Compendium of Theology

 TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

 CONTENTS

 CHAPTER 1

 CHAPTER 2

 CHAPTER 3

 CHAPTER 4

 CHAPTER 5

 CHAPTER 6

 CHAPTER 7

 CHAPTER 8

 CHAPTER 9

 CHAPTER 10

 CHAPTER 11

 CHAPTER 12

 CHAPTER 13

 CHAPTER 14

 CHAPTER 15

 CHAPTER 16

 CHAPTER 17

 CHAPTER 18

 CHAPTER 19

 CHAPTER 20

 CHAPTER 21

 CHAPTER 22

 CHAPTER 23

 CHAPTER 24

 CHAPTER 25

 CHAPTER 26

 CHAPTER 27

 CHAPTER 28

 CHAPTER 29

 CHAPTER 30

 CHAPTER 31

 CHAPTER 32

 CHAPTER 33

 CHAPTER 34

 CHAPTER 35

 CHAPTER 36

 CHAPTER 37

 CHAPTER 38

 CHAPTER 39

 CHAPTER 40

 CHAPTER 41

 CHAPTER 42

 CHAPTER 43

 CHAPTER 44

 CHAPTER 45

 CHAPTER 46

 CHAPTER 47

 CHAPTER 48

 CHAPTER 49

 CHAPTER 50

 CHAPTER 51

 CHAPTER 52

 CHAPTER 53

 CHAPTER 54

 CHAPTER 55

 CHAPTER 56

 CHAPTER 57

 CHAPTER 58

 CHAPTER 59

 CHAPTER 60

 CHAPTER 61

 CHAPTER 62

 CHAPTER 63

 CHAPTER 64

 CHAPTER 65

 CHAPTER 66

 CHAPTER 67

 CHAPTER 68

 CHAPTER 69

 CHAPTER 70

 CHAPTER 71

 CHAPTER 72

 CHAPTER 73

 CHAPTER 74

 CHAPTER 75

 CHAPTER 76

 CHAPTER 77

 CHAPTER 78

 CHAPTER 79

 CHAPTER 80

 CHAPTER 81

 CHAPTER 82

 CHAPTER 83

 CHAPTER 84

 CHAPTER 85

 CHAPTER 86

 CHAPTER 87

 CHAPTER 88

 CHAPTER 89

 CHAPTER 90

 CHAPTER 91

 CHAPTER 92

 CHAPTER 93

 CHAPTER 94

 CHAPTER 95

 CHAPTER 96

 CHAPTER 97

 CHAPTER 98

 CHAPTER 99

 CHAPTER 100

 CHAPTER 101

 CHAPTER 102

 CHAPTER 103

 CHAPTER 104

 CHAPTER 105

 CHAPTER 106

 CHAPTER 107

 CHAPTER 108

 CHAPTER 109

 CHAPTER 110

 CHAPTER 111

 CHAPTER 112

 CHAPTER 113

 CHAPTER 114

 CHAPTER 115

 CHAPTER 116

 CHAPTER 117

 CHAPTER 118

 CHAPTER 119

 CHAPTER 120

 CHAPTER 121

 CHAPTER 122

 CHAPTER 123

 CHAPTER 124

 CHAPTER 125

 CHAPTER 126

 CHAPTER 127

 CHAPTER 128

 CHAPTER 129

 CHAPTER 130

 CHAPTER 131

 CHAPTER 132

 CHAPTER 133

 CHAPTER 134

 CHAPTER 135

 CHAPTER 136

 CHAPTER 137

 CHAPTER 138

 CHAPTER 139

 CHAPTER 140

 CHAPTER 141

 CHAPTER 142

 CHAPTER 143

 CHAPTER 144

 CHAPTER 145

 CHAPTER 146

 CHAPTER 147

 CHAPTER 148

 CHAPTER 149

 CHAPTER 150

 CHAPTER 151

 CHAPTER 152

 CHAPTER 153

 CHAPTER 154

 CHAPTER 155

 CHAPTER 156

 CHAPTER 157

 CHAPTER 158

 CHAPTER 159

 CHAPTER 160

 CHAPTER 161

 CHAPTER 162

 CHAPTER 163

 CHAPTER 164

 CHAPTER 165

 CHAPTER 166

 CHAPTER 167

 CHAPTER 168

 CHAPTER 169

 CHAPTER 170

 CHAPTER 171

 CHAPTER 172

 CHAPTER 173

 CHAPTER 174

 CHAPTER 175

 CHAPTER 176

 CHAPTER 177

 CHAPTER 178

 CHAPTER 179

 CHAPTER 180

 CHAPTER 181

 CHAPTER 182

 CHAPTER 183

 CHAPTER 184

 CHAPTER 185

 CHAPTER 186

 CHAPTER 187

 CHAPTER 188

 CHAPTER 189

 CHAPTER 190

 CHAPTER 191

 CHAPTER 192

 CHAPTER 193

 CHAPTER 194

 CHAPTER 195

 CHAPTER 196

 CHAPTER 197

 CHAPTER 198

 CHAPTER 199

 CHAPTER 200

 CHAPTER 201

 CHAPTER 202

 CHAPTER 203

 CHAPTER 204

 CHAPTER 205

 CHAPTER 206

 CHAPTER 207

 CHAPTER 208

 CHAPTER 209

 CHAPTER 210

 CHAPTER 211

 CHAPTER 212

 CHAPTER 213

 CHAPTER 214

 CHAPTER 215

 CHAPTER 216

 CHAPTER 217

 CHAPTER 218

 CHAPTER 219

 CHAPTER 220

 CHAPTER 221

 CHAPTER 222

 CHAPTER 223

 CHAPTER 224

 CHAPTER 225

 CHAPTER 226

 CHAPTER 227

 CHAPTER 228

 CHAPTER 229

 CHAPTER 230

 CHAPTER 231

 CHAPTER 232

 CHAPTER 233

 CHAPTER 234

 CHAPTER 235

 CHAPTER 236

 CHAPTER 237

 CHAPTER 238

 CHAPTER 239

 CHAPTER 240

 CHAPTER 241

 CHAPTER 242

 CHAPTER 243

 CHAPTER 244

 CHAPTER 245

 CHAPTER 246

 Part Two

 CHAPTER 1

 CHAPTER 2

 CHAPTER 3

 CHAPTER 4

 CHAPTER 5

 CHAPTER 6

 CHAPTER 7

 CHAPTER 8

 CHAPTER 9

 CHAPTER 10

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER 154

MIRACULOUS NATURE OF THE RESURRECTION

When substances corrupt, the survival of the species, but not the restoration of the individual, is effected by the action of nature. The cloud from which rain is produced and the cloud which is again formed by evaporation from the fallen rain water, are not numerically the same. Accordingly, since the human body substantially dissolves in death, it cannot be restored to numerical identity by the action of nature. But the concept of resurrection requires such identity, as we have just shown. Consequently the resurrection of man will not be brought about by the action of nature, as some philosophers have held in their theory that, when all bodies return to the position formerly occupied after untold cycles of years, then also men will return to life in the same numerical identity. No, the restoration of all who rise will be effected solely by divine power.

             Moreover, it is clear that senses once destroyed, and anything possessed as a result of generation, cannot be restored by the activity of nature, for the simple reason that the same numerical being cannot be generated several times. If any such perfection is restored to anyone, for example, an eye that has been torn out or a hand that has been cut off, it will be through divine power which operates beyond the order of nature, as we said above. Therefore, since all the senses and all the members of man corrupt in death, a dead man cannot be brought back to life except by divine action.

             The fact that, as we hold, the resurrection will be effected by divine power, enables us to perceive readily how the same numerical body will be revived. Since all things, even the very least, are included under divine providence, as we showed above, the matter composing this human body of ours, whatever form it may take after man's death, evidently does not elude the power or the knowledge of God. Such matter remains numerically the same, in the sense that it exists under quantitative dimensions, by reason of which it can be said to be this particular matter, and is the principle of individuation. If then, this matter remains the same, and if the human body is again fashioned from it by divine power, and if also the rational soul which remains the same in its incorruptibility is united to the same body, the result is that identically the same man is restored to life.

             Numerical identity cannot be impeded, as some object, by the consideration that the humanity is not numerically the same as before. In the view of some philosophers, humanity, which is said to be the form of the whole, is nothing else than the form of a part, namely, the soul, and they admit that humanity is the form of the body also, in the sense that it confers species on the whole. If this is true, evidently the humanity remains numerically the same, since the rational soul remains numerically the same.

             Humanity, however, is that which is signified by the definition of man, as the essence of anything whatever is that which is signified by its definition. But the definition of man signifies not form alone but also matter, since matter must be comprised in the definition of material things. Hence we shall do better to say, with others, that both soul and body are included in the notion of humanity, although otherwise than in the definition of man. The notion of humanity embraces only the essential principles of man, prescinding from all other factors. For, since humanity is understood to be that whereby man is man, whatever cannot truly be said to constitute man as man, is evidently cut off from the notion of humanity. But when we speak of man, who has humanity, the fact that he has humanity does not exclude the possession of other attributes, for instance, whiteness, and the like. The term "man" signifies man's essential principles, but not to the exclusion of other factors, even though these other factors are not actually, but only potentially, contained in the notion of man. Hence "man" signifies as a whole, per modum totius, whereas "humanity" signifies as a part, per modum partis, and is not predicated of man. In Socrates, then, or in Plato, this determinate matter and this particular form are included. Just as the notion of man implies composition of matter and form, so if Socrates were to be defined, the notion of him would imply that he is composed of this flesh and these bones and this soul. Consequently, since humanity is not some third form in addition to soul and body, but is composed of both, we see clearly that, if the same body is restored and if the same soul remains, the humanity will be numerically the same.

             The numerical identity in question is not frustrated on the ground that the corporeity recovered is not numerically the same, for the reason that it corrupts when the body corrupts. If by corporeity is meant the substantial form by which a thing is classified in the genus of corporeal substance, such corporeity is nothing else than the soul, seeing that there is but one substantial form for each thing. In virtue of this particular soul, this animal is not only animal, but is animated body, and body, and also this thing existing in the genus of substance. Otherwise the soul would come to a body already existing in act, and so would be an accidental form. The subject of a substantial form is something existing only in potency, not in act. When it receives the substantial form it is not said to be generated merely in this or that respect, as is the case with accidental forms, but is said to be generated simply, as simply receiving existence. And therefore the corporeity that is received remains numerically the same, since the same rational soul continues to exist.

             If, however, the word "corporeity" is taken to mean a form designating body (corpus), which is placed in the genus of quantity, such a form is accidental, since it signifies nothing else than three-dimensional existence. Even though the same numerical form, thus understood, is not recovered, the identity of the subject is not thereby impeded, for unity of the essential principles suffices for this. The same reasoning holds for all the accidents, the diversity among which does not destroy numerical identity. Consequently, since union is a kind of relation, and therefore an accident, its numerical diversity does not prevent the numerical identity of the subject; nor, for that matter, does numerical diversity among the powers of the sensitive and vegetative soul, if they are supposed to have corrupted. For the natural powers existing in the human composite are in the genus of accident; and what we call "sensible" is derived, not from the senses according as sense is the specific difference constituting animal, but from the very substance of the sensitive soul, which in man is essentially identical with the rational soul.