Upon this I recurred to the definition which she had previously given of the soul, and I said that to my thinking her definition had not indicated36    ἐνδεδεῖχθαι. Gregory constantly uses ἐνδείκνυσθαι (middle) transitively, e.g. 202 C, 203 A, C, 208 B, and above, 189 A, so that it is possible that we have here, in the passive form, a deponent (transitive) perfect; moreover the sense seems to require it. Gregory objects that in what has been said all the powers which analysis finds in the soul have not been set forth with sufficient fulness: an exhaustive account of them has not been given; and he immediately proceeds to name other δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι which have not been taken into consideration. That this view of the passage is correct is further shown by 202 C, where, the present objection having been treated at length, it is concluded that there is no real ground for quarrelling with the definition of soul ὡς ἐλλειπῶς ἐνδειξαμένῳ τὴν φύσιν. Krabinger therefore is right in dropping ἐννοουμένῳ, which two of his mss. exhibit, and which Sifanus translates as governing τὰς…δυνάμεις, as if the sense were, “When I consider all the powers of the soul, I do not think that your definition has been made good.” distinctly enough all the powers of the soul which are a matter of observation. It declares the soul to be an intellectual essence which imparts to the organic body a force of life by which the senses operate. Now the soul is not thus operative only in our scientific and speculative intellect; it does not produce results in that world only, or employ the organs of sense only for this their natural work. On the contrary, we observe in our nature many emotions of desire and many of anger; and both these exist in us as qualities of our kind, and we see both of them in their manifestations displaying further many most subtle differences. There are many states, for instance, which are occasioned by desire; many others which on the other hand proceed from anger; and none of them are of the body; but that which is not of the body is plainly intellectual. Now37    The syllogism implied in the following words is this:—   The emotions are something intellectual (because incorporeal).   Therefore the emotions are soul (or souls).   This conclusion is obviously false; logically, by reason of the fallacy of “the undistributed middle”; ontologically, because it requires a false premise additional (i.e. “everything intellectual is soul”) to make it true. Macrina directly after this piece of bad logic deprecates the use of the syllogism. Is this accidental? It looks almost like an excuse for not going into technicalities and exposing this fallacy, which she has detected in her opponent’s statement. Macrina actually answers as if Gregory had urged his objection thus. “The emotions are not purely intellectual, but are conditioned by the bodily organism: but they do belong to the expression and the substance of the soul: the soul therefore is dependent on the organism and will perish along with it.” our definition exhibits the soul as something intellectual; so that one of two alternatives, both absurd, must emerge when we follow out this view to this end; either anger and desire are both second souls in us, and a plurality of souls must take the place of the single soul, or the thinking faculty in us cannot be regarded as a soul either (if they are not), the intellectual element adhering equally to all of them and stamping them all as souls, or else excluding every one of them equally from the specific qualities of soul.

_Γ. Ἐγὼ δὲ, ἀναλαβὼν τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸν ὁρισμὸν, ὃν ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτου λόγοις περὶ ψυχῆς ἐποιήσατο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς εἶπον ἐνδεδεῖχθαί μοι τὸν λόγον ἐκεῖνον τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας τῇ ψυχῇ δυνάμεις: ὅς φησι νοερὰν αὐτὴν εἶναι οὐσίαν, καὶ τῷ ὀργανικῷ σώματι ζωτικὴν δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐνέργειαν ἐμποιεῖν: οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τὴν ἐπιστημονικήν τε καὶ θεωρητικὴν διάνοιαν ἐνεργός ἐστιν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐν τῷ νοερῷ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐργαζομένη, οὐδὲ τὰ αἰσθητήρια μόνα πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν οἰκονομεῖ: ἀλλὰ πολλὴ μὲν ἡ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ θυμὸν κίνησις ἐνθεωρεῖται τῇ φύσει: ἑκατέρας δὲ τούτων γενικῶς ἡμῖν ἐνυπαρχούσης, εἰς πολλάς τε καὶ ποικίλας διαφορὰς ὁρῶμεν προϊοῦσαν παῖς ἐνεργείαις ἀμφοτέρων τὴν κίνησιν. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, ὧν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καθηγεῖται: πολλά γε πάλιν ἃ τῆς θυμοειδοῦς αἰτίας ἐκφύεται, καὶ οὐδὲν τοῦτο σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον νοερὸν πάντως: νοερὸν δέ τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἀπεφήνατο, ὥστε δυοῖν ἀτόποις τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἀνακύπτειν τοῦ λόγου, ἢ καὶ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἄλλας ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι ψυχὰς, καὶ πλῆθος ψυχῶν ἀντὶ μιᾶς καθορᾶσθαι, ἢ μηδὲ τὸ διανοητικὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχὴν οἴεσθαι. Τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν ἐπίσης πᾶσιν ἐφαρμοζόμενον, ἢ πάντας ψυχὰς ἀποδείξει ταῦτα, ἢ ἕκαστον τούτων ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ ἰδιώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξαιρήσει.