Chapter 29.—A Subterfuge of the Pelagians.

Now, with reference to the passage of the apostle which I have quoted, some would maintain it to mean that “whatever amount of good will a man has, must be attributed to God on this account,—namely, because even this amount could not be in him if he were not a human being. Now, inasmuch as he has from God alone the capacity of being any thing at all, and of being human, why should there not be also attributed to God whatever there is in him of a good will, which could not exist unless he existed in whom it is?” But in this same manner it may also be said that a bad will also may be attributed to God as its author; because even it could not exist in man unless he were a man in whom it existed; but God is the author of his existence as man; and thus also of his bad will, which could have no existence if it had not a man in whom it might exist. But to argue thus is blasphemy.

29. Namque illud Apostoli quod commemoravi, sic defendere quidam voluerunt, ut dicerent, «ideo quidquid etiam bonae voluntatis habet homo, Deo tribuendum esse, quia et hoc in illo esse non posset, si homo ipse non esset: cum vero ut sit aliquid atque ut homo sit, non habeat nisi a Deo, cur non auctori Deo tribuatur etiam quidquid in illo est bonae voluntatis, quod non esset, nisi esset in quo esset?» Sed hoc modo etiam illud dici potest, malam quoque voluntatem Deo auctori tribuendam: quia nec ipsa esse posset in homine, nisi homo esset in quo esset; ut autem homo sit, Deus auctor est: ita et ejus malae voluntatis, quae nisi hominem haberet ubi esset, esse omnino non posset , quod nefas est dicere.