15. When that man had received the imperial power immediately after him, who was elected for his successor in the very camp, and in the extremity of danger----that imperatively demanded a leader----a man illustrious in all other respects as well as for piety,¹¹ and in personal appearance truly fitted for sovereignty----he was utterly unable to come to blows with, or even to get near the Persians (although far from deficient either in courage or eagerness for battle), because his army had lost all force and all hope.¹² He sought therefore for the means of retreating, and considered in what way he could effect this with safety, inasmuch as he had not been the inheritor of empire, but of defeat. Now, if the Persians had not made a moderate use of their victory (for it is a law with them to know how to measure out prosperity) or had not been fearful of something or other, as the report goes, and therefore had agreed to terms so unexpected and reasonable,¹³ nothing was there to prevent "not even a fire-carrier's" (as the saying is) "surviving out of the whole army," so completely had the Persians got them in their power, inasmuch as the latter were fighting in their own country, and were elated by the recent events; for the obtaining of some success is a sufficient foundation for hope of the future. In the present case, the one party had, as I have said, but one object in view----namely, how to save his army and preserve the sinews of the Roman power, for they were the sinews, and though they had failed, it was more through the imprudence of him that commanded than their own cowardice. So they agreed to these terms, so disgraceful,¹⁴ and so unworthy of the hand of Romans, to sum up the whole in one word; of the blame of which convention if anyone acquits the late and charges the present emperor, he is, in my opinion, but an ignorant critic of what has happened, for the crop is not due to the reaper, but to its sower, nor the conflagration to him that is unable to extinguish it, but to the incendiary. And the remark of Herodotus about the tyranny at Samos may be appropriately quoted, "that Histiaeus stitched the shoe, but Aristagoras put it on," meaning him that had received the succession from the man who had first gotten it.

ΙΕʹ. Διαδεξάμενος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν εὐθὺς μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ὁ μετ' ἐκεῖνον ἀναῤῥηθεὶς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ τῇ τῶν κινδύνων ἀκμῇ ἀναγκαίως ἐπιζητούσῃ τὸν ἡγησόμενον, ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανὴς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ἀληθῶς τυραννίδος ἄξιος, τὸ μὲν εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι Πέρσαις, ἢ προϊέναι οὐδαμῶς οἷός τε ἦν, καίτοι γε ἀνδρείας καὶ προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπων, τοῦ στρατοῦ παρεικότος τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἐζήτει δὲ τὴν ἀνάζευξιν: καὶ ὅπως ἂν ἀσφαλῶς τύχοι ταύτης ἐσκόπει, ὥσπερ οὐ βασιλείας, ἀλλ' ἥττης γεγονὼς κληρονόμος. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Πέρσαι τῇ νίκῃ μετριάζοντες (καὶ γὰρ νόμος οὗτος αὐτοῖς εἰδέναι μετρεῖν εὐπραγίαν), ἤ τι δείσαντες ἄλλο τῶν λεγομένων, εἰς συμβάσεις ἐτράποντο, καὶ ταύτας ἀδοκήτους οὕτω καὶ φιλανθρώπους, οὐδὲν ἐκώλυε μηδὲ πυρφόρον, ὃ δή φασιν, ὑπολειφθῆναι τῷ στρατῷ: τοσοῦτον εἶχον αὐτοὺς οἱ Πέρσαι διὰ χειρὸς, ἐν γῇ τε ἰδίᾳ μαχόμενοι, καὶ προσεπηρμένοι τοῖς γεγονόσιν: ἱκανὸν γὰρ τό τι προσλαβεῖν εὐημερίας, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ μέλλοντος: νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἑνὸς ἦν τοῦ διασώσασθαι τὸν στρατὸν, καὶ τὰ νεῦρα Ῥωμαίοις ὑπολιπεῖν: νεῦρα γὰρ ἦσαν, καὶ εἰ κακῶς ἔπραξαν ἀβουλίᾳ μᾶλλον τοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίᾳ. Οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς συνθήκαις ταύταις συνέβησαν, ταῖς οὕτως αἰσχραῖς τε καὶ ἀναξίαις τῆς Ῥωμαίων χειρὸς, ἴν' εἴπω τὸ συντομώτατον: ὧν εἴ τις, ἐκεῖνον ἀφεὶς τῆς αἰτίας, τοῦτον καταμέμφοιτο, λίαν ἐστὶν ἀγνώμων ἔμοιγε λογιστὴς τῶν τότε συμβεβηκότων. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ἀμήσαντος ὁ στάχυς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σπείραντος: οὐδὲ τοῦ κατασβέσαι μὴ δυνηθέντος ὁ ἐμπρησμὸς, τοῦ δὲ ἀνάψαντος: καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἡροδότου περὶ τῆς Σαμίων τυραννίδος καιρὸς εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Τοῦτο τὸ ὑπόδημα ἔῤῥαψε μὲν Ἱστιαῖος, ὑπεδύσατο δὲ Ἀρισταγόρας, ὁ τὰ τοῦ προειληφότος ὑποδεξάμενος.