§39. Impossibility of a plurality of Gods.

For we must not think there is more than one ruler and maker of Creation: but it belongs to correct and true religion to believe that its Artificer is one, while Creation herself clearly points to this. For the fact that there is one Universe only and not more is a conclusive proof that its Maker is one. For if there were a plurality of gods, there would necessarily be also more universes than one. For neither were it reasonable for more than one God to make a single universe, nor for the one universe to be made by more than one, because of the absurdities which would result from this. 2. Firstly, if the one universe were made by a plurality of gods, that would mean weakness on the part of those who made it, because many contributed to a single result; which would be a strong proof of the imperfect creative skill of each. For if one were sufficient, the many would not supplement each other’s deficiency. But to say that there is any deficiency in God is not only impious, but even beyond all sacrilege. For even among men one would not call a workman perfect if he were unable to finish his work, a single piece, by himself and without the aid of several others. 3. But if, although each one was able to accomplish the whole, yet all worked at it in order to claim a share in the result, we have the laughable conclusion that each worked for reputation, lest he should be suspected of inability. But, once more, it is most grotesque to ascribe vainglory to gods. 4. Again, if each one were sufficient for the creation of the whole, what need of more than one, one being self-sufficient for the universe? Moreover it would be evidently impious and grotesque, to make the thing created one, while the creators were many and different, it being a maxim of science59    Cf. Plato Phædr. 245 C–E., Legg. 896, A, B. The former passage is more likely to be referred to here as it is, like the text, an argument for immortality. Athan. has also referred to Phædrus above, §5. (Against Gwatkin, Studies, p. 101.)    Or, perhaps, “innate, self-evident maxim” (λόγος φυσικός). that what is one and complete is higher than things that are diverse. 5. And this you must know, that if the universe had been made by a plurality of gods, its movements would be diverse and inconsistent. For having regard to each one of its makers, its movements would be correspondingly different. But such difference again, as was said before, would involve disarray and general disorder; for not even a ship will sail aright if she be steered by many, unless one pilot hold the tiller60    Cp. xxxi. 5, and ref.    lit. “the steering-paddles.”, nor will a lyre struck by many produce a tuneful sound, unless there be one artist who strikes it. 6. Creation, then, being one, and the Universe one, and its order one, we must perceive that its King and Artificer also is one. For this is why the Artificer Himself made the whole universe one, lest by the coexistence of more than one a plurality of makers should be supposed; but that as the work is one, its Maker also may be believed to be One. Nor does it follow from the unity of the Maker that the Universe must be one, for God might have made others as well. But because the Universe that has been made is one, it is necessary to believe that its Maker also is one.

39 Οὐδὲ γὰρ πολλοὺς εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν τοὺς τῆς κτίσεως ἄρχοντας καὶ ποιητάς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν ἀκριβῆ καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἕνα τὸν ταύτης δημιουργὸν πιστεύειν προσήκει· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς κτίσεως αὐτῆς ἐμφανῶς δεικνυούσης. γνώρισμα γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς τοῦ ἕνα τὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τοῦ παντός ἐστι τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ πολλοὺς ἀλλ' ἕνα εἶναι τὸν κόσμον. ἔδει γάρ, εἴπερ ἦσαν πολλοὶ θεοί, πολλοὺς εἶναι καὶ δια φόρους τοὺς κόσμους. οὔτε γὰρ ἔπρεπε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἕνα κόσμον κατασκευάζειν, οὔτε τὸν ἕνα ὑπὸ πολλῶν ποιεῖσθαι διὰ τὰ ἐκ τούτων δεικνύμενα ἄτοπα. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι, εἰ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὁ εἷς ἐγεγόνει κόσμος, ἀσθένεια τῶν ποιησάντων ἦν· ὅτι ἐκ πολλῶν ἓν ἔργον ἀπετελέσθη· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώρισμα οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἦν τῆς ἀτελοῦς ἑκάστου πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐπιστήμης. εἰ γὰρ ἤρκει εἷς, οὐκ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀνεπλήρουν ἔλλειψιν. ἐν Θεῷ δὲ λέγειν εἶναί τι ἐλλιπὲς, ἀσεβὲς οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πέρα τῶν ἀθεμίτων ἐστί. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τεχνίτην ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τέλειον, ἀλλὰ ἀσθενῆ, εἰ μὴ μόνος, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῶν ἓν ἀποτελοίη τὸ ἔργον. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστος μὲν ἠδύνατο τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελέσαι, οἱ πάντες δὲ εἰργάσαντο διὰ τὴν τοῦ γιγνομένου κοινωνίαν· γελοῖον μὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ διὰ δόξαν ἕκαστος εἰργάσατο, ἵνα μὴ ὡς ἀδύνατος ὑπονοηθῇ. κενοδοξίαν δὲ πάλιν λέγειν ἐν θεοῖς τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων ἐστίν. ἔπειτα, εἰ ἕκαστος ἱκανὸς ἦν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δημιουργίαν, τίς ἡ χρεία τῶν πολλῶν, ἑνὸς αὐτάρκους γιγνομένου πρὸς τὸ πᾶν; ἄλλως τε ἀσεβὲς καὶ ἄτοπον ἂν φανείη, εἰ τὸ μὲν ποίημα ἓν τυγχάνει, οἱ δὲ ποιήσαντες διάφοροι καὶ πολλοί, λόγου ὄντος φυσικοῦ τὸ ἓν καὶ τέλειον τῶν διαφόρων κρεῖττον εἶναι. Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἰστέον, ὅτι εἰ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὁ κόσμος ἐγεγόνει, διαφόρους εἶχε καὶ τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἀνομοίους ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν ποιησάντων ἀποβλέπων, διαφόρους εἶχε καὶ τὰς κινήσεις. ἐν δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, πάλιν ἦν ἀκοσμία καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀταξία· ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ ναῦς ὑπὸ πολλῶν κυβερνωμένη κατ' ὀρθὸν πλευσεῖται, εἰ μὴ εἷς ταύτης τοὺς οἴακας κρατοίη κυβερνήτης· οὐδὲ λύρα ὑπὸ πολλῶν κρουομένη σύμφωνον ἀποτελέσει τὸν ἦχον, εἰ μὴ εἷς ὁ ταύτην πλήττων εἴη τεχνίτης. οὐκοῦν μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς κτίσεως, καὶ ἑνὸς ὄντος κόσμου, καὶ μιᾶς τῆς τούτου τάξεως, ἕνα δεῖ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ τὸν ταύτης βασιλέα καὶ δημιουργὸν Κύριον. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ δημιουργὸς ἕνα τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον πεποίηκεν, ἵνα μὴ τῇ τῶν πολλῶν συστάσει πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ δημιουργοὶ νομίζοιντο, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ποιήματος, εἷς καὶ ὁ τούτου ποιητὴς πιστεύηται. καὶ οὐχ ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ δημιουργός, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος· ἠδύνατο γὰρ καὶ ἄλλους κόσμους ποιῆσαι ὁ Θεός. ἀλλ' ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος ὁ γενόμενος, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν τούτου δημιουργὸν ἕνα πιστεύειν εἶναι.