§31. Proof of the existence of the rational soul. (1) Difference of man from the brutes. (2) Man’s power of objective thought. Thought is to sense as the musician to his instrument. The phenomena of dreams bear this out.

Firstly, then, the rational nature of the soul is strongly confirmed by its difference from irrational creatures. For this is why common use gives them that name, because, namely, the race of mankind is rational. 2. Secondly, it is no ordinary proof, that man alone thinks of things external to himself, and reasons about things not actually present, and exercises reflection, and chooses by judgment the better of alternative reasonings. For the irrational animals see only what is present, and are impelled solely by what meets their eye, even if the consequences to them are injurious, while man is not impelled toward what he sees merely, but judges by thought what he sees with his eyes. Often for example his impulses are mastered by reasoning; and his reasoning is subject to after-reflection. And every one, if he be a friend of truth, perceives that the intelligence of mankind is distinct from the bodily senses. 3. Hence, because it is distinct, it acts as judge of the senses, and while they apprehend their objects, the intelligence distinguishes, recollects, and shews them what is best. For the sole function of the eye is to see, of the ears to hear, of the mouth to taste, of the nostrils to apprehend smells, and of the hands to touch. But what one ought to see and hear, what one ought to touch, taste and smell, is a question beyond the senses, and belonging to the soul and to the intelligence which resides in it. Why, the hand is able to take hold of a sword-blade, and the mouth to taste poison, but neither knows that these are injurious, unless the intellect decide. 4. And the case, to look at it by aid of a simile, is like that of a well-fashioned lyre in the hands of a skilled musician. For as the strings of the lyre have each its proper note, high, low, or intermediate, sharp or otherwise, yet their scale is indistinguishable and their time not to be recognized, without the artist. For then only is the scale manifest and the time right, when he that is holding the lyre strikes the strings and touches each in tune. In like manner, the senses being disposed in the body like a lyre, when the skilled intelligence presides over them, then too the soul distinguishes and knows what it is doing and how it is acting. 5. But this alone is peculiar to mankind, and this is what is rational in the soul of mankind, by means of which it differs from the brutes, and shews that it is truly distinct from what is to be seen in the body. Often, for example, when the body is lying on the earth, man imagines and contemplates what is in the heavens. Often when the body is quiet47    Cf. Vit. Ant. 34.    Cf. below, 40. 2., and at rest and asleep, man moves inwardly, and beholds what is outside himself, travelling to other countries, walking about, meeting his acquaintances, and often by these means divining and forecasting the actions of the day. But to what can this be due save to the rational soul, in which man thinks of and perceives things beyond himself?

31 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ μικρὸν γνώρισμα τοῦ λογικὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα διαλλάττειν αὐτήν· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἄλογα καλεῖν ἡ φύσις εἴωθεν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ γένος ἐστὶ λογικόν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἂν εἴη, ἐκ τοῦ μόνον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰ ἔξωθεν ἑαυτοῦ λογίζε σθαι, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι τὰ μὴ παρόντα, καὶ πάλιν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ κρίσει τὸ κρεῖττον τῶν λογισμῶν αἱρεῖσθαι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογα μόνα τὰ παρόντα βλέπει, καὶ πρὸς μόνα τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρμᾷ, κἂν μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν βλάβην ἔχῃ. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ πρὸς τὰ βλεπόμενα ὁρμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ τὰ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρώμενα κρίνει· πολλάκις γοῦν ὁρμήσας κεκράτηται τῷ λογισμῷ· καὶ λογισάμενος, πάλιν ἐπελογίσατο, καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, εἰ τῆς ἀληθείας γένοιτο φίλος, ὅτι ἄλλος παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νοῦς. διὰ τοῦτο γοῦν ὡς ἄλλος ὤν, αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων γίνεται κριτής· καὶ ὧν ἐκεῖναι ἀντιλαμβάνονται, ταῦτα οὗτος διακρίνει, καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκει, καὶ δείκνυσιν αὐταῖς τὸ κρεῖττον. ὀφθαλμοῦ μὲν γάρ ἐστι μόνον τὸ ὁρᾷν, καὶ ὤτων τὸ ἀκούειν, καὶ στόματος γεύεσθαι, καὶ ῥινὸς ὀδμῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ χειρῶν τὸ ἅπτεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἃ δεῖ ὁρᾷν καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ὧν ἅπτεσθαι δεῖ καὶ γεύεσθαι καὶ ὀδμᾶσθαι, οὐκέτι τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ ταύτης νοῦ διακρῖναι. ἀμέλει καὶ ξίφους λαβέσθαι δύναται ἡ χείρ, καὶ δηλητηρίου γεύσασθαι τὸ στόμα· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι βλάπτει ταῦτα, εἰ μὴ ὁ νοῦς διακρίνῃ. Καὶ ἔοικέ γε τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἵνα ἐπὶ εἰκόνος αὐτὸ θεωρήσωμεν, λύρᾳ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένῃ, καὶ τῷ ταύτην κρατοῦντι μουσικῷ μετ' ἐπιστήμης. ὡς γὰρ αἱ ἐν τῇ λύρᾳ νευραὶ ἑκάστη μὲν ἔχει τὸν ἴδιον φθόγγον, ἡ μὲν βαρύν, ἡ δὲ ὀξύν, ἡ δὲ μέσον, ἡ δὲ ὀξύτονον, ἡ δὲ ἄλλον· ἀδιάκριτος δέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ ἀδιάγνωστος ἡ σύνθεσις χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος· τότε γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἁρμονία αὐτῶν δείκνυται καὶ ἡ σύνταξις ὀρθή, ὅταν ὁ κατέχων τὴν λύραν πλήξῃ τὰς νευράς, καὶ ἁρμοδίως ἑκάστης ἅψηται· τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐν τῷ σώματι ὡς λύρας ἡρμοσμένων, ὅταν ὁ ἐπι στήμων νοῦς αὐτῶν ἡγεμονεύῃ· τότε καὶ διακρίνει ἡ ψυχή, καὶ οἶδεν ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ πράττει. τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἴδιον ἀνθρώπων ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ᾧ χρωμένη διαλλάττει τῶν ἀλόγων, καὶ δείκνυσιν ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἄλλη παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐν σώματί ἐστιν. πολλάκις γοῦν κειμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ γῆς, τὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς φαντάζεται καὶ θεωρεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ πολλάκις τοῦ σώματος ἠρεμοῦντος καὶ ἡσυχάζοντος καὶ καθεύδοντος, κινεῖται ἔνδον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἑαυτοῦ θεωρεῖ, χώρας ἀποδημῶν καὶ περιπατῶν, καὶ ἀπαντῶν τοῖς γνωρίμοις, καὶ πολλάκις διὰ τούτων τὰς μεθ' ἡμέραν πράξεις ἑαυτοῦ μαντευόμενος καὶ προγινώ σκων. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη ἕτερον ἢ ψυχὴ λογική, ἐν ᾗ λογίζεται καὶ νοεῖ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;