Chapter 36.—The Rules of Eloquence are True, Though Sometimes Used to Persuade Men of What is False.

54.  There are also certain rules for a more copious kind of argument, which is called eloquence, and these rules are not the less true that they can be used for persuading men of what is false; but as they can be used to enforce the truth as well, it is not the faculty itself that is to be blamed, but the perversity of those who put it to a bad use.  Nor is it owing to an arrangement among men that the expression of affection conciliates the hearer, or that a narrative, when it is short and clear, is effective, and that variety arrests men’s attention without wearying them.  And it is the same with other directions of the same kind, which, whether the cause in which they are used be true or false, are themselves true just in so far as they are effective in producing knowledge or belief, or in moving men’s minds to desire and aversion.  And men rather found out that these things are so, than arranged that they should be so.

CAPUT XXXVI. Eloquentiae praecepta vera sunt, quamvis eis interdum falsa persuadeantur.

54. Sunt etiam quaedam praecepta uberioris disputationis, quae jam eloquentia nominatur, quae nihilominus vera sunt, quamvis eis possint etiam falsa persuaderi: sed quia et vera possunt , non est facultas ipsa culpabilis, sed ea male utentium perversitas. Nam neque hoc ab hominibus institutum est, ut charitatis expressio conciliet auditorem, aut ut facile quod intendit, insinuet brevis et aperta narratio, et varietas ejus sine fastidio teneat intentos; et caeterae hujusmodi observationes, quae sive in falsis sive in veris causis, verae sunt tamen, in quantum vel sciri vel credi aliquid faciunt, aut ad expetendum fugiendumve animos movent, et inventae potius quod ita se habeant, quam ut ita se haberent institutae.