CHAPTER 122

PUNISHMENT VARIOUSLY OPPOSED TO THE WILL

Not all punishment is opposed to the will in the same way. Some punishments are opposed to what man actually wills; and this kind of punishment is felt most keenly. Some punishments are opposed not to the actual but to the habitual tendency of the will, as when a person is deprived of something, for instance, his son or his property, without his knowledge. In this case, nothing actually thwarts his will; but the withdrawal of the good would be against his will if he were aware of what was happening. At times a punishment is opposed to the will according to the very nature of that faculty. For the will is naturally turned to what is good. Thus if a person is lacking in a virtue, this need not always be opposed to his actual will, for he may, perhaps, despise this virtue; nor need it be against his habitual will, for he may, perhaps, have a habitual disposition of will toward what is contrary to the virtue. Nevertheless such a privation is opposed to the natural rectitude of the will, whereby man naturally desires virtue.

             Consequently, as is evident, the degrees of punishment may be measured by two standards: first, by the quantity of the good of which a man is deprived for his punishment; secondly, by the greater or less opposition it arouses in the will. For the withdrawal of a greater good is more opposed to the will than the withdrawal of a lesser good.