APPENDICES

 I. There is no existing thing equal in honour to God, but he is the one Ruler, and Governor, and King, to whom alone it is lawful to govern and regula

 II. Where, then, God placed the roots, and what foundation it has upon which it is so firmly fixed like a statue, we must now consider. It is not natu

 III. But the Creator created two different kinds both in the earth, and in the water, and in the air. In the air he placed those animals which fly, an

 IV. But, taking up our discourse again at the beginning for the sake of clearness, let us say that of bodies some have put on habit, and others nature

 V. In such important particulars are animals superior to plants. Let us now therefore see in what man is superior to the other animals. He now has rec

 VI. Having now, therefore, gone through the whole question of the more important plants in the world, let us see in what manner also the all-wise God

 VII. And the way in which Paradise was planted is in strict conformity with what has been here said for we read that God planted a Paradise in Eden,

 VIII. Having now, then, discussed these matters at sufficient length, we must proceed to investigate its imperishableness. Now, there are three opinio

 IX. But we must place those arguments first which make out the world to be uncreated and indestructible, because of our respect for that which is visi

 X. Since, therefore, the arrangement of the world is such as I have endeavoured to describe it, so that there is no part whatever left out, so as for

 XI. Let this be taken as a testimony delivered by Plato to the imperishable nature of the world. Its uncreated character follows from the truth of nat

 XII. Moreover this point is manifest to every one, that every nature is desirous to keep and preserve, and if it were possible to make immortal, every

 XIII. However, this argument also is a most demonstrative one, on which I know that vast numbers of philosophers pride themselves as one most accurate

 XIV. But Boethus adduces the most convincing arguments, which we shall proceed to mention immediately for if, says he, the world was created and is l

 XV. Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been destroyed b

 XVI. However, besides what has been here said, any one may use this argument also in corroboration of his opinion, which will certainly convince all t

 XVII. But some of those persons who have fancied that the world is everlasting, inventing a variety of new arguments, employ also such a system of rea

 XVIII. Theophrastus, moreover, says that those men who attribute a beginning and destructibility to the world are deceived by four particulars of the

 XIX. But it is necessary to encounter such quibbling arguments as these, lest some persons of too little experience should yield to and be led away by

 XX. These things, then, may be said by us with respect to the argument that the inequalities of the surface of the earth are no proof of the world hav

 XXII. And as for the third argument, it is convicted by itself, as being derived only from an unsound system of questioning proceeding from the assert

XV. Is it not however worth while to examine this question, in what manner there can be a regeneration of all those things which have been destroyed by fire, and resolved into fire? for when their substance has been wholly destroyed by the fire, it follows of necessity that the fire itself must also be extinguished as no longer having any nourishment. Therefore, as long as it remained the seminal principle of arrangement was likewise preserved, but when it is destroyed that principle is destroyed with it. But it would be impious, and an impiety of double dye, not only to attribute destruction to the world, but also to take away the possibility of its regeneration; as if God delighted in disorder, and irregularity, and all kinds of evil things. But we must examine this question more accurately, in the following manner. There are three species in fire; the coal, and the flame, and the light. Now coal is the fire in its earthy substance, which, like a sort of spiritual habit, couches and lies hid in a sort of cavern, pervading it all to its very extremities. And the flame is that part which, being raised on high, is lifted up from its fuel. And the light is that which is emitted from the flame, so as to co-operate with the eyes, in order to enable them to comprehend what is seen. And the flame occupies the middle position between the coal and the light; for when it is extinguished it ends in coal, and when it is kindled it excites the light, which, being deprived of its burning power, blazes. If therefore, we affirm that the world is dissolved by conflagration, it would not be coal, because, in that case there will be a great deal of the earthy substance left behind, in which also fire must necessarily be contained. But we must agree, that none of the other bodies subsist any longer, but that earth, and water, and air, are all dissolved into unmixed fire. Nor, again, would it become flame; for that can only exist in connexion with nourishment; and, if nothing is left behind, being deprived of all nourishment it will immediately be extinguished. It follows from all this, that it cannot become light either; for light by itself has no substance at all, but flows from the things before mentioned, coal and flame, not in a great degree from the coal, but very much from the flame; for it is diffused over a very great space indeed. But if, as has been already proved, those things had no existence from the conflagration of all things, then there could not be any light either. So that it is impossible for the world to be susceptible of any regeneration, inasmuch as there is no spermatic principle smouldering beneath; from which consideration it is plain that it is uncreated, and that it will be for ever imperishable.