Γ. Ταῦτα δέ μου διεξιόντος μεταξὺ κατασείσασα τῇ χειρὶ ἡ διδάσκαλος
_ Γ. Τί οὖν ἂν εἴη, φημὶ, τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τὸ χάσμα, ἢ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν εἰρημένων, ἢ μὴ ἃ λέγεται
Γ. Τί οὖν, εἶπον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ δόγμα
_ Γ. Τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν, εἶπον, πρὸς τοὺς μικροψύχως ταῖς συμβολαῖς διακειμένους
_ Μ. Τί οὖν, φησὶ, τούτων ἀμνημόνευτον ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστίν
_ Γ. Αὐτὸ, φημὶ, τὸ δόγμα τῆς ἀναστάσεως.
Μ. Καὶ μὴν πολλὰ, φησὶ, τῶν νῦν διεξοδικῶς εἰρημένων, πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν σκοπὸν φέρει.
I think, replied the Teacher, that I am myself responsible for this confusion arising from different accounts of the matter; for I did not state it as distinctly as I might have, by introducing a certain order of consequences for our consideration. Now, however, some such order shall, as far as it is possible, be devised, so that our essay may advance in the way of logical sequence and so give no room for such contradictions. We declare, then, that the speculative, critical, and world-surveying faculty of the soul is its peculiar property by virtue of its very nature50 Reading κατὰ φύσιν αὐτήν, καὶ τῆς θεοειδοῦς χάριτος, κ. τ. λ. with Sifanus., and that thereby the soul preserves within itself the image of the divine grace; since our reason surmises that divinity itself, whatever it may be in its inmost nature, is manifested in these very things,—universal supervision and the critical discernment between good and evil. But all those elements of the soul which lie on the border-land51 ὅσα δε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν μεθορί& 251· κεῖται. Moller (Gregorii Nysseni doctrina de hominis naturâ) remarks rightly that Krabinger’s translation is here incorrect: “quæcunque autem in animæ confinio posita sunt”; and that τῆς ψυχῆς should on the contrary be joined closely to ὅσα. The opposition is not between elements which lie in, and on the confines of the soul, but between the divine and adventitious elements within the soul: μεθορί& 251· refers therefore to “good and bad,” below. and are capable from their peculiar nature of inclining to either of two opposites (whose eventual determination to the good or to the bad depends on the kind of use they are put to), anger, for instance, and fear, and any other such-like emotion of the soul divested of which human nature52 This is no contradiction of the passage above about Moses: there it was stated that the Passions did not belong to the essence (ουσία) of man. cannot be studied—all these we reckon as accretions from without, because in the Beauty which is man’s prototype no such characteristics are to be found. Now let the following statement53 ὅδε δὴ. The Teacher introduces this λόγος with some reserve. “We do not lay it down ex cathedrâ, we put it forward as open to challenge and discussion as we might do in the schools (ὡς ἐν γυμνασί& 251·).” It is best then to take διαφύγοι as a pure optative. Gregory appears in his answer to congratulate her on the success of this “exercise.” “To any one that reflects…your exposition…bears sufficiently upon it the stamp of correctness, and hits the truth.” But he immediately asks for Scripture authority. So that this λόγος, though it refers to Genesis, is not yet based upon Scripture. It is a “consecutive” and consistent account of human nature: but it is virtually identical with that advanced at the end of Book I. of Aristotle’s Ethics. It is a piece of secular theorizing. The sneers of cavillers may well be deprecated. Consistent, however, with this view of the λόγος here offered by Macrina, there is another possible meaning in ὡς ἐν γυμνασί& 251·, κ. τ. λ., i.e. “Let us put forward the following account with all possible care and circumspection, as if we were disputing in the schools; so that cavillers may have nothing to find fault with”: ὡς ἂν expressing purpose, not a wish. The cavillers will thus refer to sticklers for Greek method and metaphysics: and Gregory’s congratulation of his sister’s lucidity and grasp of the truth will be all the more significant. be offered as a mere exercise (in interpretation). I pray that it may escape the sneers of cavilling hearers. Scripture informs us that the Deity proceeded by a sort of graduated and ordered advance to the creation of man. After the foundations of the universe were laid, as the history records, man did not appear on the earth at once; but the creation of the brutes preceded his, and the plants preceded them. Thereby Scripture shows that the vital forces blended with the world of matter according to a gradation; first, it infused itself into insensate nature; and in continuation of this advanced into the sentient world; and then ascended to intelligent and rational beings. Accordingly, while all existing things must be either corporeal or spiritual, the former are divided into the animate and inanimate. By animate, I mean possessed of life: and of the things possessed of life, some have it with sensation, the rest have no sensation. Again, of these sentient things, some have reason, the rest have not. Seeing, then, that this life of sensation could not possibly exist apart from the matter which is the subject of it, and the intellectual life could not be embodied, either, without growing in the sentient, on this account the creation of man is related as coming last, as of one who took up into himself every single form of life, both that of plants and that which is seen in brutes. His nourishment and growth he derives from vegetable life; for even in vegetables such processes are to be seen when aliment is being drawn in by their roots and given off in fruit and leaves. His sentient organization he derives from the brute creation. But his faculty of thought and reason is incommunicable54 Following the order and stopping of Krabinger, ἄμικτόν ἐστι καὶ ἰδιάζον ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως, ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, κ. τ. λ., and is a peculiar gift in our nature, to be considered by itself. However, just as this nature has the instinct acquisitive of the necessaries to material existence—an instinct which, when manifested in us men, we call Appetite—and as we admit this appertains to the vegetable form of life, since we can notice it there too like so many impulses working naturally to satisfy themselves with their kindred aliment and to issue in germination, so all the peculiar conditions of the brute creation are blended with the intellectual part of the soul. To them, she continued, belongs anger; to them belongs fear; to them all those other opposing activities within us; everything except the faculty of reason and thought. That alone, the choice product, as has been said, of all our life, bears the stamp of the Divine character. But since, according to the view which we have just enunciated, it is not possible for this reasoning faculty to exist in the life of the body without existing by means of sensations, and since sensation is already found subsisting in the brute creation, necessarily as it were, by reason of this one condition, our soul has touch with the other things which are knit up with it55 Reading διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς τὰ συνημμένα τούτῳ (for τούτων), with Sifanus.; and these are all those phænomena within us that we call “passions”; which have not been allotted to human nature for any bad purpose at all (for the Creator would most certainly be the author of evil, if in them, so deeply rooted as they are in our nature, any necessities of wrong-doing were found), but according to the use which our free will puts them to, these emotions of the soul become the instruments of virtue or of vice. They are like the iron which is being fashioned according to the volition of the artificer, and receives whatever shape the idea which is in his mind prescribes, and becomes a sword or some agricultural implement. Supposing, then, that our reason, which is our nature’s choicest part, holds the dominion over these imported emotions (as Scripture allegorically declares in the command to men to rule over the brutes), none of them will be active in the ministry of evil; fear will only generate within us obedience56 Cf. De Hom. Opif. c. xviii. 5. “So, on the contrary, if reason instead assumes sway over such emotions, each of them is transmuted to a form of virtue: for anger produces courage; terror, caution; fear, obedience; hatred, aversion from vice; the power of love, the desire for what is truly beautiful, &c.” Just below, the allusion is to Plato’s charioteer, Phædrus, p. 253 C, and the old custom of having the reins round the driver’s waist is to be noticed., and anger fortitude, and cowardice caution; and the instinct of desire will procure for us the delight that is Divine and perfect. But if reason drops the reins and is dragged behind like a charioteer who has got entangled in his car, then these instincts are changed into fierceness, just as we see happens amongst the brutes. For since reason does not preside over the natural impulses that are implanted57 are implanted. All the Codd. have ἐγκειμένης here, instead of the ἐγκωμιαζομένης of the Paris Edition, which must be meant for ἐγκωμαζομένης (itself a vox nihili), “run riot in them.” in them, the more irascible animals, under the generalship of their anger, mutually destroy each other; while the bulky and powerful animals get no good themselves from their strength, but become by their want of reason slaves of that which has reason. Neither are the activities of their desire for pleasure employed on any of the higher objects; nor does any other instinct to be observed in them result in any profit to themselves. Thus too, with ourselves, if these instincts are not turned by reasoning into the right direction, and if our feelings get the mastery of our mind, the man is changed from a reasoning into an unreasoning being, and from godlike intelligence sinks by the force of these passions to the level of the brute.
Μ. Καὶ ἡ διδάσκαλος, Ἔοικα, φησὶ, τῆς τοιαύτης τῶν λογισμῶν συγχύσεως αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν παρέχειν, μὴ διακρίνασα τὸν περὶ τούτου λόγον, ὥστε τινὰ τάξιν ἀκόλουθον ἐπιτεθῆναι τῇ θεωρίᾳ. Νῦν οὖν, ὅπως ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, ἐπινοηθήσεταί τις τάξις τῷ σκέμματι, ὡς ἂν δι' ἀκολούθου προϊούσης τῆς θεωρίας, μὴ καθ' ἡμῶν αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἀντιθέσεων ἔχοιεν χώραν. Φαμὲν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν μὲν θεωρητικήν τε καὶ διακριτικὴν καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐποπτικὴν δύναμιν οἰκείαν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν, καὶ διὰ τῆς θεοειδοῦς χάριτος, διὰ τοῦτο σώζειν ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν εἰκόνα. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ Θεῖον, ὅ, τί ποτε κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν, ἐν τούτοις ὁ λογισμὸς εἶναι στοχάζεται: ἐν τῷ ἀφορᾷν τε τὰ πάντα καὶ διακρίνειν τὸ καλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος. Ὅσα δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν μεθορίῳ κεῖται πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιῤῥεπῶς κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἔχοντα: ὧν ἡ ποία χρῆσις, ἢ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἄγει τὴν ἔκβασιν, οἷον τὸν θυμὸν, ἢ τὸν φόβον, ἢ εἴ τι τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κινημάτων ἐστὶν, ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπίνην θεωρηθῆναι φύσιν: ταῦτα ἔξωθεν ἐπιγενέσθαι αὐτῇ λογιζόμεθα, διὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ κάλλει μηδένα τοιοῦτον ἐνθεωρηθῆναι χαρακτῆρα. Ὁ δὲ δὴ περὶ τούτων λόγος ἡμῖν ὡς ἐν γυμνασίῳ προκείσθω, ὡς ἂν διαφύγοι τῶν συκοφαντικῶς ἀκουόντων τὰς ἐπηρείας, ὁδῷ τινι καὶ τάξεως ἀκολουθίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποποιΐαν ὁρμῆσαι τὸ Θεῖον διηγεῖται ὁ λόγος. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συνέστη τὸ πᾶν, καθὼς ἡ ἱστορία φησὶν, οὐκ εὐθὺς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ γῇ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τούτου μὲν ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων προηγήσατο φύσις: ἐκείνων δὲ τὰ βλαστήματα. Δείκνυσιν, οἶμαι, διὰ τούτων ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἡ ζωτικὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθίᾳ τινὶ τῇ σωματικῇ καταμίγνυται φύσει, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις ἐνδύουσα, κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν προϊοῦσα, εἶθ' οὕτως πρὸς τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικὸν ἀναβαίνουσα.
Οὐκοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὸ μὲν σωματικὸν, τὸ δὲ νοερόν ἐστι πάντως: τοῦ δὲ σωματικοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἄψυχον. Ἔμψυχον δὲ λέγω τὸ μετέχον ζωῆς: τῶν δὲ ζώντων, τὰ μὲν αἰσθήσει συζῇ, τὰ ἀμοιρεῖ ταύτης. Πάλιν τῶν αἰσθητικῶν, τὰ μὲν λογικά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ζωὴ οὐκ ἂν δίχα τῆς ὕλης συσταίη, οὐδ' ἂν τὸ νοερὸν ἄλλως ἐν σώματι γένοιτο, μὴ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ ἐμφυόμενον, τούτου χάριν τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴ ἱστορεῖται, ὡς πᾶσαν ἐκπεριειληφότος τὴν ζωτικὴν ἰδέαν, τήν τε ἐν τοῖς βλαστήμασι καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις θεωρουμένην. Τὸ μὲν τρέφεσθαί τε αὔξεσθαι ἐκ τῆς φυτικῆς ἔχει ζωῆς: ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰδεῖν, ἑλκομένης τε καὶ διὰ ῥιζῶν τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἀποποιουμένης διὰ καρπῶν τε καὶ φύλλων: τὸ δὲ κατ' αἴσθησιν οἰκονομεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀλόγων ἔχει. Τὸ δὲ διανοητικόν τε καὶ λογικὸν ἄμικτόν ἐστι ἰδιάζον, ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ θεωρούμενον. Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἐφελκτικὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς τὴν ὑλικὴν ζωὴν ἡ φύσις ἔχει, ὅπερ ἐν ἡμῖν γενόμενον ὄρεξις λέγεται. Τοῦτο δέ φαμεν τοῦ φυσικοῦ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδους εἶναι: ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, οἷόν τινας ὁρμὰς φυσικῶς ἐνεργουμένας ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαί τε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ὀργᾷν πρὸς τὴν ἔκφυσιν: οὕτω καὶ ὅσα τῆς ἀλόγου φύσεώς ἐστιν ἴδια, ταῦτα τῷ νοερῷ τῆς ψυχῆς κατεμίχθη. Ἐκείνων, φησὶν, ὁ θυμὸς, ἐκείνων ὁ φόβος, ἐκείνων τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνεργεῖται, πλὴν τῆς λογικῆς τε καὶ διανοητικῆς δυνάμεως: ὃ δὴ μόνον τῆς ἡμετέρας ζωῆς ἐξαίρετον ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καθὼς εἴρηται, τοῦ θείου χαρακτῆρος ἔχον τὴν μίμησιν. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸν ἤδη προαποδοθέντα λόγον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως τὴν λογικὴν δύναμιν ἐγγενέσθαι τῇ σωματικῇ ζωῇ, μὴ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐγγινομένην: ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀλόγων προϋπέστη φύσει: ὡς ἀναγκαίως διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς τὰ συνημμένα τούτων γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν ἡ κοινωνία.
Ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ὅσα ἐν ἡμῖν γινόμενα πάθη λέγεται, ἃ οὐχὶ πάντως ἐπὶ κακῷ τινι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ συνεκληρώθη ζωῇ: ἦ γὰρ ἂν ὁ Δημιουργὸς τῶν κακῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχῃ, εἰ ἐκεῖθεν αἱ τῶν πλημμελημάτων ἦσαν ἀνάγκαι συγκαταβεβλημέναι τῇ φύσει: ἀλλὰ τῇ ποιᾷ χρήσει τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἢ ἀρετῆς, ἢ κακίας ὄργανα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα γίνεται. Καθάπερ ὁ σίδηρος κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ τεχνίτου τυπούμενος, πρὸς ὅπερ ἂν ἔθετο τοῦ τεχνιτεύοντος ἡ ἐνθύμησις, πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ σχηματίζεται, ἢ ξίφος, ἤ τι γεωργικὸν ἐργαλεῖον γινόμενος. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ὁ λόγος, ὃ δὴ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν ἐξαίρετον, τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπεισκριθέντων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοι, καθὼς καὶ δι' αἰνίγματος ὁ τῆς Γραφῆς παρεδήλωσε λόγος, ἄρχειν ἐγκελευόμενος πάντων τῶν ἀλόγων, οὐκ ἄν τι πρὸς κακίας ὑπηρεσίαν τῶν τοιούτων κινημάτων ἡμῖν ἐνεργήσειε, τοῦ μὲν φόβου τὸ ὑπήκοον ἐμποιοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ θυμοῦ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον, τῆς δειλίας δὲ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, τῆς δὲ ἐπιθυμητικῆς ὁρμῆς τὴν θείαν τε καὶ ἀκήρατον ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν προξενούσης. Εἰ δὲ ἀποβάλοι τὰς ἡνίας ὁ λόγος, καὶ οἷόν τις ἡνίοχος ἐμπλακεὶς τῷ ἅρματι κατόπιν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σύροιτο, ἐκεῖ ἀπαγόμενος ὅπουπερ ἂν ἡ ἄλογος κίνησις τῶν ὑπεζευγμένων φέρει, τότε εἰς πάθος αἱ ὁρμαὶ καταστρέφονται, οἷον δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστατεῖ λογισμοῖς τοῖς φυσικῶς αὐτοῖς ἐγκωμιαζομένης κινήσεως, τὰ μὲν θυμώδη τῶν ζώων ἐν ἀλλήλοις φθείρεται τῷ θυμῷ στρατηγούμενα: τὰ δὲ πολύσαρκά τε καὶ δυνατὰ εἰς οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν ἀπώνατο τῆς δυνάμεως, κτῆμα τοῦ λογικοῦ διὰ τὴν ἀλογίαν γινόμενα: ἥ τε τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέργεια περὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ὑψηλῶν ἀσχολοῦται: οὔτε ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς θεωρουμένων λόγῳ τινὶ πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν διεξάγεται. Οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ δέον ἄγοιτο ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπικρατοίη τῆς τοῦ νοῦ δυναστείας τὰ πάθη, πρὸς τὸ ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἀνόητον μεταβαίνων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀπὸ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ καὶ θεοειδοῦς τῇ ὁρμῇ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων ἀποκτηνούμενος.