Chapter 30.—All Will is Either Good, and Then It Loves Righteousness, or Evil, When It Does Not Love Righteousness.

Unless, therefore, we obtain not simply determination of will, which is freely turned in this direction and that, and has its place amongst those natural goods which a bad man may use badly; but also a good will, which has its place among those goods of which it is impossible to make a bad use:—unless the impossibility is given to us from God, I know not how to defend what is said: “What hast thou that thou didst not receive?” For if we have from God a certain free will, which may still be either good or bad; but the good will comes from ourselves; then that which comes from ourselves is better than that which comes from Him. But inasmuch as it is the height of absurdity to say this, they ought to acknowledge that we attain from God even a good will. It would indeed be a strange thing if the will could so stand in some mean as to be neither good nor bad; for we either love righteousness, and it is good, and if we love it more, more good,—if less, it is less good; or if we do not love it at all, it is not good. And who can hesitate to affirm that, when the will loves not righteousness in any way at all, it is not only a bad, but even a wholly depraved will? Since therefore the will is either good or bad, and since of course we have not the bad will from God, it remains that we have of God a good will; else, I am ignorant, since our justification is from it, in what other gift from Him we ought to rejoice. Hence, I suppose, it is written, “The will is prepared of the Lord;”364    Prov. viii. 35. and in the Psalms, “The steps of a man will be rightly ordered by the Lord, and His way will be the choice of his will;”365    Ps. xxxvii. 23. and that which the apostle says, “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do of His own good pleasure.”366    Phil. ii. 13.

0169 30. Quapropter nisi obtineamus, non solum voluntatis arbitrium, quod huc atque illuc liberum flectitur, atque in eis naturalibus bonis est, quibus et male uti malus potest, sed etiam voluntatem bonam, quae jam in eis bonis est, quorum esse usus non potest malus, nisi ex Deo nobis esse non posse, nescio quemadmodum defendamus quod dictum est: Quid enim habes quod non accepisti? Nam si nobis libera quaedam voluntas ex Deo est, quae adhuc potest esse vel bona vel mala; bona vero voluntas ex nobis est: melius est id quod a nobis, quam quod ab illo est. Quod si absurdissime dicitur, oportet fateantur etiam bonam voluntatem nos divinitus adipisci. Quanquam voluntas mirum si potest in medio quodam ita consistere, ut nec bona nec mala sit. Aut enim justitiam diligimus, et bona est; et si magis diligimus, magis bona; si minus, minus bona est: aut si omnino non diligimus, non bona est. Quis vero dubitet dicere voluntatem nullo modo justitiam diligentem, non modo esse malam, sed etiam pessimam voluntatem? Si ergo voluntas aut bona est, aut mala, et utique malam non habemus ex Deo; restat ut bonam voluntatem habeamus ex Deo: alioquin nescio, cum ab eo justificamur, quo alio munere ipsius gaudere debeamus. Et hinc scriptum arbitror, Paratur voluntas a Domino (Prov. VIII, 35); et in Psalmis, A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur, et viam ejus volet (Psal. XXXVI, 23); et quod Apostolus ait, Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari, pro bona voluntate (Philipp. II, 13).