APPENDICES

 I. There is no existing thing equal in honour to God, but he is the one Ruler, and Governor, and King, to whom alone it is lawful to govern and regula

 II. Where, then, God placed the roots, and what foundation it has upon which it is so firmly fixed like a statue, we must now consider. It is not natu

 III. But the Creator created two different kinds both in the earth, and in the water, and in the air. In the air he placed those animals which fly, an

 IV. But, taking up our discourse again at the beginning for the sake of clearness, let us say that of bodies some have put on habit, and others nature

 V. In such important particulars are animals superior to plants. Let us now therefore see in what man is superior to the other animals. He now has rec

 VI. Having now, therefore, gone through the whole question of the more important plants in the world, let us see in what manner also the all-wise God

 VII. And the way in which Paradise was planted is in strict conformity with what has been here said for we read that God planted a Paradise in Eden,

 VIII. Having now, then, discussed these matters at sufficient length, we must proceed to investigate its imperishableness. Now, there are three opinio

 IX. But we must place those arguments first which make out the world to be uncreated and indestructible, because of our respect for that which is visi

 X. Since, therefore, the arrangement of the world is such as I have endeavoured to describe it, so that there is no part whatever left out, so as for

 XI. Let this be taken as a testimony delivered by Plato to the imperishable nature of the world. Its uncreated character follows from the truth of nat

 XII. Moreover this point is manifest to every one, that every nature is desirous to keep and preserve, and if it were possible to make immortal, every

 XIII. However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most accurate

 XIV. But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and is l

 XV. Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been destroyed b

 XVI. However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince all t

 XVII. But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system of rea

 XVIII. Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars of the

 XIX. But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led away by

 XX. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world hav

 XXII. And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the assert

XIII. However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most accurately worked out, and altogether irresistible; for they inquire what reason there is for God's destroying the world. For if he destroys it at all he must do so either with the intention of never making a world again, or with the object of creating a second fresh one; now the former idea is inconsistent with the character of God; for it is proper to change disorder into order, and not order into disorder: in the second place, it is so because it would give rise to repentance, which is an affliction and a disease of the soul. For he ought either never to have created a world at all, or else, if he judged that it was a fitting employment for him, he ought to have been pleased with it after it was made. But the second reason deserves no superficial examination; for if he were intending to make another world instead of that which exists at present, then of necessity this second world that would be made, in that case, would be either worse than, or similar to, or better than the first; everyone of which ideas is inadmissible; for if the new world is to be worse than the former, then the maker must be also worse: but all the works of God are without blemish, beyond all reproach and wholly faultless, inasmuch as they are wrought with the most consummate skill and knowledge; for as the proverb says; -

"For e'en a woman's wisdom's not so coarse

As to despise the good and choose the worse."

But it is consistent with the character of, and becoming to God to give form to what is shapeless, and to invest what is most ugly with admirable beauty. Again, if the new world is to be exactly like the old one, then the maker is only wasting his labour, and differs in no respect from infant children who, very often while playing on the sea shore raise up little mounds of sand, and then pull them down again with their hands and destroy them; for it would have been much better than making another world exactly like the former, neither to take anything from, nor to add anything to, nor to change either for the better or for the worse, what existed originally, but to let it remain just as it was. If, on the other hand, he is about to make a world better than the former one, then the maker too must be better than the maker of the former world, so that when he made the former world he was inferior both in his skill and in his intellect, which is impious even to imagine, for God is at all times equal and similar to himself, being neither capable of any relaxation which can make him worse, nor of any extension which can make him better. Men, indeed, do admit of such inequalities in either direction, being naturally liable to alter either for the better or for the worse, and continually admitting of increase, and advance, and improvement, and everything contrary to these states; and besides this, the works of us who are but mortal men may very appropriately be perishable, but the works of the immortal must in all consistency and reason be likewise imperishable, for it is natural that what is made should resemble the nature of the maker.