34. For what is written in another place, “Wish not to use every lie;”56    Ecclus. vii. 13 μὴ θέλε ψεύδεσθαι πᾶν Ψεῦδος, noli velle mentiri omne mendacium. “Use not to make any manner of lie,” E.V. “Every” is used for “any.” they say is not of force for this, that a person is not to use any lie. Therefore, when one man shall say, that according to this testimony of Scripture we must to that degree hold every sort and kind of lie in detestation, that even if a man wish to lie, yea, though he lie not, the very wish is to be condemned; and to this sense interpreteth, that it is not said, Do not use every lie, but, “Do not wish to use every lie;” that one must not dare not only to tell, but not even to wish to tell, any lie whatever: saith another man, “Nay, in that it saith, Do not wish to use every lie, it willeth that from the mouth of the heart we exterminate and estrange lying: so that while from some lies we must abstain with the mouth of the body, as are those chiefly which pertain to doctrine of religion; from some, we are not to abstain with the mouth of the body, if reason of avoiding a greater evil require; but with the mouth of the heart we must abstain utterly from every lie.” Where it behoveth to be understood what is said, “Do not wish:” namely, the will itself is taken as it were the mouth of the heart, so that it concerneth not the mouth of the heart when in shunning a greater evil we lie unwillingly. There is also a third sense in which thou mayest so take this word, “not every,” that, except some lies, it giveth thee leave to lie. Like as if he should say, wish not to believe every man: he would not mean to advise that none should be believed; but that not all, some however, should be believed. And that which follows, “For assiduity thereof will not profit for good,” sounds as if, not lying, but assiduous lying, that is, the custom and love of lying, should seem to be that which he would prohibit. To which that person will assuredly slide down,57    Abutendum who either shall think that every lie may be boldly used (for so he will shun not that even which is committed in the doctrine of piety and religion; than which what more abominably wicked thing canst thou easily find, not among all lies, but among all sins?) or to some lie (no matter how easy, how harmless,) shall accommodate the inclination of the will; so as to lie, not unwillingly for the sake of escaping a greater evil, but willingly and with liking. So, seeing there be three things which may be understood in this sentence, either “Every lie, not only tell thou not, but do not even wish to tell:” or, “Do not wish, but even unwillingly tell a lie when aught worse is to be avoided:” or, “Not every,” to wit, that except some lies, the rest are admitted: one of these is found to make for those who hold that one is never to lie, two for those who think that sometimes one may tell a lie. But yet what follows, “For assiduity thereof will not profit to good,” I know not whether it can countenance the first sentence of these three; except haply so, that while it is a precept for the perfect not only not to lie, but not even to wish; assiduity of lying is not permitted even to beginners. As if, namely, on laying down the rule at no time whatever not merely to lie but so much as to have a wish to lie, and this being gainsaid by examples, in regard that there are some lies which have been even approved by great authority, it should be rejoined that those indeed are lies of beginners, which have, in regard of this life, some kind of duty of mercy; and yet to that degree is every lie evil, and by perfect and spiritual minds in every way to be eschewed, that not even beginners are permitted to have assiduous custom thereof. For we have already spoken concerning the Egyptian midwives, that it is in respect of the promise of growth and proficiency to better things that they while lying are spoken of with approval: because it is some step towards loving the true and eternal saving of the soul, when a person doth mercifully for the saving of any man’s albeit mortal life even tell a lie.

34. Nam quod alio loco scriptum est, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium; non ad hoc volunt valere, ut nullo mendacio quisquam mentiatur. Itaque cum alius dixerit, ex isto Scripturae testimonio usque adeo generaliter omne mendacium esse detestandum, ut etiam si quis mentiri velit, etiamsi non mentiatur, jam voluntas ipsa damnanda sit; atque ad hoc interpretetur, 0510 quod non dictum est, Noli mentiri omne mendacium; sed, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium; ut non solum mentiri, sed nec velle mentiri quisque audeat ullo mendacio.

CAPUT XVII.

Psalmi 5 versiculus 7 tripliciter quoque intellectus. Praeceptum vetans falsum testimonium dici, quomodo intelligendum. Dicit alius, Imo quod ait, Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium; de ore cordis exterminandum atque alienandum esse mendacium voluit: ut a quibusdam mendaciis ore corporis abstinendum sit, sicut illa sunt maxime, quae pertinent ad doctrinam religionis; a quibusdam vero non sit ore corporis abstinendum, si majoris mali evitandi causa exigit; ore autem cordis ab omni mendacio penitus abstinere debeamus. Ubi oportet intelligi quod dictum est, Noli velle: voluntas quippe ipsa quasi os cordis accipitur, ut non pertineat ad os cordis, cum majus malum caventes mentimur inviti. Est et tertius intellectus, quo sic accipias, Noli omne, ut exceptis aliquibus mendaciis mentiri te sinat. Tanquam si diceret, Noli velle credere omni homini: non utique ut nulli crederetur moneret; sed ut non omnibus, aliquibus autem crederetur. Et id quod sequitur, Assiduitas enim ejus non proficiet ad bonum (Eccli. VII, 14), ita sonat, quasi non a mendacio, sed ab assiduo mendacio, id est, a consuetudine atque amore mentiendi prohibere videatur. Quo profecto delabetur, quisquis vel omni mendacio putaverit abutendum, (ita enim nec illud cavebit, quod fit in doctrina pietatis et religionis; quo sceleratius quid facile invenias, non inter omnia mendacia, sed inter omnia peccata?) vel alicui mendacio, quamvis facili, quamvis innoxio, nutum voluntatis accommodaverit; ut non invitus evadendi majoris mali causa, sed volens libensque mentiatur. Ita cum tria sint quae in hac sententia intelligi possint: aut, Omne mendacium non solum mentiri noli, sed nec velle mentiri ; aut, noli velle, sed vel invitus mentire, cum fugiendum est aliquid gravius; aut, noli omne, ut exceptis aliquibus mendaciis caetera permittantur: unum hic pro his quibus mentiri nunquam placet, duo pro illis qui aliquando putant esse mentiendum, inveniuntur. Sed tamen quod sequitur, Assiduitas enim ejus non proficiet ad bonum, nescio utrum possit primae harum trium sententiae suffragari: nisi forte ita ut perfectorum praeceptum sit, omnino nunquam non solum mentiri, sed vel velle mentiri; assiduitas vero mentiendi nec proficientibus permittatur. Tanquam si cum praeciperetur, nunquam prorsus non solum mentiendum, sed nec voluntatem habendam esse mentiendi, contradiceretur exemplis, quod aliqua sunt etiam magna auctoritate approbata mendacia: responderetur autem, illa quidem esse proficientium, quae habent secundum hanc vitam qualecumque officium misericordiae; sed usque adeo esse omne mendacium malum, et perfectis atque spiritualibus animis omni modo fugiendum, ut nec ipsis proficientibus assiduitas ejus permittenda sit. Dictum est enim jam de obstetricibus Aegyptiis, quod de indole ad melius proficiendi 0511 mentientes approbatae sunt: quia nonnullus gradus est ad diligendam veram ac sempiternam salutem, cum quisque misericorditer etiam pro alicujus quamvis mortali salute mentitur (Supra, cap. 5, n. 5-7).