Chapter 58 [L.]—Even Pious and God-Fearing Men Resist Grace.

Observe also what remark he adds, by which he thinks that his position is confirmed: “No will,” says he, “can take away that which is proved to be inseparably implanted in nature.” Whence then comes that utterance: “So then ye cannot do the things that ye would?”142    Gal. v. 17. Whence also this: “For what good I would, that I do not; but what evil I hate, that do I?”143    Rom. vii. 15. Where is that capacity which is proved to be inseparably implanted in nature? See, it is human beings who do not what they will; and it is about not sinning, certainly, that he was treating,—not about not flying, because it was men not birds, that formed his subject. Behold, it is man who does not the good which he would, but does the evil which he would not: “to will is present with him, but how to perform that which is good is not present.”144    Rom. vii. 18. Where is the capacity which is proved to be inseparably implanted in nature? For whomsoever the apostle represents by himself, if he does not speak these things of his own self, he certainly represents a man by himself. By our author, however, it is maintained that our human nature actually possesses an inseparable capacity of not at all sinning. Such a statement, however, even when made by a man who knows not the effect of his words (but this ignorance is hardly attributable to the man who suggests these statements for unwary though God-fearing men), causes the grace of Christ to be “made of none effect,”145    1 Cor. i. 17. Another reading has crux Christi instead of “Christi gratia,” thus closely adopting the apostle’s words. since it is pretended that human nature is sufficient for its own holiness and justification.

CAPUT L.

58. Etiam a piis ac Deum timentibus gratia impugnatur. Et videte quid adjungat, unde illud confirmari existimat. «Quia nulla,» inquit, «adimere voluntas potest, quod inseparabiliter insitum probatur esse naturae.» Unde ergo illa vox: Ut non quae vultis illa faciatis (Galat. V, 17)? Unde etiam illa: Non enim quod volo facio bonum; sed quod odi malum, hoc ago? Ubi est possibilitas, quae inseparabiliter insita probatur esse naturae? Ecce homines non ea quae volunt faciunt: et de non peccando utique agebat, non de volando, quia homines, non alites erant. Ecce homo quod vult bonum non agit; sed quod non vult malum, hoc agit: velle illi adjacet, perficere autem bonum non adjacet (Rom. VII, 15, 18). Ubi est possibilitas, quae inseparabiliter insita probatur esse naturae? Quemlibet enim in se transfiguret, si de se ipso ista non dicit Apostolus, hominem certe in se transfigurat. Ab isto autem ipsa humana natura inseparabilem nihil peccandi possibilitatem habere defenditur. Sed his verbis id agitur, etiam a nesciente qui loquitur, non autem nesciente illo qui haec loquenda incautis etiam Deum timentibus suggerit, ut evacuetur Christigratia , humana sibi ad justitiam suam quasi sufficiente natura.