Γ. Ταῦτα δέ μου διεξιόντος μεταξὺ κατασείσασα τῇ χειρὶ ἡ διδάσκαλος
_ Γ. Τί οὖν ἂν εἴη, φημὶ, τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τὸ χάσμα, ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, ἢ μὴ ἃ λέγεται
Γ. Τί οὖν, εἶπον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ δόγμα
_ Γ. Τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν, εἶπον, πρὸς τοὺς μικροψύχως ταῖς συμβολαῖς διακειμένους
_ Μ. Τί οὖν, φησὶ, τούτων ἀμνημόνευτον ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστίν
_ Γ. Αὐτὸ, φημὶ, τὸ δόγμα τῆς ἀναστάσεως.
Μ. Καὶ μὴν πολλὰ, φησὶ, τῶν νῦν διεξοδικῶς εἰρημένων, πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν σκοπὸν φέρει.
That the thing perceived, I replied, is not the same as the thing not perceived, I grant; but I do not discover any answer to our question in such a statement; it is not yet clear to me what we are to think that thing not-perceived to be; all I have been shown by your argument is that it is not anything material; and I do not yet know the fitting name for it. I wanted especially to know what it is, not what it is not.
Γ. Ἐγὼ δὲ, Τοῦτο μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν φημὶ καὶ αὐτὸς, τὸ μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον: οὐ μὴν τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ βλέπω, οὔπω γάρ μοι δῆλόν ἐστιν, ὅ τί ποτε χρὴ νομίζειν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν ὑλικόν τι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐδιδάχθην τῷ λόγῳ: οὐδέπω δὲ ἔγνων, ὅ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ προσήκει λέγειν: ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐδεόμην μαθεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστίν.