Chapter IV.

As it has been shown that he who injures another for the sake of his own advantage will undergo terrible punishment at the hand of his own conscience, it is referred that nothing is useful to one which is not in the same way useful to all. Thus there is no place among Christians for the question propounded by the philosophers about two shipwrecked persons, for they must show love and humility to all.

24. Hence we infer598    Cic. de Off. III. 5, § 25. that a man who guides himself according to the ruling of nature, so as to be obedient to her, can never injure another. If he injures another, he violates nature, nor will he think that what he has gained is so much an advantage as a disadvantage. And what punishment is worse than the wounds of the conscience within? What judgment harder than that of our hearts, whereby each one stands convicted and accuses himself of the injury that he has wrongfully done against his brother? This the Scriptures speak of very plainly, saying: “Out of the mouth of fools there is a rod for wrong-doing.”599    Prov. xiv. 3. Folly, then, is condemned because it causes wrong-doing. Ought we not rather to avoid this, than death, or loss, or want, or exile, or sickness? Who would not think some blemish of body or loss of inheritance far less than some blemish of soul or loss of reputation?

25. It is clear, then,600    Cic. de Off. III. 6. that all must consider and hold that the advantage of the individual is the same as that of all, and that nothing must be considered advantageous except what is for the general good. For how can one be benefited alone? That which is useless to all is harmful. I certainly cannot think that he who is useless to all can be of use to himself. For if there is one law of nature for all, there is also one state of usefulness for all. And we are bound by the law of nature to act for the good of all. It is not, therefore, right for him who wishes the interests of another to be considered according to nature, to injure him against the law of nature.

26. For if those who run in a race601    Cic. de Off. III. 10, § 42. are, as one hears, instructed and warned each one to win the race by swiftness of foot and not by any foul play, and to hasten on to victory by running as hard as they can, but not to dare to trip up another or push him aside with their hand, how much more in the course of this life ought the victory to be won by us, without falseness to another and cheating?

27. Some ask602    Cic. de Off. 23, § 89. whether a wise man ought in case of a shipwreck to take away a plank from an ignorant sailor? Although it seems better for the common good that a wise man rather than a fool should escape from shipwreck, yet I do not think that a Christian, a just and a wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed robber he cannot return his blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbour. The verdict on this is plain and clear in the books of the Gospel. “Put up thy sword, for every one that taketh the sword shall perish with the sword.”603    S. Matt. xxvi. 52. What robber is more hateful than the persecutor who came to kill Christ? But Christ would not be defended from the wounds of the persecutor, for He willed to heal all by His wounds.

28. Why dost thou consider thyself greater than another, when a Christian man ought to put others before himself, to claim nothing for himself, usurp no honours, claim no reward for his merits? Why, next, art thou not wont to bear thy own troubles rather than to destroy another’s advantage? For what is so contrary to nature as not to be content with what one has or to seek what is another’s, and to try to get it in shameful ways. For if a virtuous life is in accordance with nature—for God made all things very good—then shameful living must be opposed to it. A virtuous and a shameful life cannot go together, since they are absolutely severed by the law of nature.

CAPUT IV.

Ubi strictius ostensum est eum qui commodi sui causa 0152A noceat alteri, graves conscientiae suae paenas luiturum, colligitur uni utile nihil esse, quod itidem non sit omnibus: atque adeo propositae a philosophis de naufragis duobus quaestioni locum non esse apud Christianos, quibus ubique charitas atque humilitas exercendae sunt.

24. Hinc ergo colligitur quod homo, qui secundum naturae formatus est directionem, ut obediat ei, nocere non possit alteri: quod si cui noceat, naturam violet: neque tantum esse commodi quod adipisci sese putet, quantum incommodi, quod ex eo sibi accidat. Quae enim poena gravior, quam interioris vulnus conscientiae? Quod severius judicium, quam domesticum, quo unusquisque sibi est reus, seque ipse arguit quod injuriam fratri indigne fecerit? 0152B Quod non mediocriter Scriptura commendat dicens: Ex ore stultorum baculum contumeliae (Prov. XIV, 3). Stultitia igitur condemnatur, quia contumeliam facit. Nonne hoc magis fugiendum, quam mors, quam dispendium, quam inopia, quam exsilium, quam debilitatis dolor? Quis enim vitium corporis, aut patrimonii damnum non levius ducat vitio animi, et existimationis dispendio?

114 25. Liquet igitur id spectandum et tenendum omnibus, quod eadem singulorum sit utilitas, quae sit universorum: nihilque judicandum utile, nisi quod in commune prosit. Quomodo enim potest uni prodesse? Quod inutile sit omnibus, nocet. Mihi certe non videtur, qui inutilis est omnibus, sibi utilis esse posse. Etenim si una lex 0152C naturae omnibus, una utique utilitas universorum, ad consulendum utique omnibus naturae lege constringimur. Non est ergo ejus qui consultum velit alteri secundum naturam, nocere ei adversus legem naturae.

26. Etenim si hi qui in stadio currunt, ita feruntur praeceptis informari atque instrui, ut unusquisque celeritate non fraude contendat, cursuque, quantum potest, ad victoriam properet; supplantare autem alterum aut manu dejicere non ausit: quanto magis in hoc cursu vitae istius, sine fraude alterius et circumscriptione gerenda nobis victoria est?

27. Quaerunt aliqui, si sapiens in naufragio positus 0153A insipienti naufrago tabulam extorquere possit, utrum debeat? Mihi quidem, etsi praestabilius communi videatur usui sapientem de naufragio quam insipientem evadere; tamen non videtur quod vir christianus, et justus, et sapiens, quaerere sibi vitam aliena morte debeat: utpote qui etiam si latronem armatum incidat, ferientem referire non possit; ne dum salutem defendit, pietatem contaminet. De quo in Evangelii libris aperta et evidens sententia est: Reconde gladium tuum; omnis enim qui gladio percusserit gladio ferietur (Matth. XXVI, 52). Quis latro detestabilior, quam persecutor qui venerat ut Christum occideret? Sed noluit se Christus persecutorum defendi vulnere, qui voluit suo vulnere omnes sanare.

0153B 28. Cur enim te potiorem altero judices, cum viri sit christiani praeferre sibi alterum, nihil sibi arrogare, nullum sibi honorem assumere, non vindicare meriti sui pretium? Deinde cur non tuum tolerare potius incommodum, quam alienum commodum diripere assuescas? Quid tam adversus naturam, quam non esse contentum eo quod habeas, aliena quaerere, ambire turpiter? Nam si honestas secundum naturam, omnia enim fecit Deus bona valde, turpitudo utique contraria est. Non potest ergo honestati convenire et turpitudini, cum haec inter se discreta naturae lege sint.