Chapter 57 [XLIX.]—It Does Not Detract from God’s Almighty Power, that He is Incapable of Either Sinning, or Dying, or Destroying Himself.
“Inasmuch,” says he, “as not to sin is ours, we are able to sin and to avoid sin.” What, then, if another should say: “Inasmuch as not to wish for unhappiness is ours, we are able both to wish for it and not to wish for it?” And yet we are positively unable to wish for it. For who could possibly wish to be unhappy, even though he wishes for something else from which unhappiness will ensue to him against his will? Then again, inasmuch as, in an infinitely greater degree, it is God’s not to sin, shall we therefore venture to say that He is able both to sin and to avoid sin? God forbid that we should ever say that He is able to sin! For He cannot, as foolish persons suppose, therefore fail to be almighty, because He is unable to die, or because He cannot deny Himself. What, therefore, does he mean? by what method of speech does he try to persuade us on a point which he is himself loth to consider? For he advances a step further, and says: “Inasmuch as, however, it is not of us to be able to avoid sin; even if we were to wish not to be able to avoid sin, it is not in our power to be unable to avoid sin.” It is an involved sentence, and therefore a very obscure one. It might, however, be more plainly expressed in some such way as this: “Inasmuch as to be able to avoid sin is not of us, then, whether we wish it or do not wish it, we are able to avoid sin!” He does not say, “Whether we wish it or do not wish it, we do not sin,”—for we undoubtedly do sin, if we wish;—but yet he asserts that, whether we will or not, we have the capacity of not sinning,—a capacity which he declares to be inherent in our nature. Of a man, indeed, who has his legs strong and sound, it may be said admissibly enough, “whether he will or not he has the capacity of walking;” but if his legs be broken, however much he may wish, he has not the capacity. The nature of which our author speaks is corrupted. “Why is dust and ashes proud?” 139 Ecclus. x. 9. It is corrupted. It implores the Physician’s help. “Save me, O Lord,”140 Ps. xii. 1. is its cry; “Heal my soul,”141 Ps. xli. 4. it exclaims. Why does he check such cries so as to hinder future health, by insisting, as it were, on its present capacity?
CAPUT XLIX.
57. Omnipotentiae Dei nihil adimit quod nec peccare, nec mori, nec seipsum occidere potest. «Quia non peccare,» inquit, «nostrum est, possumus peccare et non peccare.» Quid, si alius dicat, Quia nolle infelicitatem, nostrum est, possumus eam et nolle et velle? Et tamen eam velle omnino non possumus. Quis enim ullo modo velle esse possit infelix, etiamsi aliud vult ubi eum et nolentem infelicitas consequatur? Deinde, quia Dei multo magis est non peccare, num audebimus cum dicere et peccare posse et non peccare? Absit a nobis ut Deum peccare posse dicamus. Non enim, ut stulti putant, ideo non erit omnipotens, quia nec mori potest, et negare se ipsum non potest (II Tim. II, 13). Quid est ergo quod loquitur, et quibus locutionum regulis conatur persuadere, quod non vult considerare? Adhuc addit et dicit: «Quia vero posse non peccare, nostrum non est; et si voluerimus non posse non peccare, non possumus non posse non peccare.» Intorte hoc dixit, et ideo subobscure. Sed ita posset dici planius: Quia posse non peccare, nostrum non est; seu velimus, seu nolimus, possumus non peccare. Non enim ait, Seu velimus, seu nolimus. non 0275 peccamus; sine dubio enim peccamus, si volumus: sed tamen velimus nolimus, habere nos asserit non peccandi possibilitatem, quam naturae insitam dicit. Sed de homine sanis pedibus tolerabiliter dici potest, velit nolit habet ambulandi possibilitatem: confractis vero, et si velit, non habet. Vitiata est natura de qua loquitur. Quid superbit terra et cinis (Eccli. X, 9)? Vitiata est, medicum implorat: Salvum me fac, Domine, clamat (Psal. XI, 2): Sana animam meam, clamat (Psal. XL, 5). Quid intercludit has voces, ut defendendo quasi praesentem possibilitatem, futuram impediat sanitatem?