitous and casual--is reduced to the order of divine providence on which they said fate depends. Other foolish men have denied this, judging of the Divine Intellect in the mode of our intellect which does not know singulars. But the position of the latter is false, for His divine thinking and willing is His very being. Hence, just as His being by its power comprehends all that is in any way (i.e., inasmuch as it is through participation of Him) so also His thinking and what He thinks comprehend all knowing and everything knowable, and His willing and what He wills comprehend all desiring and every desirable good; in other words, whatever is knowable falls under His knowledge and whatever is good falls under His will, just as whatever is falls under His active power, which He comprehends perfectly, since He acts by His intellect.

             17. It may be objected, however, that if Divine Providence is the per se cause of everything that happens in this world, at least of good things, it would look as though everything takes place of necessity: first on the part of His knowledge, for His knowledge cannot be fallible, and so it would seem that what He knows happens necessarily; secondly, on the part of the will, for the will of God cannot be inefficacious; it would seem, therefore, that everything He wills happens of necessity.

             18. These objections arise from judging of the cognition of the divine intellect and the operation of the divine will in the way in which these are in us, when in fact they are very dissimilar.

             19. On the part of cognition or knowledge it should be noted that in knowing things that take place according to the order of time, the cognitive power that is contained in any way under the order of time is related to them in another way than the cognitive power that is totally outside of the order of time. The order of place provides a suitable example of this. According to the Philosopher in IV Physicorum, before and after in movement, and consequently in time, corresponds to before and after in magnitude. Therefore, if there are many men passing along some road, any one of those in the ranks has knowledge of those preceding and following as preceding and following, which pertains to the order of place. Hence any one of them sees those who are next to him and some of those who precede him; but he cannot see those who follow behind him. If, however, there were someone outside of the whole order of those passing along the road, for instance, stationed in some high tower where he could see the whole road, he would at once see all those who were on the road--not under the formality of preceding and subsequent (i.e., in relation to his view) but all at the same time and how one precedes another.

             Now, our cognition falls under the order of time, either per se or accidentally; whence the soul in composing and dividing necessarily includes time, as is said in III De anima. Consequently, things are subject to our cognition under the aspect of present, past, and future. Hence the soul knows present things as existing in act and perceptible by sense in some way; past things it knows as remembered; future things are not known in themselves because they do not yet exist, but can be known in their causes--with certitude if they are totally determined in their causes so that they will take place of necessity; by conjecture if they are not so determined that they cannot be impeded, as in the case of those things that are for the most part; in no way if in their causes they are wholly in potency, i.e., not more determined to one than to another, as in the case of those that are indeterminate to either of two. The reason for this is that a thing is not knowable according as it is in potency, but only according as it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in IX Metaphysicae.

             20. God, however, is wholly outside the order of time, stationed as it were at the summit of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to Him the whole course of time is subjected in one simple intuition. For this reason, He sees in one glance everything that is effected in the evolution of time, and each thing as it is in itself, and it is not future to Him in relation to His view as it is in the order of its causes alone (although He also sees the very order of the causes), but each of the things that are in whatever time is seen wholly eternally as the human eye sees Socrates sitting, not in its causes but in itself.

             21. Now from the fact that man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his sitting which concerns the order of cause to effect, is not destroyed; yet the eye of man most certainly and infallibly sees Socrates sitting while he is sitting, since each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Hence it follows that God knows all things that take place in time most certainly and infallibly, and yet the things that happen in time neither are nor take place of necessity, but contingently.

             22. There is likewise a difference to be noted on the part of the divine will, for the divine will must be understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing the whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are differences of being, and therefore necessity and contingency in things and the distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes originate from the divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the effects that He wills to be necessary, and He ordains causes acting contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects that He wills to be contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects are called either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine will as on a first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency.

             This, however, cannot be said of the human will, nor of any other cause, for every other cause already falls under the order of necessity or contingency; hence, either the cause itself must be able to fail or, if not, its effect is not contingent, but necessary. The divine will, on the other hand, is unfailing; yet not all its effects are necessary, but some are contingent.

             23. Some men, in their desire to show that the will in choosing is necessarily moved by the desirable, argued in such a way as to destroy the other root of contingency the Philosopher posits here, based on our deliberation. Since the good is the object of the will, they argue, it cannot (as is evident) be diverted so as not to seek that which seems good to it; as also it is not possible to divert reason so that it does not assent to that which seems true to it. So it seems that choice, which follows upon deliberation, always takes place of necessity; thus all things of which we are the principle through deliberation and choice, will take place of necessity.

             24. In regard to this point there is a similar diversity with respect to the good and with respect to the true that must be noted. There are some truths that are known per se, such as the first indemonstrable principles; these the intellect assents to of necessity. There are others, however, which are not known per se, but through other truths. The condition of these is twofold. Some follow necessarily from the principles, i.e., so that they cannot be false when the principles are true. This is the case with all the conclusions of demonstrations, and the intellect assents necessarily to truths of this kind after it has perceived their order to the principles, but not before. There are others that do not follow necessarily from the principles, and these can be false even though the principles be true. This is the case with things about which there can be opinion. To these the intellect does not assent necessarily, although it may be inclined by some motive more to one side than another.

             Similarly, there is a good that is desirable for its own sake, such as happiness, which has the nature of an ultimate end. The will necessarily adheres to a good of this kind, for all men seek to be happy by a certain kind of natural necessity. There are other good things that are desirable for the sake of the end. These are related to the end as conclusions are to principles. The Philosopher makes this point clear in II Physicorum. If, then, there were some good things without the existence of which one could not be happy, these would be desirable of necessity, and especially by the person who perceives such an order. Perhaps to be, to live, and to think, and other similar things, if there are any, are of this kind. However, particular good things with which human acts are concerned are not of this kind nor are they apprehended as being such that without them happiness is impossible, for instance, to eat this food or that, or abstain from it. Such things, nevertheless, do have in them that whereby they move the appetite according to some good considered in them. The will, therefore, is not induced to choose these of necessity. And on this account the Philosopher expressly designates the root of the contingency of things effected by us on the part of deliberation--which is concerned with those things that are for the end and yet are not determined. In those things in which the means are determined there is no need for deliberation, as is said in III Ethicorum.

             These things have been stated to save the roots of contingency that Aristotle posits here, although they may seem to exceed the mode of logical matter.