Chapter 49 [XXIX.]—In Infants Nature is of God, and the Corruption of Nature of the Devil.

“In a single man rightly is the intention blamed and the origin praised; because there must be two things to admit of contraries: in an infant, however, there is but one thing, nature only; because will has no existence in his case. Now this one thing,” says he, “is ascribable either to God or to the devil. If nature,” he goes on to observe, “is of God, there cannot be original evil in it. If of the devil, there will be nothing on the ground of which man may be vindicated for the work of God. So that he is completely a Manichean who maintains original sin.” Let him hear rather what is true in opposition to all this. In a single man the will is to be blamed, and his nature to be praised; because there should be two things for the application of contraries. Still, even in an infant, it is not the case that there is but one thing only, that is, the nature in which man was created by the good God; for he has also that corruption, which has passed upon all men by one, as the apostle wisely says, and not as the folly of Pelagius, or Cœlestius, or any of their disciples would represent the matter. Of these two things, then, which we have said exist in an infant, one is ascribed to God, the other to the devil. From the fact, however, that (owing to one of the two, even the corruption) both are subjected to the power of the devil, there really ensues no incongruity; because this happens not from the power of the devil himself, but of God. In fact, corruption is subjected to corruption, nature to nature, because the two are even in the devil; so that whenever those who are beloved and elect are “delivered from the power of darkness”244    Col. i. 13. to which they are justly exposed, it is clear enough how great a gift is bestowed on the justified and good by the good God, who brings good even out of evil.

CAPUT XXIX.

49. «In uno,» inquit, «homine jure vituperatur intentio, et origo laudatur, quia duo 0465 sunt quae contrariis applicentur: in parvulo autem unum est, natura tantum, quia voluntas non est. Illud ergo unum,» inquit, «aut Deo adscribetur , aut daemoni. Si natura», inquit, «per Deum est, non potest in ea esse originale malum. Si a diabolo, nihil erit per quod homo divino operi vindicetur. Perfecte itaque Manichaeus est, qui malum originale defendit.» Audiat potius adversum ista quod verum est. In uno homine jure vituperatur intentio, et natura laudatur, quia duo sunt quae contrariis applicentur: sed etiam in parvulo, non unum est tantum, id est, natura, in qua creatus est homo a Deo bono; habet enim et vitium, quod per unum in omnes homines pertransiit, sicut sapit Apostolus, non sicut desipit Pelagius, vel Coelestius, vel eorum quicumque discipulus. Horum itaque duorum, quae in parvulo esse diximus, unum adscribitur Deo, alterum diabolo. Et quod utrumque propter unum horum, id est, propter vitium, subjicitur potestati diaboli, ideo non est incongruum, quia non fit ipsius diaboli potestate, sed Dei. Subjicitur autem vitium vitio, natura naturae; quia et in diabolo utrumque est: ut cum dilecti et electi de potestate tenebrarum eruuntur, cui jure subduntur, appareat quid donetur justificatis bonis a Deo bono, bene operante et de malis .