LESSON XIV

The Opposition of True and False that Constitutes Contrariety of

Opinions Is Opposition According to Affirmation and Negation of

the Same Predicate of the Same Subject

             23b 13 Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. Now the things from which fallacies arise are the things from which generations arise; but generations are from opposites, therefore also fallacies.

             23b 15 Now if that which is good is both good and not evil, the former per se, the latter accidentally (for it is accidental to that which is good not to be evil), and the true opinion which is a per se opinion of a thing is more true, then the false opinion which is a per se opinion is also more false. But the opinion that that which is good is not good is a false opinion about what belongs per se to a good and the opinion that it is evil, a false opinion concerning what belongs to it accidentally. Therefore the opinion of the negation of the good will be more false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Now the one who holds the contrary opinion about each thing is most mistaken; for contraries are those that differ most with respect to the same thing. If, then, of two opinions one is the contrary, but the opinion of the negation is more contrary, it is evident that it must be the contrary. The opinion that that which is good is evil, however, is implicative; for probably along with this opinion one must understand that the good is not good.

             23b 27 Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in all other cases, it would seem that what we have said is correct; for the opposition of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere. Now in the case where there is no contrary, that opinion is false which is the opposite of the true opinion; for instance, he who thinks man is not man thinks falsely. If then these are contraries, the others in which there is contradiction are also contraries.

             23b 33 Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel; so also are the opinions of that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it is good. What, then, would be the contrary of a true opinion that that which is not good is not good? It is not the opinion saying that it is evil. This might be at the same time true and a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion; for some things that are not good are evil and therefore it is possible for both opinions to be true. Nor is the opinion that it is not evil the contrary, for this too might be true, since something could be at one and the same time not good and not evil. It remains, therefore, that the contrary of an opinion that that which is not good is not good, is the false opinion that that which is not good is good; for the former is true. Therefore, also, the opinion that that which is good is not good is contrary to the opinion that that which is good is good.

             24a 3 It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, for the universal negation will be the contrary. For instance, the contrary of the opinion that everything that is good is good, is that nothing that is good is good. For the opinion that that which is good is good, if the good is taken universally, is the same as the opinion that whatever is good is good; and this is no different from the opinion that everything that is good is good. And the same is the case with respect to the not good.

             24b 1 If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the affirmation is the negation of the same subject universally. For example, the contrary of the enunciation "Everything good is good" is "Nothing good is good," or of "Every man is good," "No man is good." The contradictories, on the other hand, are "Not everything good is good," and "Not every man is good."

             24b 6 It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction. For contraries are about opposites, and while it is possible for the same thing to be said truly about contraries, it is not possible for contraries to belong at once to the same subject.

             1. Aristotle has just completed a subtle investigation in which he has shown that contrariety of matter does not constitute contrariety of opinion, nor does just any kind of opposition of true and false, but some opposition of true and false does. Now he intends to determine what kind of opposition of true and false it is that constitutes contrariety of opinions, for this will answer the question directly.

             He maintains that only opposition of opinions according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing, etc., constitutes their contrariety. Accordingly, as the response to the question, he intends to prove the following conclusion: opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing are contraries; and consequently, opinions opposed according to affirmation of contrary predicates of the same subject are not contraries, for if these were contraries, the true affirmative would have two contraries, which is impossible, since one is contrary to one other.

             2. Aristotle uses three arguments to prove this conclusion. The first one is as follows: Those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries. Opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same predicate of the same subject are those in which there is fallacy first. Therefore, these are contraries.

             The sense of the major is this: Opinions which first in the order of nature are the limits of fallacy, i.e., of deception or error, are contraries; for when someone is deceived or errs, there are two limits, the one from which he turns away and the one toward which he turns.

             In the text the major of the argument is posited first: Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. By uniting this part of the text adversatively with what was said previously, Aristotle implies that not just any of the number of opinions enumerated are contraries, but those in which there is fallacy first in the manner we have explained. Then he gives this proof of the minor: those things from which generations are and from which fallacies are, are the same proportionally; generations are from opposites according to affirmation and negation; therefore fallacies, too, are from opposites according to affirmation and negation (which was assumed in the minor). Hence he posits the major of this prosyllogism: Now the things from which fallacies arise, namely, limits, are the things from which generations arise--proportionally however. Under it he posits the minor: but generations are from opposites, i.e., according to affirmation and negation. Finally, he concludes, therefore also fallacies, i.e., they are from opposites according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing.

             3. This proof will be more evident from the following: Knowledge and fallacy, or error, bring about the same thing in the intellect's progression as generation and corruption do in nature's progression. For just as natural perfections are acquired by generations and perish by corruptions, so intellectual perfections are acquired by knowledge and lost by errors or deceptions. Accordingly, just as generation and corruption are between affirmation and negation as proper terms, as is said in V Physicae, so both to know something and to be deceived about it is between affirmation and negation as proper terms. Consequently, what one who knows attains first in the second operation of the intellect is affirmation of the truth, and what he rejects per se and first is the negation of it. In like manner, what he who is deceived loses per se and first is affirmation of the truth, and acquires first is negation of the truth. Therefore Aristotle is correct in maintaining that the terms between which there is generation first and between which there is fallacy first are the same, because with respect to both, the terms are affirmation and negation.

             4. When he says, Now, if that which is good is both good and not evil, the former per se, the latter accidentally, etc., he intends to prove the major of the principal argument. He has already shown that the opinions in which there is fallacy first are affirmation and negation, and therefore in place of the major to be proved (i.e., opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries) he uses his conclusion--which has already been shown to be equivalent--that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries. Thus with his customary brevity he at once proves the major, responds directly to the question, and applies it to what he has proposed.

             In place of the major, then, he proves the conclusion principally intended, i.e., that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries, and not those opposed according to affirmation of contraries about the same thing. His argument is as follows: A true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it are contrary opinions, but opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are the true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it; therefore, opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are contraries. The major is proved thus: those things that are most distant in respect to the same thing are contraries; but the true and the more false are most distant in respect to the same thing, as is clear. The proof of the minor is that the opposite according to negation of the same thing of the same thing is per se false in relation to the true affirmation of it. But a per se false opinion is more false than any other, since each thing that is per se such is more such than anything that is such by reason of something else.

             5. Accordingly, returning to the opinions already given in proposing the question so as to show his intention more clearly by example, he begins with the proof of the minor. There are four opinions, of which two are true, "A good is good," "A good is not evil"; two are false, "A good is not good" and "A good is evil." It is evident that the first is true by reason of itself, the second accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, for not to be evil is added to that which is good. Hence, "A good is not evil" is true because a good is good, and not contrarily. Therefore, the first of these opinions, which is per se true, is more true than the second, for in each genus that which per se is true is more true. The two false opinions are to be judged in the same way. The more false is the one that is per se false. The first of them, the negative, "A good is not good," in relation to the affirmative, "A good is good," is per se false, not false by reason of another. The second, the affirmative of the contrary, "A good is evil," in relation to the same opinion, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another (for "A good is evil" is not immediately falsified by the true opinion, "A good is good," but mediately through the other false opinion "A good is not good"). Therefore, the negation of the same thing is more false in respect to a true affirmation than the affirmation of a contrary. This was assumed in the minor.

             6. As was pointed out above, Aristotle returns to the opinions already posited, and infers the first two true opinions: Now if that which is good is both good and not evil, and if what the first opinion says is true per se, i.e., by reason of itself, and what the second opinion says is true accidentally (since it is accidental to it, i.e., added to it, that is, to the good, not to be evil), and if in each order that which is per se true is more true, then that which is per se false is more false, since, as has been shown, the true also is of this nature, namely, that the more true is that which per se is true.

             Therefore, of the two false opinions proposed in the question, namely, "A good is not good," and "A good is evil," the one saying that what is good is not good, namely, the negative, is an opinion positing what is per se false, i.e., by reason of itself it contains falsity in it. The other false opinion, the one saying it is evil, namely, the affirmative contrary in respect to it, i.e., in respect to the affirmation saying that a good is good, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another.

             Then he gives the minor: Therefore, the opinion of the negation of the good will be more false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Next, he posits the major, the one who holds the contrary judgment about each thing is most mistaken, i.e., in relation to the true judgment the contrary is more false. This was assumed in the major. He gives as the proof of this, for contraries are those that differ most with respect to the same thing, for nothing differs more from a true opinion than the more false opinion in respect to it.

             7. Finally, he directly approaches the question. If (for "since"), then, of two opinions (namely, false opinions--the negation of the same thing and the affirmation of a contrary), one is the contrary of the true affirmation, and, the contradictory opinion, i.e., the negation of the same thing of the same thing, is more contrary according to falsity, i.e., is more false, it is evident that the false opinion of negation will be contrary to the true affirmation, and conversely. The opinion saying that what is good is evil, i.e., the affirmation of a contrary, is not the contrary but implies it, i.e., it implies in itself the opinion contrary to the true opinion, i.e., "A good is not good." The reason for this is that the one conceiving the affirmation of a contrary must conceive that the same thing of which he affirms the contrary, is not good. If, for example, someone conceives that life is evil, he must conceive that life is not good, for the former necessarily follows upon the latter and not conversely. Hence, affirmation of a contrary is said to be implicative, but negation of the same thing of the same thing is not implicative. This concludes the first argument.

             8. The general rule about the contrariety of opinions that Aristotle has given here (namely, that contrary opinions are those opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing) is accurate both in itself and in the propositions assumed for its proof. Many questions may arise, however, as a consequence of this doctrine and its proof. First of all, all philosophers hold that opposition according to affirmation and negation constitutes contradiction, not contrariety. How, then, can Aristotle maintain that opinions opposed in this way are contraries? The difficulty is augmented by the fact that he has said that those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries, yet he adds that they are opposed as the terms of generation are, which he establishes to be opposed contradictorily. In addition, there is a difficulty as to the way in which the assertion of St. Thomas, which we used above, is true, namely, that no two opinions are opposed contradictorily, since here it is explicitly said that some are opposed according to affirmation and negation.

             The second question involves his assumption that the contrary of each true opinion is per se false. This does not seem to be true, for according to what was determined previously, the contrary of the true opinion "Socrates is white" is "Socrates is not white." But this is not per se false, for the opposed affirmation is true accidentally, and hence its negation is false accidentally. Falsity is accidental to such an enunciation because, being in contingent matter, it can be changed into a true one.

             A third difficulty arises from the fact that Aristotle says the contradictory opinion is more contrary. He seems to be proposing, according to this, that both the opinion of the negation and of a contrary are contrary to a true affirmation. Consequently, he is either positing two opinions contrary to one or he is not taking contrariety strictly, although we showed above that he was taking contrariety properly and strictly.

             9. In order to answer all of the difficulties in regard to the first argument it must be noted that opinions, or intellectual conceptions in the second operation, can be taken in three ways: (1) according to what they are absolutely; (2) according to the things they represent absolutely, (3) according to the things they represent, as they are in opinions. We will omit the first since it does not belong to the present consideration. If they are taken in the second way, i.e., according to the things represented, there can be opposition of contradiction, of privation, and of contrariety among them. The mental enunciation "Socrates sees," according to what it represents, is opposed contradictorily to "Socrates does not see"; privatively to "Socrates is blind"; contrarily to "Socrates is purblind." Aristotle points out the reason for this in the Postpredicamenta: not only is blindness privation of sight but to be blind is also a privation of to be seeing, and so of others.

             Opinions taken in the third way, i.e., as the things represented through opinions are in the opinions, have no opposition except contrariety; for opposites as they are in opinions, whether represented contradictorily or privatively or contrarily, only admit of the opposition that can be found between two real beings, for opinions are real beings. The rule is that whatever belongs to something according to the being which it has in another, belongs to it according to the mode and nature of that in which it is, and not according to what its own nature would require. Now, between real beings only contrariety is found formally. (I am omitting here the consideration of relative opposition.) Therefore, opinions taken in this mode, if they are opposed, represent contrariety, although not all are contraries properly. Only those differing most in respect to truth and falsity about the same thing are contraries properly. Now Aristotle proved that these are judgments affirming and denying the same thing of the same thing. Therefore, these are the true contraries. The rest are called contraries by reduction to these.

             10. From this the answer to the objections is clear. We grant that affirmation and negation in themselves constitute contradiction. In actual judgments, affirmation and negation cause contrariety between opinions because of the extreme distance they posit between real beings, namely, true opinion and false opinion in respect to the same thing. And these two stand at the same time: those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as the terms of generation are and yet they are contraries by the use of the foresaid distinction--for they are opposed contradictorily as terms of generation according to the things represented, but they are contraries insofar as they have in themselves those contradictories and hence differ most.

             It is also evident that there is no disagreement between Aristotle and St. Thomas, for we have shown that it is true that some opinions are opposed according to affirmation and negation if we consider the things represented, as is said here.

             11. It will be noted, however, by those of you who are more penetrating and advanced in your thinking, that between opposite opinions there is something of true motion when a change is made from the affirmed to the affirmed; but according to the order of representation there is a certain similitude to generation and corruption so long as the change is bounded by affirmation and negation. Consequently, fallacy or error may be regarded in different ways. Sometimes it has the aspect of both movement and change. This is the case when someone changes his opinion from a true one to one that is per se false, or conversely. Sometimes change alone is imitated. This happens when someone arrives at a false opinion apart from a former true opinion. Sometimes, however, there is movement in every respect. This is the case when reason passes from the true affirmation to the false affirmation of a contrary about the same thing.

             However, since the first root of being in error is the opposition of affirmation and negation, Aristotle is correct in saying that those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as are the terms of generation.

             12. With respect to the second question, I say that there is an equivocation of the term "per se false" and "per se true" in the objection. Opinion, as well as enunciation, can be called per se true or false in two ways. It can be called per se true in itself. This is the case in respect to all opinions and enunciations that are in accordance with the modes of perseity enumerated in I Posteriorum. Similarly, they can be said to be per se false according to the same modes. An example of this would be "Man is not an animal." Per se true or false is not taken in this mode in the rule about contrariety of opinions and enunciations, as the objection concludes. For if this were needed for contrariety of opinions there could not be contrary opinions in contingent matter, which is false.

             Secondly, an opinion or enunciation can be said to be per se true or false in respect to its opposite: per se true with respect to its opposite false opinion, and per se false with respect to its opposite true opinion. Accordingly, to say that an opinion is per se true in respect to its opposite is to say that on its own account and not on account of another it is verified by the falsity of its opposite. Similarly, to say that an opinion is per se false in respect to its opposite means that on its own account and not on account of another it is falsified by the truth of the opposite. For example, the opinion that is per se false in respect to the true opinion "Socrates is running" is not, "Socrates is sitting," since the falsity of the latter does not immediately follow from the former, but mediately from the false opinion, "Socrates is not running." It is the latter opinion that is per se false in relation to "Socrates is running," since it is falsified on its own account by the truth of the opinion "Socrates is running," and not through an intermediary. Similarly, the per se true opinion in respect to the false opinion "Socrates is four-footed" is not, "Socrates is two-footed," for the truth of the latter does not by itself make the former false; rather, it is through "Socrates is not four-footed" as a medium, which is per se true in respect to "Socrates is four-footed"; for "Socrates is not four-footed" is verified on its own account by the falsity of "Socrates is four-footed," as is evident.

             We are using "per se true" and "per se false" in this second mode in propounding the rule concerning contrariety of opinions and enunciations. Thus the rule that the true opinion and the per se false opinion in relation to it and the false opinion and the per se true in relation to it are contraries, is universally true in all matter. Consequently, the response to the objection is clear, for it results from taking "per se true" and "per se false" in the first mode.

             13. The answer to the third difficulty is the following. Since there is no other opposition but contrariety between opinions pertaining to each other, Aristotle (since he chose to use limited terms) has been forced to say that one is more contrary than another, which implies that both have opposition of contrariety in respect to a true opinion. However, he determines immediately that only one of them, the negative opinion, is contrary to a true affirmation, when he adds, it is evident that it must be the contrary.

             What he says, then, is that each, i.e., both negation of the same thing and affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to a true affirmation, and that only one of them, i.e., the negation, is contrary. Both of these statements are true, for both contrarieties are caused by an opposition contrary to the affirmation, as was said, but not uniformly. The opinion of negation is contrary first and per se, the opinion of affirmation of a contrary, secondarily and accidentally, i.e., through another, namely, by reason of the negative opinion, as has already been shown. There is a parallel to this in natural things: both black and red are contrary to white, the former first, the latter reductively, i.e., inasmuch as red is reduced to black in a motion from white to red, as is said in V Physicorum.

             However, the second statement, i.e., that only one of them, the negation, is contrary, is true simply, for the most distant extremes of one extent are contraries absolutely. Now there are only two extremes of one distance and since between opinions pertaining to each other true affirmation is at one extreme, the remaining extreme must be granted to only one false opinion, i.e., to the one that is most distant from the true opinion. This has been proved to be the negative opinion. Only this one, then, is contrary to that absolutely speaking. Other opposites are contrary by reason of this one, as was said of those in between.

             Therefore, Aristotle has not posited many opinions contrary to one, nor used contrariety in a broad sense, both of which were maintained by the objector.

             14. When Aristotle says, Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in all other cases, it would seem that what we have said is correct, etc., he gives the second argument to prove that the negation of the same thing is contrary to the affirmation, and not the affirmation of a contrary. If opinions are necessarily related in a similar way, i.e., in the same way, in other matter, that is, in such a way that affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries in other matter, it would seem that what we have said about the opinions of that which is good and that which is evil is correct, i.e., that the contrary of the affirmation of that which is good is not the affirmation of evil but the negation of good. He proves this consequence when he adds: for the opposition of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere, i.e., in every matter one part of a contradiction must be judged contrary to its affirmation--or never, i.e., in no matter. For if there is a general art which deals with contrary opinions, contrary opinions must be taken everywhere and in every matter in one and the same mode. Consequently, if in any matter, negation of the same thing of the same thing is the contrary of the affirmation, then in all matter negation of the same thing of the same thing will be the contrary of the affirmation.

             Since he intends in his proof to conclude from the position of the antecedent, Aristotle affirms the antecedent through its cause: in matter in which there is not a contrary, such as substance and quantity, which have no contraries, as is said in the Predicamenta, the one contradictorily opposed to the true opinion is per se false. For example, he who thinks that man, for instance Socrates, is not man, is per se mistaken with regard to one who thinks that Socrates is man. Then he affirms the antecedent formally and concludes directly from the position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. If then these, namely, affirmation and negation in matter which lacks a contrary, are contraries, all other contradictions must be judged to be contraries.

             15. Then he says, Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. This begins the third argument to prove the same thing.

             The two opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and that it is not good, are related in the same way as the two opinions of that which is not good, that it is not good and that it is good; i.e., the opposition of contradiction is kept in both. The first opinion of each combination is true, the second false. Hence with respect to the first true opinions of each combination he proposes this major: Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. With respect to the second false judgment of each combination he adds: so also are the opinions of that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it is good. This is the major. But the contrary of the true opinion of that which is not good, namely, the true opinion "That which is not good is not good," is not, "That which is not good is evil," nor "That which is not good is not evil," which have a contrary predicate, but the opinion that that which is not good is good, which is its contradictory. Therefore, the contrary of the true opinion of that which is good, namely, the true opinion "That which is good is good," will also be its contradictory, "That which is good is not good," and not the affirmation of the contrary "That which is good is evil." Hence he adds the minor which we have already stated: What, then, would be the contrary of the true opinion asserting that that which is not good is not good? The contrary of it is not the opinion which asserts the contrary predicate affirmatively, "That which is not good is evil," because these two are sometimes at once true. But a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion. That these two are sometimes at once true is evident from the fact that some things that are not good are evil. Take injustice; it is something not good, and it is evil. Therefore, contraries would be true at one and the same time, which is impossible. But neither is the contrary of the above true opinion the one asserting the contrary predicate negatively, "That which is not good is not evil," and for the same reason. These will also be true at the same time. For example, a chimera is something not good, and it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is not good and that it is not evil.

             There remains the third part of the minor: the contrary of the true opinion that that which is not good is not good is the opinion that it is good, which is the contradictory of it. Then he concludes as he intended: the opinion that a good is not good is contrary to the opinion that a good is good, i.e., its contradictory. Therefore, it must be judged that contradictions are contraries in every matter.

             16. He then says, It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, etc. Here he shows that the truth he has determined is extended to opinions of every quantity. The case has already been stated in respect to indefinites, particulars, and singulars. On this point their status is alike, for indefinites and particulars, unless they stand for the same thing, as is the case in singulars, are not opposed by way of affirmation and negation, since they are at once true. Therefore he turns his attention to those of universal quantity. It is evident, he says, that it will make no difference with respect to the proposed question if we posit the affirmations universally, for the contrary of the universal affirmative is the universal negative, and not the universal affirmation of a contrary. For example, the contrary of the opinion that everything that is good is good is the opinion that nothing that is good (i.e., no good) is good. He manifests this by the nominal definition of universal affirmative: for the opinion that that which is good is good, if the good is universal, i.e., the universal opinion "Every good is good," is the same, i.e., is equivalent to the opinion that whatever is good is good. Consequently, its negation is the contrary I have stated, "Nothing which is good is good," i.e., "No good is good."

             The case is similar with respect to the not good. The universal negation of the not good is opposed to the universal affirmation of the not good, as we have stated with respect to the good.

             17. Then he says, If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, etc. With this he returns to the question first advanced, to reply to it, for he has now completed the second on which the first depends. He first replies to the question, then manifests a point in the solution of a preceding difficulty where he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc.

             First, then, he replies directly to the question: If, therefore, contrariety is such in the case of opinions, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of affirmations and negations in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the affirmation, i.e., of the affirmative, enunciation, is the negation of the same subject. In other words, the negative enunciation of the same predicate of the same subject will be the contrary, and not the affirmative enunciation of a contrary. Thus the response to the first question--whether the contrary of the affirmative enunciation is its negative or the contrary affirmative--is clear. The answer is that the negative is the contrary.

             Next, he divides negation as it is contrary to affirmation, i.e., into the universal negation, and the contradictory: The universal, i.e., negation, is contrary to the affirmation, etc. In order to state this division by way of example he relates one enunciation to one enunciation: the contrary of the universal affirmative enunciation "Every good is good" or "Every man is good," is the universal negative "No good is good" or "No man is good." Again, relating one to one, he says that the contradictory negation contrary to the universal affirmation is "Not every man is good" or "Not everything good is good." Thus he posits both members of the division and makes the division evident.

             18. A difficulty arises at this point which we cannot disregard. If the contrary of the universal affirmative is a twofold negation, namely, the universal and the contradictory, either there are two contraries to one affirmation or Aristotle is using contrariety in a broad sense, although we showed that this was not the case apropos of an earlier passage of the text. The difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle said in the passage immediately preceding that it makes no difference if we take the universal negation as contrary to the universal affirmation, i.e., as one of its negations. Hence, the conclusion cannot be avoided that in the mode in which Aristotle speaks of contrariety here, there are two contrary negations to the universal affirmative.

             19. To clear up this difficulty we must note that it is one thing to speak of the contrariety there is between the negation of some universal affirmative in relation to the affirmation of a contrary, and another to speak of that same universal negative in relation to the negation contradictory to the same affirmative. For example, the four enunciations of which we are now speaking are the universal affirmative, the contradictory, the universal negative, and the universal affirmation of a contrary: "Every man is just," "Not every man is just," "No man is just," "Every man is unjust." Notice that although all the rest are contrary to the first in some way, there is a great difference between the contrariety of each to the first. The last one, the affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to the first by reason of the preceding universal negation, for it is false, not per se but by reason of that negation, i.e., it is implicative, as Aristotle has already proved. The third, the universal negation, is not per se contrary to the first either. It is contrary by reason of the second, the contradictory negation, and for the same reason, i.e., it is not per se false in respect to the truth of the affirmation but is implicative, for it contains the contradictory negation "Not every man is just," by means of which it is made false in respect to the truth of the affirmation. The reason for this is that the falsity of the contradictory negation is prior absolutely to the falsity of the universal negation, for the whole is more composite and posterior as compared to its parts. There is, therefore, an order among these three false enunciations. Only the contradictory negation is simply contrary to the true affirmation, for it is per se false simply in respect to the affirmation; the affirmative of the contrary is per accidens contrary, since it is per accidens false; the universal negation, which is a medium partaking of the nature of each extreme, is per se contrary and per se false as related to the affirmation of a contrary, but is per accidens false and per accidens contrary as related to the contradictory negation; just as red in a motion from red to black takes the place of white, and in a motion from red to white takes the place of black, as is said in V Physicorum.

             Therefore, it is one thing to speak of the universal negation in relation to affirmation of a contrary and another to speak of it in relation to the contradictory negation. If we are speaking of it in the first way, the universal negation is per se contrary and per se false; if in the second, it is not per se false or contrary to the affirmation.

             20. Since Aristotle is now treating the question as to which is the contrary of a true affirmation, affirmation of a contrary or the negation, and not the question as to which of the negations is contrary to a true affirmation--as is clear in the whole progression of the question--his answer is that both negations are contrary to the true affirmation without distinction, and that affirmation of a contrary is not. His intention is to manifest the diversity between the negation, and the affirmation of a contrary, inasmuch as they are contrary to a true affirmation. He does not intend to say that both negations are contrary simply, for this is not the difficulty in question here, but the former is.

             With respect to his saying that it makes no difference if we posit the universal negation, the same point applies, for in regard to showing that affirmation of a contrary is not contrary to a true affirmation, which is the question at issue here, it makes no difference which negation is posited. It would make a great deal of difference, however, if we wished to discuss which negation was contrary to a true affirmation.

             It is evident, then, that Aristotle's discussion of the true contrariety of enunciations is very subtle, for he has posited one to one contraries in every matter and quantity, and affirmed that contradictions are contraries simply.

             21. When he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc., he returns to a statement he has already made in order to prove it. It is evident, too, from what has been said, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, i.e., in vocal enunciation. He gives as the cause of this that contraries are opposites about the same thing; consequently, true enunciations and opinions about diverse things cannot be contraries. However, it is possible for all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing to be verified at the same time, inasmuch as the things signified or represented by them belong to the same thing at the same time; otherwise they are not true. Consequently, not all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing are contraries, for it is not possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, no true opinion or enunciation, whether it is about the same thing or is about another is contrary to another.

Notes

Footnotes

   Peri Hermeneias means literally, "On Interpretation" or "Explanation," but these English equivalents do not quite convey what Aristotle's treatise is about. The Greek--English Lexicon by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, (rev. ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953) adds to the meanings of "interpretation" or "explanation," "especially of thoughts by words." Consequently, Peri Hermeneias might be better translated "On the Enunciation," as St. Thomas also concludes in his Commentary (Introduction, n. 3). This latter translation might be more accurate since the principle subject of the treatise is the enunciation, i.e., speech which not only signifies something per se, as Boethius says, but which is either true or false; hence the definition of the enunciation as "speech in which there is truth or falsity." Cf. page 7, n. {g} of the Leonine edition for a discussion of ancient and modern opinions about the title of this work.

   J. Isaac, O.P., Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boèce a Saint Thomas (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1953).

   W.D. Ross, Aristotle (New York: Meridian Book, Inc., 1959), p. 292.

   In Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XIII, 23-71.

   For the chronology and authenticity Mandonnet, Des écrits authentiques de s. Thomas (2d ed., Fribourg: Imprimerie de l'oeuvre de Saint-Paul, 1910); M. Grabmann, Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Beiträge, zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XXII, No. 1-2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1931); A. Walz, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Écrits," in Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique, XV, No. 1, (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1926), 635-41; M. D. Chenu, Introduction a l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin, XI (Montreal: Institut l'Étude Médiévaux, 1950).

   The Preface of the Leonine edition can be consulted for a more detailed account of these supplements; also, Isaac, op. cit., pp. 86, 111-12.

   The World of Mathematics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956) III, 1848.

   Formal Logic or the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (London: Taylor and Walton, 1847), p. 37.

   (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 14, n. 2.

   Actually: {dynamis hama tes antiphaseos}. See Metaphysics, {Th}, 8, 1050b 10.

   The prima facie explanation of this apparent digression on contingency might be found in what seems to be a similar case. In Physics I, Aristotle points out that it is not for the natural scientist to argue against those (such as Parmenides and Melissus) who deny the very subject and principles of his science; he then proceeds, without explicit justification, to do so nonetheless. His discussion is actually logical and metaphysical, as he himself points out. Why then could one not say the same of his procedure in the Peri Hermeneias? Actually, the difference is a considerable one. In the Physics he proceeds as he does to relieve our minds, for if Parmenides were right, there could be no natural science. But in the Peri Hermeneias, the treatment of contingency is not a digression: it is intrinsically necessary to a certain division of propositions, namely, into those which are determinately true or determinately false and those which are neither.

   Metaph. {D}, 12, 1019b 34.

   The logical treatises of the late fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries contain far more metaphysics than logic.

   "And because it is not easy for a man to grasp two things at once, for when he attends to two things he can grasp neither, it is absurd that a man should seek simultaneously to acquire scientific knowledge and the method which belongs to this science. This is the reason one must learn logic before the other sciences, for logic provides the common method of procedure in all the other sciences. But the method proper to any given science must be taught at the beginning of that science." In II Metaph. lect. 5, (Cathala edit.) n. 335.

   On this score even the more outstanding late Scholastics are more Cartesian than Aristotelian for they believed that whatever we understand first is distinctly and infallibly grasped once and for all. If such were indeed the case, divisions and definitions would not display new knowledge. How, then, could we account for the necessity of these? Such a position is patently contrary to experience and to what Aristotle records in the Physics (Book I, Chapter 1, 184b 10): "For names signify a kind of whole indistinctly, such as 'circle'; whereas the definition analyzes this into its [defining] parts." Seeing that a definition is in itself neither true nor false, such a passage from definiendum to definitum occurs within the first operation of the mind (Metaph. {Th}, 10, 1051b 18 ff.). In fact, St. Thomas calls this going from one to another a composition (Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 6), a discourse (Scripta super libros Sententiarum III, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1), and a reasoning process (In Joannem, Chapter 1, Lesson 1, [Marietta] n. 26). A complete Aristotelian logic should therefore include--as Boethius held--special treatises which, after a treatise on the predicables and one on the categories, aim to set further order within the very first operation of the mind--a section on division and one on definition. The decadence of late Scholasticism can be traced to this failure: confused knowledge is taken for distinct because of its certitude and, consequently, the relevance and sufficiency of confused knowledge for logic is not realized. Little wonder, then, that logic should eventually degenerate into a pseudo-metaphysics.

   Although on the one hand purely symbolic logic, sometimes called logistics, can be taught to the young like arithmetic--understood as an art of computation--Aristotelian logic, on the other hand, is extremely difficult. This logic, then, is somewhat anomalous, for it must be taught first, after computation, and has at the same time maxima difficultas, as St. Thomas observes: ". . . In learning we start from what is easier, unless necessity requires otherwise. For sometimes, in learning, it is necessary to begin, not with what is easier, but with the knowledge upon which further knowledge depends. This is the reason in learning that we must begin with logic, not because it is easier than the other sciences, for it has the greatest difficulty seeing that it is about things secondarily understood, but rather because the other sciences depend upon it inasmuch as logic teaches the method of procedure in all the other sciences. Hence we must first know the method of a science before the science itself, as is said in Metaph. II, (995a 12-14). Exposito super librum Boethü De Trinitate q. 6, a. 1, ad 2 am q., ad 3.

   De Anima III, 6, 430a 26 ff.

   "In connection with the mental image of signifying something," see ibid., II, 8, 420b 30-34; St. Thomas, Lesson XVII, n. 477; also, Summa Theologiae I, q. 34, a. 1.

   This treatise of Aristotle's has as its subject logic, not grammar, and therefore he is treating here--and will define later (16a 19)--the name, not the noun. One indication of this is his use of "name" to cover both the noun and the adjective. Another is his statement (16b 19) that verbs in themselves are names. To translate this as "verbs in themselves are nouns" confuses what he has said up to this point (for he does not mean the infinitive form of the verb). "Name," on the other hand, clarifies what he is saying, for "name" is taken here as a genus which includes names (i.e., nouns and adjectives) and verbs (cf. St. Thomas, Lesson V, n. 15). This reading is again confirmed in Book II, 19b 20, where Aristotle speaks of "is" as a name or a verb. "Name" is therefore used generally at first to cover the substantive name, the adjectival name, and the verb; then it is taken more determinately (16a 19) to include only the first two when it is defined as opposed to the verb, i.e., where the species of the genus name are defined.

   Modern usage has substituted "proposition" for "enunciation" and "premise" for "proposition." In the present work {apophansis} has been translated as "enunciation" which is its literal meaning, rather than as "proposition," the Greek word for which is {protasis}. ("Declaration" and "statement," which are also meanings of {apophansis} and which at first sight might seem to clarify Aristotle's thought, are quite ambiguous in English because of their generality and their lack of logical significance and hence the literal meaning has been used here.) Now while it is true that an enunciation and a proposition may be materially the same, there is a formal difference between them. "Enunciation" denotes either part of a contradiction indifferently, whether affirmative or negative, universal, particular, or even singular, true or false, one or many. "Proposition" originally meant the conclusion of a syllogism, i.e., what had to be proved. Its meaning was extended to the enunciation assumed as part of a syllogism in order to prove something. The point is that the enunciation taken as part of a syllogism constitutes a second intention quite distinct from an enunciation taken absolutely. The former would deserve the name "proposition" in the strict sense of the term, and so taken immediately conveys a universal enunciation.

   The Greek word {logos}, which is translated here as "speech," means any connection of words to express thought. It is used for anything from a phrase to an epic poem (cf. Categories 4b 23 and 4b 31; Posterior Analytics II, 93b 36 ff.). It has usually been translated as "sentence," but this is a word imposed to signify a grammatical construction rather than a logical construction, and hence is too narrow in meaning for what Aristotle intends. Signs of this can be found within this work. One would not ask whether a sentence is true or false, because grammar only deals with the order of words among themselves. Logic, on the other hand, deals with speech as expressing conceptions of the intellect and therefore is concerned about such a question. Again, in Lesson VI (Aristotle, 16b 34; St. Thomas, nn. 7 and 8) there is a question as to whether speech is significant by convention or as an instrument, i.e., as an instrument of a natural power such as throat, lungs, etc., and therefore significant naturally. Such a question would not arise with respect to the sentence as a grammatical construction.

   The Greek text reads: "{proton dei thesthai . . .}" "Establish," which is used in the translation of Aristotle, seemed the best English word to use in this context, but the Commentary at this point required the more literal word "posit," which is being related here to "position" to bring out, at least implicitly, that logic proceeds scientifically, (in accordance with the Aristotelian meaning of science).

   The editors of the Leonine edition suggest this alternate reading: ". . . in treating the simple enunciation it is sufficient to treat only those parts of speech from which the simple enunciation is necessarily formed." Cf. note {z}, Lesson I, p. 6 in the Leonine edition for the variations in the manuscripts.

   De Anima II, 8, 420b 5-421a 6; De Generatio Animalium, chapter 8.

   Suggested reading by the editors of the Leonine: ". . . order of enumeration."

   The Greek word {symbolon} means "token" and the Latin word nota used by William of Moerbeke is an exact translation of this. "Sign" and "symbol" are later meanings which have become technical and therefore less directly convey what Aristotle intends here. "Sign" has nevertheless been used in the present translation because "token" is now an uncommon word, and "sign" is at least closer to the first imposition, which was related more directly to sense experience.

   The Greek word {pathema}, translated here as "passions," in its verb form meant being subject to or affected by something. "Being acted upon" would be a good translation of the verb form, but since there is no equivalent noun except "affections," which is too narrow in meaning as commonly used, and since the commentary on this passage is made in terms of "passions," this literal word has been kept.

   The Latin text adds another "first" and consequently reads: ". . . but the passions of the soul, of which first passions these are the first signs . . .," etc. (Italics added.)

   St. Thomas, Lesson IV.

   St. Thomas, Lesson III.

   The {oun} in the Greek text is very rarely used by Aristotle to mean "therefore" and has been omitted from the translation of the Aristotelian text, since it probably only indicates a continuation of his discussion. It is put in the text here only because St. Thomas immediately comments on it.

   Nichomachean Ethics II, 5, 1105b 21.

   Politics I, 2, 1253a 10-14.

   De Anima I, 1, 403a 3 ff; cf. also, ibid., II, 5, 416b 32 ff. and II, 8, 420b 5 ff.; ibid., III, 4 and 5.

   De Anima III, 5, 430a 25.

   De Anima III, 4, 429b 29 ff.

   Supra, note 10.

   In the Greek text this reads: ". . . but the passions of the soul, of which these [vocal sounds] are the first signs . . ." Supra, note 12.

   The Latin word translated as "idea" here is ratio.

   In Boethius' Preface of Commentarii in librum Aristotelis {Peri hermeneias}, 2nd ed., p. 303, (cited in the Leonine edition, n. o, p. 14).

   De Anima III, 6, 430a 26 ff.

   Metaphysicae, {G}, 4, 1006b 4 ff.

   Supra, note 22.

   De Anima III, 4-8.

   De Anima III, 6, 430a 26 ff.

   De Anima III, 6, 430a 26 ff.

   De Anima II, 6, 418a 15.

   Metaph., {L}, 9, 1074b 15-1075a 11, especially 1075a 5-11.

   Nic. Eth. VI, 2, 1139a 28-30.

   Physics I, 9, 192a 17.

   De Anima III, 3, 427b 12 and 428a 11 in relation to the senses; 6, 430a 26 in relation to the intellect.

   Metaph. {E}, 4, 1027b 26 ff.

   Cf. Sum. Theol. I, q. 14, a. 14.

   E.g. "It is raining" or "It snows," although these of course have more than one word in English. The point made here is relevant only in an inflected language.

   The editors of the Leonine suggest this reading: ". . . in which the falsity would appear immediately if it could be true or false without composition and division." However, the reading as it is in the text seems better, for with a name such as "goatstag" it is immediately evident that a name alone is neither true nor false, and in addition, only becomes true or false when used in composition or division. These points would not be as evident if a name of something really existing were used.

   The Greek name used here is {kallippos}, the Latin, equiferus. The Greek word seems to be a proper name and in the Oxford edition is translated as "Fairsteed," in the Loeb as "Goodsteed," which are literal translations of the Greek. "Campbell" has been substituted for the Greek name in the present translation as a more evident example of a proper name. It is interesting to note that St. Thomas uses a name that is only compound and makes no comment on the fact that Aristotle uses a name that is both proper and compound. Actually Aristotle's point is made more evident by the use of a proper compound name, and hence in giving such an example first he is following his principle of going from what is more known to what is less known.

   The Greek word here is {keles} in the word {epaktrokeles}. {keles} means a courser, riding horse or fast sailing yacht with one bank of oars; when compounded with {epaktris} (a skiff), the whole word has the meaning of a light piratical skiff. The Latin uses equiferus again. The Oxford edition translates this as "pirate-boat," the Loeb, as "pirate-vessel," which are literal translations of the Greek example. In order to duplicate more closely Aristotle's use of a compound name imposed to signify a simple concept (which is obscured by the hyphenated word) "fast" in the word "breakfast" has been used in the present translation.

   In Greek the word, {ptosis}, is used for cases of names and tenses of verbs. In Latin casus, or cases has been used for both. The Greek word seems to signify a more general and logical notion than our "cases" and "tenses," which were introduced later by grammarians. The first meaning of {ptosis}, as also of casus, is "a falling away from," or a kind of "diminishing" or "declining." In order, then, to preserve the more general logical notion, the {ptosis} has been translated as "modes;" but the casus in the commentary kept as "cases" since the commentary is made in terms of this. In relation to this point, see R. H. Robins, Ancient and Medieval Grammatical Theory in Europe (London: Bell, 1951), especially pp. 19-25, 31-32. I disagree, however, with Mr. Robins' position that Aristotle is defining grammatical notions in the Peri Hermeneias. See also, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. by M. Cary and others, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949), under Grammar, (Greek). The latter reference, in my opinion, is not exact with respect to the meaning of {logos} in Aristotle (cf. supra note 2.)

   St. Thomas, Lesson VII.

   St. Thomas, Lesson VI.

   St. Thomas, Lesson V.

   "Name" is taken here as a species under the genus name and is therefore opposed to the verb; it includes both the substantive and adjective name. A parallel case of this usage is animal taken as a species under the genus animal.

   De Anima II, 8, 420b 30-34.

   Supra, note 40.

   The Latin here is lapis, from laesione pedis. To bring out the point St. Thomas is making here an equivalent English word of Latin derivation, i.e., "pedigree," has been used.

   The Latin word used here is again equiferus.

   Cf. Plato's Cratylus.

   Boethius', Commentarii in librus Aristotelis {Peri hermeneias}, 2nd ed., Bk. I, De nomine: Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione Commentarius, sect. I, 7.

   According to the Greek text Aristotle seems to be saying here that the definition of the name, i.e., vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no part of which is significant separately, applies also to the modes, that is, to what we would call cases of the name. There might appear to be a difficulty in relation to this point apropos of the last part of the definition, i.e., no part of which is significant separately, as far as English is concerned, because we sometimes have to use a preposition with a name to express cases. The preposition, however, is a "syncategorematic" word, i.e., it is, used with names, as a connecter; it does not have meaning by itself. This difficulty does not arise in an inflected language since oblique cases of names are like names in that they are one word, i.e., the name with an inflected ending. This is the very reason that Aristotle discusses them.

   The Greek name used here is {hygieia} and the verb {hygiainei}. The Latin uses cursus and currit. The {hygiainei} cannot be translated into English as a verb since it becomes a predicate adjective with the verb "is," i.e., "is healthy." This would not fulfill Aristotle's purpose here, for he is defining the verb, not a predicate adjective; nor would the "is" serve the purpose here for there are special difficulties about it which will be taken up later (Aristotle, 16b 20, St. Thomas, n. 18 of this lesson).

   Supra, note 42.

   The Latin text of Aristotle has est for {to on}. St. Thomas points out this difference when he comments on this part of the text in n. 19 of this lesson.

   Four of the manuscripts of St. Thomas' Commentary have "to persons" (personis) rather than "to predicates."

   See note 54. "Maturity" and matures" have been substituted for the examples used in the Greek and Latin texts here and throughout the rest of the text, except in n. 15 of Lesson III where "runs" seemed to fit the case better. These examples are more equivalent to the Greek examples and in addition remove some of the ambiguity of the Latin examples when translated into English, i.e., "'runs' is a verb" would be ambiguous since "runs" is also a noun.

   Lesson IV, n. 7.

   The Oxford Greek text of this sentence reads: "{. . . kai aei ton hyparchonton semeion estin, oion ton kath hypokeimenou}." The Leonine Greek text (and several other manuscripts) read: ". . . kai aei ton kath heterou legomenon semeion estin, oion ton kath npokeimenou, e en hypokeimeno.}" St. Thomas comments on the text as having the phrase "said [i.e., belonging to] a subject or in a subject" (n. 9; italics added).

   See note 60 for this variation in the text.

   Boethius, Comment. in librum Aristotelis {Peri hermeneias}, I, De verbo, p. 314.

   ". . . predicated of another" is not in the Greek text, as can be noted in the quotation of the text in note 60, but it is implied in "of something that belongs to something" and is in the definition of the verb (16b 5) in the sense that "said of something else" could be translated as "predicated of another."

   For a further discussion of this point see p. 24, n. {b} of the Leonine edition of the Peri Hermeneias, where the distinction is made between the predicate as formal and material.

   This might seem inaccurate as it stands. One would expect "signifies with time," for it is of the nature of the verb to signify action or passion and by reason of this to signify time, i.e., as a consequence it signifies time. One manuscript of St. Thomas' Commentary (Codex B, ed. 1526) does have consignificat tempus (see p. 25, n. {z} of the Leonine) but St. Thomas could be using "signifies" here in a broader sense.

   Phys. VI, 3, 234a 24-234b 9; and 8, 238a 23-239b 41.

   Supra, note 42.

   Cf. n. 16 of St. Thomas's Commentary for this division.

   The Greek text has {to on} here; the Latin, est.

   The Greek {to on} is closer to this reading.

   Supra, note 5.

   The Greek word Aristotle uses for this illustration is {anthropos} (the Latin, homo), which because of its two syllables he can use in the next sentence (16b 30) to make a point in relation to his definition of speech. To preserve the value of the example the word "animal" has been used in the present translation. "Man" would not do this; nor would "human" or "mortal" which are closer to the Greek word in meaning and do have more than one syllable, since "is" or "is not" cannot be meaningfully added to them in English.

   Another example has also been substituted for Aristotle's here. He uses {us} from {mys} (mouse) because {us} appears to have a meaning since there is a Greek word {hys}, which means "the wild swine." To preserve the value of this example, "owl" from the word "fowl" has been used.

   Cf. 16a 22.

   There is a question as to whether this is Alexander's or Porphyry's answer to the objection; and in relation to St. Thomas' statement later on that Porphyry's solution reduces to the same thing, etc., whether this solution is Porphyry's or Alexander's. Boethius attributes it to Alexander. Cf. p. 30, n. {e} of the Leonine, where there is also a discussion of Porphyry's and Alexander's opinions.

   This point is difficult to see when translated into English. The Latin word for "to say" is dicere and for "word" dictio, in Greek {kataphasis} and {phasis}. Actually the Greek {phasis} which has been translated as "word" means an utterance or a saying, and could easily be confused with "affirmation." Cf. St. Thomas', Commentary on De Anima II, Lesson 18 n. 469 for the meaning of dictio as word.

   The Latin uses rex and sorex here in place of the Greek example {mys} (mouse), a word of two syllables rather than one as in the example used by Aristotle.

   This is the reading of codices. C, D, and E; A has "it can have a part which is a non-significant vocal sound." The Piana edition adds to this "and which is 'rex.'" Edition b (Veneta, 1495), has "it [a word] can have a part which will signify." The editors of the Leonine suggest that "significative" should either be added or understood here. Cf. p. 31 n. {x}, of the Leonine edition for the variations in the texts and the Preface for identification of the manuscripts.

   Cf. 16a 21-16a 25; St. Thomas, Lesson IV, nn. 9-10.

   De Anima III, 4, 429a 10 ff.

   Book II, Lesson I.

   In Book I, Lesson VIII.

   In Book I, Lesson IX.

   Cf. Book I, Lesson II, n. 5.

   Metaph. {E}, 4, 1027b 17-1028a 5.

   Categ. 5, 4a 35-4b 9.

   Rhetoric I, 2, 1356a 2, 1356a 14; III, 1, 1403b 12.

   Cf. Metaph. {Z}, 12, 1037b 7 ff.

   The Greek text here is: "{esti de eis protos logos apophantikos kataphasis eita apophasis. oi de alloi syndesmo eis.}" This could have been translated as "affirmation is the first kind, negation the second of enunciative speech that is one; the other kinds are only one by conjunction." However, Aristotle seems to be speaking more generally here, as the balance of the text bears out, for he goes on to elucidate what he means by "one" (17a 15) and to divide enunciations that are one into kinds (17a 20).

   The Latin word ratio, translated here as "notion," means that which the intellect conceives from the signification of a name, even though it may not have a definition. Ratio does not signify the conception itself but the intention of the conception. Cf. St. Thomas, Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard I, d. 2. 1, 3. He also points out here that there is something corresponding to this intention in things.

   16b 7; St. Thomas, Lesson V, n. 4.

   16b 25; St. Thomas, Lesson V, n. 21.

   Metaph. {Z}, 12, 1037b 7 ff.; {H}, 6, 1045a 6 ff.

   In the Piana edition this is "mode" rather than "modes."

   Boethius (Comment. in librum Aristotelis {Peri hermeneias}, 2nd ed., I, p. 328, quoted in the Leonine, note {ph}, p. 38) says: "Speech is understood as one or many if it signifies one or many; and they are always judged with respect to the proper signification. But simple and composite is not with respect to the signification but is known from the plurality of words and names, for if a proposition has more than two terms it is composite; if it has only two it is simple."

   All the editions of Veneta of the fifteenth century and of 1526 have here Quid sit in scholis" for "Quis sit in scholis" (italics added) and the answer, "Magester disputat." This answer, however, supposes the question "Quid fit in scholis." Cf. p. 40, n. {ee} of the Leonine edition.

   The Greek text and the Latin translation of it read here: "Of these," but what is intended, of course, is, "Of enunciations that are one."

   The Greek text reads here: "{. . . phone semantike peri tou ei hyparchei ti e me hyparchei . . .}" The {ei} is omitted in some manuscripts. The Latin reads: ". . . vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid, vel non est . . ."

   The editors of the Leonine suggest that this should perhaps be "univocally."

   I.e., the definition of enunciation does not have affirmation and negation as a difference.

   Supra, 17a 2.

   St. Thomas, Lesson XIII.

   St. Thomas, Lesson XII.

   St. Thomas, Lesson X.

   Cf. 17a 23; St. Thomas, Lesson VII, n. 19.

   The Greek text here reads: "{epei de esti kai to hyparchon apophainesthai os me hyparchon . . .}" The forms of {hyparcho} in this context have the meaning of "belong to" or "present in," but "is" is also one of its meanings.

   "In propositions" has been added by the editors of the Leonine because it is contained in all of the manuscripts except the Piana, and the latter appeared to them obscure. It reads: "Et sicut quatuor differentiae enunciationum inveniuntur, in quibus ponitur verbum praesentis temporis, ita etiam inveniuntur in enunciationibus in quibus ponuntur verba praeteriti vel futui temporis." That is, it is not clear to what the "in quibus" refers.

   Cf. 17a 9; St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, n. 8.

   This statement does not appear in exactly this form in the Greek text or in Moerbeke's Latin translation of it. It is actually St. Thomas' statement in his commentary on 17a 15 of Aristotle (cf. Lesson VIII, n. 13).

   De Sophisticis Elenchis 5, 166b 28-167a 36.

   The Greek text is: "{Epei de esti ta men katholou ton pragmaton ta de kath hekaston . . .}" The {pragmaton} undoubtedly means "of the things we are concerned with," i.e., things from the point of view of logic are either universal or singular. In the phrase following this Aristotle makes it perfectly clear that he is speaking of things in this way. This passage is usually translated as: "Some things are universal and others singular (italics added). In n. 2 St. Thomas seems to take this as "things"; but in n. 3 he takes this up as a possible misinterpretation of the text.

   Metaph. {Z}, 14, 1039a 23 ff.

   Categ. 5, 2a 11 ff.

   16a 3; St. Thomas, Lesson II, n. 5.

   De Anima III, 4, 429b 10 ff.

   Metaph. {H}, 6, 1045a 36-1045b 7; see also {I}, 10, 1059a 12-14.

   The word ratione translated here as "in view of" or "by reason of" indicates that predication is made in reference to the nature or the singular. The point St. Thomas is making throughout this lesson is this: the reason why we say something of a universal may be found in the singulars, as when we say "Man walks," or it may be found in the universal nature considered absolutely, as when we say "Man is an animal," or again, in the indeterminate singular, as in "Some man is wise."

   17b 30; St. Thomas, Lesson IX, n. 6.

   Cf. Lesson VIII, n. 2. For the fourth and fifth divisions see Lesson XIII, n. 3 infra.

   Cf. Lesson VIII, n. 3.

   Quale quid (quality of the essence): when a predicate is attributed to something essentially it is said to be predicated in quid, since to ask what the essence of a thing is is to ask what (quid) the thing is. When a predicate is attributed to something in quale quid it is predicated essentially (hence, the in quid), but the way in which the predicate is attributed to the subject is as an adjective, i.e., in the mode of a quality. St. Thomas' point here is that affirmation and negation are species of enunciation that are specifically different because of the difference of the predicate, i.e., of the form of the enunciation.

   St. Thomas, Lesson XI.

   "A certain one" is one word in Latin.

   See Lesson XI infra.

   The Greek again uses the verb {hyparcho} and {ti} is understood ("something belongs to or is present in"); the Latin translation has est.

   St. Thomas, In octo libros physicorum exposito, V, Lesson 3, n. 5; Aristotle, Metaph. {D} 10, 1018a 25-31.

   Cf. 23b 7.

   Cf. n. 10 of this lesson.

   That is, is more universal.

   De Anima II, 1, 412a 22; St. Thomas, Lesson I.

   The editors of the Leonine have substituted here the reading in all the texts except the Piana. The Piana reads: ". . . et ista specialiter habet locum in affirmationibus quae falsae sunt significatum universaliter praedicaretur."

   The translation of the Greek text here is: ". . . for no affirmation will be true in which a universal predicate is predicated universally." (Italics added.)

   In the two reasons given for not predicating the predicate universally, the universal is taken as it is real, i.e., in personal (or absolute) supposition, not in simple supposition. Consequently, if the predicate were predicated universally it would mean that the singulars under the universal subject would be all of the singulars under the universal predicate; i.e., man would be every animal, and hence, so would Peter, who is a man, be every animal.

   The Oxford and Loeb texts translate this sentence in such a way that there could only be one pair of contradictories, i.e., only the universal affirmative and the particular negative is a pair of contradictories. The Oxford translation is: "An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term 'contradictory,' when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not." (Italics added.) The Greek text reads: "{Antikeisthai men oun kataphasin apophasei lego antiphatikos ten to katholou semainousan to auto hoti ou katholou . . .}"

   17a 34; St. Thomas, Lesson IX, n. 8 supra.

   Cf. n. 2 of this lesson.

   Cf. n. 4 of this lesson.

   Metaph., {G}, 7, 1011b 25 ff.  St. Thomas, Bk. V, Lesson IX.

   Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione Commentarius fol. 16, verso, col. 2, Venetiis, 1546; Boethius, Comment. in librum Aristotelis {Peri hermeneias}, I, p. 352.

   Phys. III, 1, 200b 32; St. Thomas, Lesson I.

   De Anima III, 1, 424b 20; St. Thomas, Lesson I.

   Phys. I, 9, 192a 3 and 192a 22; St. Thomas, Lesson XV.

   Cf. Lesson X, n. 13.

   Cf. St. Thomas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate VIII, 14 and XXVIII, 9 ad 10; also, In I Phys. Lesson IV, n. 2.

   The contradictions of contraries may both be true (cf. 17b 23).

   This is the text as it is in Aristotle. St. Thomas quotes here: "Manifestum est ergo . . .," which is in neither the Greek nor the Latin version of Aristotle. When St. Thomas begins the actual commentary on this section in n. 6 he quotes the correct Latin version of Aristotle's text: "Quod igitur una affirmation . . ." But Codices A, B, and C have the "Manifestum est ergo . . ." here. The latter seems to be from an ancient version of Aristotle which was probably available to St. Thomas (cf. p. 57 n. {e} of the Leonine).

   17a 34; St. Thomas, Lesson IX, n. 8.

   17b 29 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 8 ff.

   St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 2.

   17b 29; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 8.

   17b 22; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 6.

   17b 26; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 7.

   17a 15; St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, n. 13.

   In the Greek text the verb used in this phrase is {estin} and in the Latin version of it est and not fit; hence it reads, ". . . from which there is not one thing."

   17a 9; St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, n. 8.

   17b 16 and 17b 26; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 3 ff.

   17b 28; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 7.

   17b 29; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 8.

   Lesson XIV.

   There are some slight variations in the text here. The Oxford Greek text has: "{. . . ei gar ho men . . .}" etc. In the Leonine Greek version it is, "{. . . hoste ei ho men . . .}" etc; and in the Latin version ". . . quare si hic quidem . . ." etc. Here in the commentary St. Thomas gives still another version of it: ". . . si itaque hic quidem . . ." etc.

   St. Thomas uses "by chance" here in place of the "fortuitously" in the Greek text; perhaps it is because "chance" is the more common and is therefore used to cover both chance and fortune.

   De Generatione et Corruptione, II, 11, 337b 7.

   Supra in this number, i.e., n. 9.

   "But that it is or is not": The editors of the Leonine edition have substituted here the reading of all other codices and the Veneta edition of 1447 for the Piana edition. This substituted reading is "but that it is or is not [going to be]." In the note of explanation (p. 62, n. {n}) they point out that the sense of the Piana text ("nor that it is or is not going to be") is that a future event is neither determinately going to be, nor determinately not going to be; and of the codices that it is either going to be or not going to be. In an indeterminate, or disjunctive sense, the editors say, the latter is true, since there is no medium between "is going to be" and "is not going to be." However, if the members of the disjunction are taken absolutely, it is not possible that one or the other is determinately going to be, or that it is determinately not going to be, which is what the Piana reading signifies (cf. Lesson XV, n. 4). The editors think the reading of the codices is better in the context, since, having just said "of none of these can it be determinately said that it is going to be," it is useless to repeat, "nor that it is . . ." etc., i.e., the truth of the hypothetical disjunctive, that it is or is not going to be, which is going to be proved next, is the meaning to be taken here.

   Cf. Lesson XV.

   Nic. Eth. III, 3, 1112a 19 ff.

   Boethius, Comment. in librum Aristotelis {Peri hermeneias}, III, pp. 373 ff.

   Metaph. {E}, 2, 1026a 33 ff; St. Thomas, Lesson III.

   Phys. II, 3, 195b 25-28; St. Thomas, Lesson VI; and Metaph. {D}, 2, 1013b 28 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson III.

   De Anima III, 4, 429a 18; St. Thomas, Lesson VII.

   De Anima III, 3, 427a 21; St. Thomas, Lesson IV.

   Nic. Eth. VII, 3, 1146a 5 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson I.

   Cf. Lesson V, n. 11 supra.

   On Prophesying by Dreams, 2, 463b 23. (St. Thomas' reference appears to be wrong.)

   Phys. IV, 11, 219a 14; St. Thomas, Lesson XVII.

   De Anima III, 6, 430a 32 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson XI.

   Metaph. {Th}, 9, 1051a 22 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson X.

   Phys. II, 7, 198a 35 ff.; St. Thomas, Lesson XV.

   Nic. Eth. III, 3, 1112a 30-1113a 14; St. Thomas, Lesson VII.

   Cf. 22a 20; Cajetan, Lesson X, infra.

   Cf. 18b 9; St. Thomas, Lesson XIII, n. 10 supra.

   One manuscript (B) has "contraries" here.

   21a 34; Cajetan, Lesson VIII.

   23a 27; Cajetan, Lesson XIII.

   20b 12; Cajetan, Lesson V.

   19b 19; St. Thomas, Book II, Lesson II.

   Cf. 16a 29; St. Thomas, Lesson IV, n. 13.

   Metaph. {G}, 21; 1003b 6 ff; St. Thomas, Book IV, Lessons I and II.

   17a 26; St. Thomas, Lesson IX, n. 6.

   17a 9; St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, n. 8.

   Cf. St. Thomas, Lesson V, n. 11.

   Cf. St. Thomas, Lesson IV n. 15.

   Cf. Prior Analytics, I, 46, 51b 5 ff.

   Prior Anal. I, 46, 51b 5 ff.

   20a 16; Cajetan, Lesson IV.

   20a 3; Cajetan, Lesson III.

   19b 32; Cajetan, Lesson III.

   19b 37; Cajetan, Lesson III.

   The Greek word used here is a form of {stoicheo}, which means "to be drawn up in a line" or" to be in rows," in its first imposition.

   Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis, {peri hermeneias}, IV, p. 388; Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretione Commentarius III, fol. 24, col. 2; fol. 25, col. 1.

   Prior Anal. I, 46, 51b 5ff.

   The text of Aristotle (19b 22) reads: ". . . two of which will correspond in their sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation, with the privations, but two will not."

   Codd, ABCE have "dissimilitude" here; P and D have "similitude."

   This is the relationship according to Porphyry's explanation of this passage:

[[

Diagram #3 (Image 3)]]

   Lesson IX, n. 6.

   Prior Anal. I, 46, 51b 5 ff.

   Cf. Ammonius, De interpret. III, 1 fol. 25, col. 4; also, note {p} in the Leonine edition, p. 85.

   Actually the enunciation with an infinite name not taken universally is dealt with in this lesson. Aristotle has just finished treating the enunciation with the finite name not taken universally, i.e., the indefinite.

   17b 16; St. Thomas, Lesson XI, n. 3.

   In Cajetan this is "Not every man is nonjust," which is the same enunciation as the diagonal to it and hence cannot be correct, for in n. 4 when he explains what Aristotle means by diagonal enunciations, and again in n. 5 when he explains that the diagonals of indefinites are both true whereas this is only sometimes true of universals, it is evident that the diagonals cannot be the identical enunciation.

   The universal affirmative of the finite predicate would be "Every man is just," which is the same enunciation as the one placed first in this diagram. This enunciation, therefore, and the one placed just above it (cf. note 28) are not correctly given in the text. It is evident from Aristotle's text (19b 32) that the "non" attached to "nonjust" has been misplaced in these two enunciations: the first one on the side of the diagram we are now setting up should be "Not every man is just" instead of "Not every man is nonjust," and the second should be "Every man is nonjust" instead of "Every man is just." This correction has been made in Cajetan's table.

   Cf., notes 28 and 29.

   Cf., note 29.

   Boethius, De Interpret. IV, p. 388.

   The Latin text of Aristotle, which Cajetan quotes here has "quasi ad subjectum." The Greek {hos hypokeimenon}"; both the quasi and the {hos} can of course be translated as "as" or "as if." Cajetan takes it in this latter meaning.

   Cajetan actually has here "Homo non currit" and "Omnis homo non currit" as examples. But if these are translated as "Man is not running" and "Every man is not running" they will not correspond to what Cajetan is saying, since the latter is not the universal universally taken. Nor can they be, "Man nonruns" and "Every man nonruns," because Cajetan has ruled out the infinite adjective verb in n. 12 of this lesson. They could, of course, be translated as "Man is nonrunning" and "Every man is nonrunning," but this would not be a very exact duplication of Aristotle's examples which have an infinite name with an adjective verb. Hence, Aristotle's examples have been substituted here for Cajetan's. It is not clear either why Cajetan mentions three other examples--only two more are given here by Aristotle--unless he is thinking of all of the examples used in this lesson.

   The Greek reads: "{. . . hoste to pas e medeis ouden allo prossemainei e hoti katholou tou onomatos kataphesin e apophesin}"; ("the 'every' and the 'no,' then, signify nothing other than that they affirm or deny universally of a name"). In the present translation this is rendered as, "The 'every' and the 'no,' then, only signify that the affirmation or negation is of a name universally."

   Post. Anal. I, 2, 71b 10.

   In the Greek this part of the sentence reads: "{. . . ta oun alla ta auta dei prostithenai.}" The Latin translation of it: "Ergo et cetera eadem oportet apponi."

   Cf. 17b 38.

   See Aristotle, 19b 35, Book II, Lesson III. Aristotle's diagram makes this point clear. The diagonal affirmatives cannot be at once true but the diagonal negatives can be.

[[

Diagram #8 (Image 8)]]

   In the Greek text the universal negative follows upon the infinite universal affirmative.

   Cf. Prior Anal. I, 46, 51b 5 ff.

   The phrase of Aristotle referred to here reads: ". . . two of which will correspond in their sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation . . . but two will not" (19b 22). See Book II, Lesson II, n. 5 ff., for the commentary on this passage.

   Cf. Prior Anal. I, 46, 52a 36 ff.

   Cf. 19b 32. In Latin the two enunciations are "Omnis homo est non justus" and "Omnis homo non est justus"; that is, the negation is placed after the copula or before it.

   The {hosper} in the Greek text (quasi in the Latin) to which Cajetan refers here appeared to be sufficiently understood in "seems to be," and hence has been omitted from the translation of Aristotle's text. In this passage Aristotle could also mean that an infinite name alone is not a negation, nor is an infinite verb alone, i.e., there must be both a name and verb for a negative enunciation.

   Aristotle's examples are the universal affirmative and the particular enunciation opposed to this, i.e., "Not every non-man is just."

   Cf. 20a 20.

   Cf. 17b 34.

   Cf. note 44 supra.

   At 17b 37.

   There are differences between the  enunciations Aristotle gives as examples and those of Cajetan. If we  were to make a diagram of Aristotle's  enunciations, modelling it upon Cajetan's it would appear thus:

[[

Diagram #11 (Image 11)]]

Cajetan has used for the last two enunciations "Non-man is white" and "Non-man is not white," i.e., an infinite name on the part of the subject rather than the predicate. Perhaps Cajetan wanted to emphasize the "imaginary" quality of the last contradictory, and obviate the difficulty caused by Aristotle's "White is not non-man" (the last enunciation in the diagram above but given in the text as the first contradictory of "White is man," which is the obversion of "White is man" and therefore equivalent to it. For with Cajetan's changes Aristotle's point seems to be more cogently proved, whereas the original text seems to beg the question as the translator of the Ross edition points out in a footnote, Cf. "De interpretatione," 20b 1, n. 3 The Works of Aristotle, ed. W.D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1937). It should also be noted that when Aristotle speaks of enunciations signifying the same thing with names and verbs transposed, he means with names transposed they signify the same thing, and when the verb is transposed they signify the same thing. Actually he only shows this about names because it is the more difficult and is almost impossible to see in English because of our rigid word order. His examples make this clear, the first of which, literally translated, are, "is man white" and "is white man," i.e., the words are only positionally changed.

   At 17b 16ff.

   In this sentence Aristotle uses "and" ({kai}) as a conjunction between the predicates and "probably" ({isos}) to qualify them in relation to the subject. The sentence could be interpreted to mean that these are many that are one. In this case, the conjunctions are used to emphasize the many, for biped civilized animal is a natural definition of man, the "biped" and "civilized" being universals ut nunc, used as a difference until a better, i.e., essential difference, is found. Hence, taken with "animal" this constitutes a dialectical definition of man and for this reason Aristotle qualifies the predicates with "probably."

   Topics VIII, 7.

   What Cajetan must mean here is "all such enunciations" or "all of these" are many.

   At the beginning of the following Lesson.

   Cf. 17a 15; St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, nn. 12 ff., especially beginning with n. 15.

   Supra, n. 53. "Probably" has been used in the present translation of the Greek rather than "perhaps" to indicate more formally the dialectical character of the definition.

   This quotation is not Aristotle's directly. It states positively what Aristotle states negatively in 20b 12. For the reference to Book I see note 57 supra.

   Aristotle treats the unity of the name beginning with 16a 22 (St. Thomas, Lesson IV, nn. 9 ff.) and beginning with 16b 30 (St. Thomas, Lesson VI, n. 6). However, Aristotle seems to be treating the unity of signification of many names here. In relation to this see 17a 13 (St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, n. 10); 17a 15 (St. Thomas, Lesson VIII, nn. 12 ff., especially n. 15); 17a 34 (St. Thomas, Lesson IX, nn. 8 ff.)

   Neither the Greek nor the Latin text of Aristotle has the "if" that Cajetan puts into this phrase. The correct reading is: ". . . but there is something one formed from these."

   Metaph. {Z}, 13, 1039a 5.

   Aristotle uses "premise" rather than proposition." The latter in its first meaning is the conclusion of a syllogism.

   The {oun} used here by Aristotle is translated as "in fact" ("ergo" in the Latin text). Aristotle does not use {oun} to mean "therefore" except in a question (cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon).

   The Greek for this and the phrase quoted in the following number is: "{. . . ouk an eie mia apokrisis pros taua oude gar he erotesis mia oud an e alethes.}" This has been translated as ". . . there would not be one answer in reference to the above predicates. There would not be one answer even if there is a true answer, for there would not be a single question."

   The Greek text has {hama} ("at the same time") for the "similarly" that Cajetan has here. The Latin text has simul.

   The Greek for this phrase is "{erotonta prosdiorisai}," which in the present translation has been rendered freely as "For this the interrogator must specifically word the question so that the parts of the contradiction are clear," from the wording of this point as it is in the Topics.

   In the Latin text "shoemaker" is changed to "lute player."

   The Greek here is: "{ton de kategoroumenon kai eph ois kategoreisthai symbainei . . .}" In order to show when predicates said of a subject divisively can be said conjointly and when not, Aristotle makes the distinction here between per se and accidental predication, i.e., predicates in relation to that to which they are joined in predication are either per se or accidental. Some have taken this phrase to mean that both subjects and predicates are per se or accidental but there would not seem to be much point in saying that subjects are per se or accidental, for although the terms of a subject may be per se or accidentally united, the subject is always one; if it does seem multiple, it is actually a multiplicity on the part of the predicate; e.g., "This distinguished man is a lawyer" is actually, "This man is a lawyer and distinguished." That Aristotle is speaking here of predicates in relation to subjects and not predicates and subjects is also born out by what he says in the next line, ". . . whichever are said accidentally of the same subject or of one another . . .," that is, in the latter case, one predicate of another predicate as in "white man."

   At the beginning of the next lesson.

   Topics II, 2, 110a 5.

   Aristotle is only speaking of predicates. Cf. Supra, note 69.

   Supra, note 69.

   "These" is not in the Greek text but is contained in "which."

   In the Greek text this is {ouch en}, in the Latin non est unum, not non est idem, as Cajetan gives it here.

   In Aristotle this reads: "{oud ei to leukon mousikon alethes eipein . . .}" which is translated as, "Even if it were true to say that whatever is white is musical . . ." The Latin does not take account as accurately as does the Greek of the whiteness as a subject of musical here, at least in predication, for it reads: "Nec si album, musicus verum est dicere . . ."

   The rule is: Those things that are predicated--taken in relation to that to which they are joined in predication--which are said accidentally, either of the same subject or of one another, will not be one." (Cf. 21a 7.)

   That is, "good" is not sheerly equivocal, or equivocal by chance, but is systematically ambiguous, i.e., analogous. Cf. Nic. Ethics I, 6, 1096 b 27.

   Cajetan's Latin here is "ex diversis" but what must be meant is "ex divisis," in view of the context.

   Cajetan quotes only three words of this sentence, "Vel etiam quando. . . ." These words do not appear anywhere in Moerbeke's Latin text of Aristotle. Perhaps what is intended is "Aut quando insit quidem. . . .," the Latin equivalent of the Greek text at 21a 24.

   Metaph. {I}, 3, 1054a 20 ff.

   See Cajetan, n. 2 of this lesson for this division of the question.

   In Greek this is "{kategoriais}," which has been rendered as "predications"; "predicates" and predicaments" are also legitimate meanings of the word.

   The Greek is, "{. . . mete enantiotes enestin . . .}"; Moerbeke's Latin is, ". . . neque contrarietas, (aliqua aut nulla oppositis) inest . . ."

   Supra, note 84.

   The Greek word used here is {legontai}. This has been rendered as ". . . when definitions are put in place of names . . ." The Latin of Moerbeke is dicantur; Cajetan uses sumantur.

   "In these" has been omitted from the translation of the Greek text because it is contained in ". . . in whatever predications . . ."

   The Greek text reads: "{. . . to ti kai haplos alethes estai eipein}" (". . . it will also be true to say [or predicate] each one simply").

   This is {kath auta} in the Greek, i.e., per se as opposed to per accidens; in both Moerbeke's and Cajetan's Latin it is secundum se, which is a synonym for per se.

   Cf. Post. Anal. I, 4, 73a 35-74a 4.

   The implication is that if it is true to say "Socrates is white," it must also be true to say "Socrates exists"; for how could he be white if he did not exist, i.e., if white Socrates exists, then Socrates exists.

   Cf. Cajetan, Lesson VI, n. 9, (last paragraph).

   Cf. Cajetan, Lesson VI, n. 10, (last paragraph).

   Moerbeke's Latin is ". . . quod autem non est . . ."; the Greek, "{. . . to me on . . .}"

   The Greek for this phrase is, "{ei gar ton symplekomenon . . ." Aristotle means by this: Of mutually related enunciations [which embraces contradictories, contraries, and the contradictories of contraries, i.e., subcontraries], we are going to speak only of contradictories. However, this phrase could be translated as, "Of combined things . . .," which is the way Cajetan takes it, and in relation to it comments that by this Aristotle differentiates complex things, such an enunciations, from incomplex things, such as names or verbs. Cf. n. 12 of this lesson.

             It should also be noted that the examples of the contradictories that follow in the text, if literally translated from the Greek would actually be, "Man to be," "Man not to be" and "Non-man to be," etc., which correspond in mode of expression to the "possible to be," "possible not to be" and "not possible to be" spoken of later in this portion of the text.

   22a 14; Lesson X, (at the beginning).

   In the Greek this is, "{. . . echei gar aporias tinas}." Moerbeke's Latin is exactly equivalent. Cajetan has, ". . . habent enim multas dubitationes speciales."

   A modal enunciation can be expressed in different ways grammatically, i.e., by an adverb, an adjective, or a verb, e.g., "Socrates runs contingently," or "That Socrates run is contingent," or "Socrates may run." Logically, however, it makes no difference what part of speech is used to express the mode, for the meaning is the same and hence as far as logic is concerned the above enunciations are identical.

             In the Latin text of Cajetan the second mode of expression is used, which has the advantage of putting the dictum first, as the subject, and the mode second, as the predicate. Hence "the first part" here refers to the subject of the modal enunciation, the dictum, whether it is stated first or second grammatically.

It should be noted that Aristotle's wording is both abbreviated and in reverse. When he speaks of "possible to be" and "possible not to be," etc., "possible" and "not possible," which are placed first, are the modes and "to be" and "not to be," which are placed second, are the dictums. Thus there are four possible combinations: possible to be, possible not to be, not possible to be, and not possible not to be, and so with the other modes, i.e., the contingent, necessary, and impossible.

   See 20b 15; Cajetan, Lesson V, n. 1.

   Supra, note 97.          

   Supra, note 95.          

   Supra, note 95.

   The Greek here is, "{. . . autai allelais antikeintai ai antiphaseis, hosai kata to einai kai me einai tattontai . . .}" Moerbeke has ". . . illae sunt sibi invicem oppositae contradictiones, quaecunque secundum esse et non esse disponuntur," Cajetan's is the same except for the "quaecunque" for which he has substituted "quae." The present translation of this is, ". . . contradictories are those opposed to each other by being related in a certain way according to 'to be' and 'not to be.'"

   Supra, note 95.

   The Greek text has, "{tas antikeimenas phaseis}," i.e., "opposed assertions," instead of "contradictions."

   At the beginning of the next lesson.

   In manuscripts {bDSa} there is the addition of "{kai to pseudos}" after "{alethes}."

   There are various differences in this portion of the text as follows: {apophasis} + {ou to ou dynaton einai alla} ({D}) {a#}, alt. {dynaton} + {einai} ({me ein [{D}]}), {all ou to dynaton} ({DS}). The Oxford Greek text incorporates none of these variations. If incorporated the text would read: "The negation, then, of 'possible not to be' is not 'not possible to be' but 'not possible not to be' and the negation of 'possible to be' is not 'possible not to be' but 'not possible to be.'"

   Notice that Cajetan is not saying precisely what Aristotle says on this point. Aristotle says that "'to be' and 'not to be' must be posited as the subject" and then that "those that produce an affirmation and negation must be joined to 'to be' and 'not to be,'" i.e., possible and not possible, etc. Cajetan says that "to be" and "not to be" must be added to the modes. Cf. note 98 for the difference in Aristotle's and Cajetan's wording of modals.

   The contradictory of "possibilis est esse" is not only "non possible est esse" but "possible non est esse." These have been translated so as to correspond to the previous translations of such phrases. In the next sentence, however, in which the reasons are given for these two ways of expressing the contradictories of "possible to be," the Latin rendering of these should be kept in mind since Cajetan's remarks depend upon the order of the words in Latin.

   That is, the impossible and not impossible have "to be" as subjects, whereas the necessary and not necessary have "not to be" and "to be" as subjects respectively.

   There is a variation in the texts here: {bDSa} have {epei ou}, so that the phrase would read, ". . . since the necessary and the impossible do not signify the same thing, but as has been said, inversely" (italics added). It would seem more consonant with what Aristotle has said (22b 3) to omit the "not" as the Oxford Greek does.

   22b 29; Cajetan, Lesson XI.

   This is Cajetan's summary of the text from 22a 14 to 22a 31.

   The position of Cajetan's second and third orders in the diagram have been changed to correspond to the way in which Aristotle has arranged them, i.e., enunciations that are contradictories are placed opposite to each other, those in the third order to those in the first and those in the fourth order to those in the second; the numbering of the orders remains the same.

   The Greek here is, "{. . . hoti enantios to adynaton to anagkaio apodidotai, to auto dynamenon.}" Moerbeke's Latin is, ". . . quoniam contrarie, impossible esse, necessario redditur idem valens."

   Cajetan is returning here to Aristotle's text (22b 10), which is worded as a question in the Greek but not in the Latin; nor is the "in fact" (certe) in the Greek text.

   Prior Anal. I, 13, 32a 28 and 32b 15.

   Cf. 22a 39.

   18b 17; St. Thomas, Lesson XII, nn. 12ff.

   The Greek here is, "{. . . touto gar alethes kai kata tou anagkaion einai.}" Moerbeke's Latin is, "Haec enim vero est, et de necesse esse." Cajetan has, "Hoc enim verum est, et de necesse non esse" (italics added). He gives as an alternative to the above, "Hoc enim verum est, contradictorium illius de necesse non esse." There are no Greek manuscripts with the {ou} (non) before {einai} (esse.) The use of {gar} (for) at the beginning of this phrase and at the beginning of the next sentence in which the point is made that "not necessary not to be" is the contradictory of "necessary not to be" might lead one to think that Cajetan's reading and interpretation (i.e., with a "not") is the correct one. On the other hand, the phrase in question is the last part of Aristotle's concluding sentence in the Greek. The sentence reads, "It remains, therefore, that 'not necessary not to be' follows upon 'possible to be'; for this is true also with respect to 'necessary to be'" (italics added). If there is no {ou} (non) in this latter phrase, and it is attached to the whole preceding argument as a part of the conclusion, then what Aristotle seems to be saying is that just as "not necessary not to be" follows upon "possible to be," so "necessary to be" follows upon "not possible not to be," i.e., there is an inverse parallel between the two.

   23a 18; Cajetan, Lesson XII, n. 7.

   Prior Anal. I, 13, 32a 31 ff.

   23a 15; Cajetan, Lesson XII, n. 5.

   23a 6; Cajetan, Lesson XII, n. 1.

   Metaph. {Th}, 2, 1046a 36 ff.

   The Greek for the quotation is: "{. . . oion to pyr thermantikon kai echei dynamin alogon.}" The Latin of Moerbeke is: ". . . ut ignis calefactibilis est, et habet vim irrationalem." Cajetan has "calefactivus" for "calefactibilis."

   Infra, Cajetan, Lesson XII, n. 4.

   Actually Aristotle does not begin this sentence with "therefore." He uses {oun}, which simply indicates a continuation of what he is saying. The Latin text has "igitur."

   De Caelo et Mundo II, 7, 286a 23 ff.

   Phys. I, 7, 189b 32 ff.

   That is, the universal follows upon the subjective part, e.g., Socrates is, therefore man is.

   Metaph. {D}, 12, 1019a 15 ff.; and {Th}, 1, 1046a 4 ff.

   Aristotle's argument is at 22b 33 of the preceding lesson, Cajetan, n. 2.

   The Greek text has, "{. . . panton e einai e me einai . . .}" Moerbeke's Latin is, ". . . omnium vel esse, vel non esse . . ." Cajetan has, ". . . omnium enunciationum modalium vel esse vel non esse . . ." (italics added). Cajetan interprets the {panton} (omnium) as limited to modal enunciations.

   Metaph. {Th}, 6, 1048b 9-17.

   Cf. Cajetan, Lesson X, n. 3.

   This table is not Cajetan's but is a full arrangement of the orders of modal enunciations as developed in this lesson.

   24b 1; Cajetan, Lesson XIV, n. 17.

   The Greek here is, "{poteron de enantia estin he kataphasis te apophasei . . .}" Moerbeke's Latin is, "Utrum autem contraria est affirmatio negationi . . ." Cajetan has, "Utrum contraria est affirmatio negationi contradictoriae . . ."

   Sum. Theol. I, q. 17, a. 4.

   Cf. 16a 3.

   The Greek is, "{hoste skepteon poia doxa alethes pseudei doze enantia, poteron he tes apophaseos e he to enantion eina idoxazonsa.}" Moerbeke's Latin reads, "Quare considerandum est quae opinio vera opinioni falsae contraria est, utrum negationis, an ea, quae contrarium esse opinatur." Cajetan has, "Quare considerandum est, opinio vero cui opinioni falsae contraria est: utrum negationi falsae an certe ei affirmationi falsae, quae contrarium esse opinatur."

   The Greek for this is, "{. . . kai ei esti mia, kata poteran enantia.}" Moerbeke's Latin is, ". . . si est una, secundum quamnan contraria est." Cajetan has "quam" for "quamnan." According to the first interpretation of this phrase the translation would have to be: "and if there is one is either one the contrary," i.e., with no comma after "one."

   Metaph. {I}, 1055a 19.

   23 b 15; Cajetan, Lesson XIV, n. 2.

   24a 3; Cajetan, Lesson XIV, n. 16.

   Metaph. {Th}, 4, 1051a 4.

   Cf. nn. 6 and 7 of this lesson.

   Cajetan uses "esse quod non est" and "non esse quod est" in this and the following phrase quoted; Aristotle has "{hyparchein to me hyparchon}" and "{me hyparchein to hyparchon.}"

   That is, the contradictory.

   E.g., number said of odd and even; color of black and white, etc.

   The second argument begins in n. 14, the third in n. 15.

   Phys. V, 1, 224b 35.

   Cajetan, Lesson XIII, n. 3.

   Cf. Cajetan, Lesson XIII, n. 4.

   Categ., 10, 12a 35 ff.

   That is, opinions actually existing in the mind.

   Cf. Phys. V for the difference between movement and change.

   Post. Anal. I, 4, 73a 34-73b 15.

   Phys. V, 5, 229b 15 ff.

   Categ. 5, 3b 24 ff.; 6, 5b 10 ff.; 6, 5b 40 ff.

   Cf. Cajetan, Lesson XIII, nn. 1 and 5.

   Cf. Cajetan, Lesson XIII, nn. 4 ff., especially n. 7.

   Phys. V, 5, 229b 15 ff.

   The statement Cajetan refers to, that a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion, is made in this lesson, at 23b 37.