Chapter 35 .—The Science of Definition is Not False, Though It May Be Applied to Falsities.

53.  Again, the science of definition, of division, and of partition, although it is frequently applied to falsities, is not itself false, nor framed by man’s device, but is evolved from the reason of things.  For although poets have applied it to their fictions, and false philosophers, or even heretics—that is, false Christians—to their erroneous doctrines, that is no reason why it should be false, for example, that neither in definition, nor in division, nor in partition, is anything to be included that does not pertain to the matter in hand, nor anything to be omitted that does.  This is true, even though the things to be defined or divided are not true.  For even falsehood itself is defined when we say that falsehood is the declaration of a state of things which is not as we declare it to be; and this definition is true, although falsehood itself cannot be true.  We can also divide it, saying that there are two kinds of falsehood, one in regard to things that cannot be true at all, the other in regard to things that are not, though it is possible they might be, true.  For example, the man who says that seven and three are eleven, says what cannot be true under any circumstances; but he who says that it rained on the kalends of January, although perhaps the fact is not so, says what posssibly might have been.  The definition and division, therefore, of what is false may be perfectly true, although what is false cannot, of course, itself be true.

CAPUT XXXV. Scientia definiendi et dividendi non est falsa etiamsi falsis adhibeatur. Falsum quid.

53. Item scientia definiendi, dividendi, atque partiendi, quanquam etiam rebus falsis plerumque adhibeatur, ipsa tamen falsa non est, neque ab hominibus instituta, sed in rerum ratione comperta. Non enim quia et fabulis suis eam poetae, et opinionibus erroris sui vel falsi philosophi, vel etiam haeretici, hoc est, falsi christiani adhibere consueverunt, propterea falsum est neque in definiendo, neque in dividendo aut partiendo, aliquid complectendum esse quod ad rem ipsam non pertinet, aut aliquid quod pertinet praetereundum. Hoc verum est, etiamsi ea quae definiuntur aut distribuuntur, vera non sint. Nam et ipsum falsum definitur, cum dicimus falsum esse significationem rei non ita se habentis ut significatur, sive alio aliquo modo: quae definitio vera est, quamvis falsum verum esse non possit. Possumus etiam dividere, dicentes, duo esse genera falsi: unum eorum quae omnino esse non possunt; alterum eorum quae non sunt, quamvis esse possint. Nam qui dicit septem et tria undecim esse, id dicit quod omnino esse non potest: qui autem dicit calendis, verbi gratia, januariis pluisse, tamenetsi factum non sit, id tamen dicit quod fieri potuerit. Definitio igitur et divisio falsorum potest esse verissima, quamvis falsa ipsa utique vera non sint.