9. But if no authority for lying can be alleged, neither from the ancient Books, be it because that is not a lie which is received to have been done or said in a figurative sense, or be it because good men are not challenged to imitate that which in bad men, beginning to amend, is praised in comparison with the worse; nor yet from the books of the New Testament, because Peter’s correction rather than his simulation, even as his tears rather than his denial, is what we must imitate: then, as to those examples which are fetched from common life, they assert much more confidently that there is no trust to be given to these. For first they teach, that a lie is iniquity, by many proofs of holy writ, especially by that which is written, “Thou, Lord, hatest all workers of iniquity, thou shall destroy them that speak leasing.”20    Ps. v. 5, 6. [See R.V.] For either as the Scripture is wont, in the following clause it expounds the former; so that, as iniquity is a term of a wider meaning, leasing is named as the particular sort of iniquity intended: or if they think there is any difference between the two, leasing is by so much worse than iniquity as “thou wilt destroy” is heavier than “thou hatest.” For it may be that God hates a person to that degree more mildly, as not to destroy him, but whom He destroys He hates the more exceedingly, by how much He punisheth more severely. Now He hateth all who work iniquity: but all who speak leasing He also destroyeth. Which thing being fixed, who of them which assert this will be moved by those examples, when it is said, suppose a man should seek shelter with thee who by thy lie may be saved from death? For that death which men are foolishly afraid of who are not afraid to sin, kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord teacheth in the Gospel; whence He charges us not to fear that death:21    Matt. x. 28 but the mouth which lies kills not the body but the soul. For in these words it is most plainly written, “The mouth that lieth slayeth the soul.”22    Wisd. i. 11; “belieth,” E.V. How then can it be said without the greatest perverseness, that to the end one man may have life of the body, it is another man’s duty to incur death of the soul? The love of our neighbor hath its bounds in each man’s love of himself. “Thou shall love,” saith He, “thy neighbor as thyself.”23    Levit. xix. 18; Matt. xxii. 39 How can a man be said to love as himself that man, for whom that he may secure a temporal life, himself loseth life eternal? Since if for his temporal life he lose but his own temporal life, that is not to love as himself, but more than himself: which exceeds the rule of sound doctrine. Much less then is he by telling a lie to lose his own eternal for another’s temporal life. His own temporal life, of course, for his neighbor’s eternal life a Christian man will not hesitate to lose: for this example has gone before, that the Lord died for us. To this point He also saith, “This is my commandment, that ye love one another as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”24    John xv. 12, 13 For none is so foolish as to say that the Lord did other than consult for the eternal salvation of men, whether in doing what He hath charged us to do, or in charging us to do what Himself hath done. Since then by lying eternal life is lost, never for any man’s temporal life must a lie be told. And as to those who take it ill and are indignant that one should refuse to tell a lie, and thereby slay his own soul in order that another may grow old in the flesh; what if by our committing theft, what if by committing adultery, a person might be delivered from death: are we therefore to steal, to commit whoredom? They cannot prevail with themselves in a case of this kind: namely, if a person should bring a halter and demand that one should yield to his carnal lust, declaring that he will hang himself unless his request be granted: they cannot prevail with themselves to comply for the sake of, as they say, saving a life. If this is absurd and wicked, why should a man corrupt his own soul with a lie in order that another may live in the body, when, if he were to give his body to be corrupted with such an object, he would in the judgment of all men be held guilty of nefarious turpitude? Therefore the only point to be attended to in this question is, whether a lie be iniquity. And since this is asserted by the texts above rehearsed, we must see that to ask, whether a man ought to tell a lie for the safety of another, is just the same as asking whether for another’s safety a man ought to commit iniquity. But if the salvation of the soul rejects this, seeing it cannot be secured but by equity, and would have us prefer it not only to another’s, but even to our own temporal safety: what remains, say they, that should make us doubt that a lie ought not to be told under any circumstances whatsoever? For it cannot be said that there is aught among temporal goods greater or dearer than the safety and life of the body. Wherefore if not even that is to be preferred to truth, what can be put in our way for the sake of which they who think it is sometimes right to lie, can urge that a lie ought to be told?

9. Quod si auctoritas mentiendi nec de antiquis Libris proferri potest, vel quia non est mendacium quod figurate gestum dictumve recipitur, vel quia bonis ad imitandum non proponitur quod in malis, cum proficere coeperint, in pejoris comparatione laudatur; nec de Novi Testamenti libris, quia correctio potius quam simulatio, sicut lacrymae potius quam negatio Petri est imitanda.

CAPUT VI.

Mendacium esse iniquitatem, et mortem animae afferre, nec proinde admittendum pro cujusquam salute temporali. Jam illis exemplis, quae de communi vita proferuntur, multo confidentius asserunt non esse credendum. Prius enim docent iniquitatem esse mendacium, multis documentis Litterarum sanctarum, et eo maxime quod scriptum est: Odisti, Domine, omnes qui operantur iniquitatem; perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium (Psal. V, 7). Aut enim, ut solet Scriptura, sequenti versu exposuit superiorem; ut quoniam latius solet patere iniquitas, intelligamus nominato mendacio tanquam speciem iniquitatis significare voluerit: aut si aliquid interesse arbitrantur, tanto pejus est mendacium, quanto gravius positum est perdes, quam odisti. Forte enim odit aliquem Deus aliquanto mitius, ut eum non perdat: quem vero perdit, tanto vehementius odit, quanto severius punit. Odit autem omnes qui operantur iniquitatem: at omnes qui loquuntur mendacium etiam perdit. Quo constituto, quis eorum qui haec asserunt commovebitur illis exemplis, cum dicitur: Quid si ad te homo confugiat, qui mendacio tuo possit a morte liberari? Illa enim mors quam stulte timent homines, qui peccare non timent, non animam, sed corpus occidit, sicut Dominus in Evangelio docet; unde praecipit ne ipsa timeatur (Matth. X, 28): os autem quod mentitur, non corpus, sed animam occidit. His enim verbis apertissime scriptum est: Os quod mentitur, occidit animam (Sap. I, 11). Quomodo ergo non perversissime dicitur, ut alter corporaliter vivat, debere alterum spiritualiter mori? Nam et ipsa dilectio proximi ex sua cujusque terminum accepit. Diliges, inquit, proximum tuum tanquam te ipsum (Levit. XIX, 18, et Matth. XXII, 39). Quomodo ergo quisque diligit tanquam se ipsum, cui ut praestet vitam temporalem, ipse amittit aeternam? quandoquidem si pro illius temporali vita suam ipsam temporalem perdat, non est jam diligere sicut se ipsum, sed plus quam se ipsum: quod sanae doctrinae regulam excedit. Multo minus igitur aeternam suam pro 0495 alterius temporali mentiendo amissurus est. Temporalem plane vitam suam pro aeterna vita proximi non dubitabit christianus amittere: hoc enim praecessit exemplum, ut pro nobis Dominus ipse moreretur. Ad hoc enim et ait: Hoc est mandatum meum, ut diligatis invicem sicut et ego dilexi vos. Majorem dilectionem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis (Joan. XV, 12, 13). Non enim quisquam est ita desipiens, ut dicat aliud quam saluti sempiternae hominum consuluisse Dominum vel faciendo quod praecepit, vel praecipiendo quod fecit. Cum igitur mentiendo vita aeterna amittatur, nunquam pro cujusquam temporali vita mentiendum est. Enimvero isti qui stomachantur et indignantur, si nolit aliquis mendacio perimere animam suam, ut alius senescat in carne; quid, si etiam furto nostro, quid, si adulterio liberari possit aliquis de morte? ideone furandum est, aut moechandum? Nesciunt enim ad hoc se cogere, ut si laqueum ferat homo et stuprum petat, confirmans quod sibi collum ligabit, nisi ei concedatur quod petit, consentiatur propter animam, sicut ipsi dicunt, liberandam. Quod si absurdum et nefarium est, cur animam suam quisque mendacio corrumpat, ut alter vivat in corpore; cum si suum corpus propterea corrumpendum daret, omnium judicio nefariae turpitudinis damnaretur? Proinde non est in ista quaestione attendendum, nisi utrum iniquitas sit mendacium. Quod cum supra commemoratis documentis asseratur, videndum est ita quaeri utrum pro alterius salute mentiri aliquis debeat, ac si quaereretur utrum pro alterius salute iniquus esse aliquis debeat. Quod si respuit animae salus, quae non potest nisi aequitate servari, et se ut praeponamus non solum alterius, sed etiam nostrae saluti temporali jubet; quid restat, inquiunt, quo dubitare debeamus nunquam omnino esse mentiendum? Non enim dici potest esse aliquid in temporalibus commodis, salute ac vita corporali majus aut charius. Unde si nec ipsa praeponenda est veritati, quid objici potest propter quod mentiendum esse contendant, qui aliquando putant oportere mentiri?