APPENDICES

 I. There is no existing thing equal in honour to God, but he is the one Ruler, and Governor, and King, to whom alone it is lawful to govern and regula

 II. Where, then, God placed the roots, and what foundation it has upon which it is so firmly fixed like a statue, we must now consider. It is not natu

 III. But the Creator created two different kinds both in the earth, and in the water, and in the air. In the air he placed those animals which fly, an

 IV. But, taking up our discourse again at the beginning for the sake of clearness, let us say that of bodies some have put on habit, and others nature

 V. In such important particulars are animals superior to plants. Let us now therefore see in what man is superior to the other animals. He now has rec

 VI. Having now, therefore, gone through the whole question of the more important plants in the world, let us see in what manner also the all-wise God

 VII. And the way in which Paradise was planted is in strict conformity with what has been here said for we read that God planted a Paradise in Eden,

 VIII. Having now, then, discussed these matters at sufficient length, we must proceed to investigate its imperishableness. Now, there are three opinio

 IX. But we must place those arguments first which make out the world to be uncreated and indestructible, because of our respect for that which is visi

 X. Since, therefore, the arrangement of the world is such as I have endeavoured to describe it, so that there is no part whatever left out, so as for

 XI. Let this be taken as a testimony delivered by Plato to the imperishable nature of the world. Its uncreated character follows from the truth of nat

 XII. Moreover this point is manifest to every one, that every nature is desirous to keep and preserve, and if it were possible to make immortal, every

 XIII. However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most accurate

 XIV. But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and is l

 XV. Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been destroyed b

 XVI. However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince all t

 XVII. But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system of rea

 XVIII. Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars of the

 XIX. But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led away by

 XX. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world hav

 XXII. And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the assert

XVI. However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince all those who are not determined to be obstinate beyond all bounds; of those things which in pairs are exactly contrary to one another it is impossible that one thing should be, and that the other should not be; for since there is white it follows as a matter of absolute necessity that there must also be black, and since there is a great there must likewise be a little; since there is an odd there must inevitably be an even; since there is a sweet there must be a bitter; since there is day there must be night; and so on in an infinite number of similar cases; but if a conflagration should take place, then something would ensue which is impossible; for then, of things in a pair, the one will happen and the other will not. Come, now, let us consider the matter thus: if everything is resolved into fire, there is then something light, and rare, and warm; for all these are the especial properties of fire; but there can be nothing heavy, or cold, or thick, which are the opposites of the qualities which I have just enumerated. How then can any one more completely overturn the idea of the universal disorder which would be involved in such a conflagration than by showing that those things which by a law of nature must exist together, are by this process separated from their natural conjunction? And the separation has extended to such a degree, that those who maintain this doctrine attribute eternal durability to the one and deny any existence at all to the other. Again, there is this assertion made by some of those who diligently employ themselves in investigating truth which appears to me to be a sufficiently felicitous one; if the world is destroyed it will either be destroyed by some other efficient cause, or by God; now there is certainly nothing else whatever from which it can receive its destruction, for there is nothing whatever which it does not surround and contain; but that which is surrounded and confined within something else is manifestly inferior in power to that which surrounds and confines it, by which it is therefore mastered; on the other hand, to say that it is destroyed by God is the most impious of all possible assertions; for God is the cause not of disorder, and irregularity, and destruction, but of order, and beautiful regularity, and life, and of every good thing, as is confessed by all those whose opinions are based on truth.