Chapter 9.—Victor Utterly Unable to Explain How the Sinless Soul Deserved to Be Made Sinful.

But what does he mean by that, which in his introduction he says has befallen him? For previous to proposing that question of his, and as introducing it, he affirms: “There are other opprobrious expressions underlying the querulous murmurings of those who rail at us; and, shaken about as in a hurricane, we are again and again dashed amongst enormous rocks.” Now, if I were to express myself about him in this style, he would probably be angry. The words are his; and after premising them, he propounded his question, by way of showing us the very rocks against which he struck and was wrecked. For to such lengths was he carried, and against such frightful reefs was he borne, drifted, and struck, that his escape was a perfect impossibility without a retreat—a correction, in short, of what he had said; since he was unable to show by what desert the soul was made sinful; though he was not afraid to say, that previous to any sin of its own it had deserved to become sinful. Now, who deserves, without committing any sin, so immense a punishment as to be conceived in the sin of another, before leaving his mother’s womb, and then to be no longer free from sin? But from this punishment the free grace of God delivers the souls of such infants as are regenerated in Christ, with no previous merits of their own—otherwise grace is no grace.”3    Rom. xi. 6. With regard, then, to this person, who is so vastly intelligent, and who in the great depth of his wisdom is displeased at our hesitation, which, if not well informed, is at all events circumspect, let him tell us, if he can, what the merit was which brought the soul into such a punishment, from which grace delivers it without any merit. Let him speak, and, if he can, defend his assertion with some show of reason. I would not, indeed, require so much of him, if he had not himself declared that the soul deserved to become sinful. Let him tell us what the desert was—whether good desert or evil? If good, how could well-deserving lead to evil? If evil, whence could arise any ill desert previous to the commission of any sin? I have also to remark, that if there be a good desert, then the liberation of the soul would not be of free grace, but it would be due to the previous merit, and thus “grace would be no more grace.” If there be, however, an evil desert, then I ask what it is. Is it true that the soul has come into the flesh; and that it would not have so come unless He in whom there is no sin had Himself sent it? Never, therefore, except by floundering worse and worse, will he contrive to set up this view of his, in which he predicates of the soul that it deserved to be sinful. In the case of those infants, too, in whose baptism original sin is washed away, he found something to say after a fashion,—to the effect, that being involved in the sin of another could not possibly have been detrimental to them, predestinated as they were to eternal life in the foreknowledge of God. This might admit of a tolerably good sense, if he had not entangled himself in that formula of his, in which he asserts that the soul deserved to be sinful: from this difficulty he can only extricate himself by revoking his words, with regret at having expressed them.

9. Sed quid dicit, cui hoc quod praelocutus est, contigit? Namque ut istam quaestionem sibi proponeret, ait: «Alia substruuntur opprobria querulis murmurationibus oblatrantium, et excussi quasi quodam turbine, identidem inter immania saxa collidimur.» Hoc si ego de illo dicerem, forsitan succenseret. Verba sunt ejus: quibus praemissis proposuit quaestionem, in qua ipsa saxa quibus collisus naufragavit, ostenderet. Ad hoc enim perductus est, et tam horrendis cautibus illatus , impulsus, infixus, ut eruere se nisi emendando quod dixit, omnino non possit; non valens ostendere quo merito anima sit facta peccatrix, quam dicere non timuit ante omne suum peccatum meruisse fieri peccatricem. Quis tam immane supplicium meretur sine peccato, ut in aliena iniquitate conceptus, antequam exeat de visceribus matris, jam non sit sine peccato? De hac autem poena parvulorum animas, qui regenerantur in Christo, nullis eorum praecedentibus meritis gratuita liberat gratia: alioquin gratia jam non est gratia (Rom. XI, 6). Proinde iste homo valde intelligens, cui displicet in tanta profunditate, etsi non docta, tamen cauta nostra cunctatio, dicat si potest, in hanc poenam quo pervenerit anima merito, de qua poena liberat gratia sine merito. Dicat, ut quod dixit, aliqua, si valuerit, ratione defendat. Non enim hoc exigerem, nisi ipse dixisset quod anima meruerit esse peccatrix. Dicat meritum ejus, utrum bonum fuerit, anne malum. Si bonum, quo merito bono venit in malum? Si malum, unde aliquod malum meritum ante omne peccatum? Item dico: Si bonum, non ergo eam gratis, sed secundum debitum liberat gratia, cujus praecessit meritum bonum; ac sic gratia jam non erit gratia. Si autem malum, quaero quod sit: an quod venit in carnem, quo non venisset, nisi apud quem non est iniquitas, ipse misisset? Nunquam igitur nisi se in pejora praecipitans, hanc suam sententiam molietur astruere, qua dixit quod anima meruit esse peccatrix. Et de his quidem parvulis, quorum in Baptismo diluitur originale peccatum, invenit qualitercumque quod diceret, quoniam praescientia Dei praedestinatis in vitam aeternam nihil obesse potuisset, paulisper alieno inhaerere peccato. Quod tolerabiliter diceretur, si non iste verbis suis implicaretur, dicens quod meruerit anima esse peccatrix; unde se omnino non liberat, nisi hoc eum dixisse poeniteat.