30. But why do these persons think they may imitate Tamar telling a lie, and not think they may imitate Judah committing fornication?57    Gen. xxxviii. 14–18 For there they have read both, and nought of these hath that Scripture either blamed or praised, but has merely narrated both, and to our judgment dismissed both: but it is marvellous if it hath permitted aught of these to be imitated with impunity. For, that Tamar not through lust of playing the harlot, but through wish of conceiving seed, did tell the lie, we know. But fornication also, howbeit Judah’s was not such, yet some man’s may be such whereby to procure that a man may be delivered, just as her lie was in order that a man might be conceived; is it right then to commit fornication on this account, if on that account it is thought that it was right to lie? Not therefore concerning lying only, but concerning all works of men in which there arise as it were compensative sins, must we consider what sentence we ought to pass; lest we open a way not only to small sins whatsoever, but even to all wickednesses, and there remain no outrageous, flagitious, sacrilegious deed, in which there may not arise a cause upon which it may rightly seem a thing meet to be done, and so universal probity of life be by that opinion subverted.

30. Cur autem isti imitandam sibi Thamar existimant mentientem, et imitandum Judam non existimant fornicantem (Gen. XXXVIII, 14-18)? Ibi enim utrumque legerunt: et nihil horum Scriptura illa sive culpavit, sive laudavit; sed tantummodo utrumque narravit, et judicandum nobis utrumque dimisit: sed mirum si aliquid horum imitandum impune permisit. Quod enim Thamar non meretricandi libidine, sed concipiendi voluntate mentita sit, novimus. Verum et fornicatio, etiamsi Judae talis non fuit, potest esse cujuspiam qua faciat ut homo liberetur, sicut illius mendacium fuit ut homo conciperetur: numquid propterea etiam fornicandum est, si propter illud putatur fuisse mentiendum? Non de solo itaque mendacio, sed de omnibus operibus hominum in quibus existunt velut compensativa peccata, considerandum est quam sententiam proferre debeamus; ne aperiamus aditum non tantum parvis quibusque peccatis, verum etiam sceleribus cunctis, nullumque remaneat facinus, flagitium, sacrilegium, in quo causa non possit existere qua recte videatur esse faciendum, universamque vitae probitatem opinio ista subvertat.