Chapter 7.—The Addition of a Negative Does Not Change the Predicament.

8. This is to be made clear by examples. And first we must notice, that by the word begotten is signified the same thing as is signified by the word son. For therefore a son, because begotten, and because a son, therefore certainly begotten. By the word unbegotten, therefore, it is declared that he is not son. But begotten and unbegotten are both of them terms suitably employed; whereas in Latin we can use the word “filius,” but the custom of the language does not allow us to speak of “infilius.” It makes no difference, however, in the meaning if he is called “non filius;” just as it is precisely the same thing if he is called “non genitus,” instead of “ingenitus.” For so the terms of both neighbor and friend are used relatively, yet we cannot speak of “invicinus” as we can of “inimicus.” Wherefore, in speaking of this thing or that, we must not consider what the usage of our own language either allows or does not allow, but what clearly appears to be the meaning of the things themselves. Let us not therefore any longer call it unbegotten, although it can be so called in Latin; but instead of this let us call it not begotten, which means the same. Is this then anything else than saying that he is not a son? Now the prefixing of that negative particle does not make that to be said according to substance, which, without it, is said relatively; but that only is denied, which, without it, was affirmed, as in the other predicaments. When we say he is a man, we denote substance. He therefore who says he is not a man, enunciates no other kind of predicament, but only denies that. As therefore I affirm according to substance in saying he is a man, so I deny according to substance in saying he is not a man. And when the question is asked how large he is? and I say he is quadrupedal, that is, four feet in measure, I affirm according to quantity, and he who says he is not quadrupedal, denies according to quantity. I say he is white, I affirm according to quality; if I say he is not white, I deny according to quality. I say he is near, I affirm according to relation; if I say he is not near, I deny according to relation. I affirm according to position, when I say he lies down; I deny according to position, when I say he does not lie down. I speak according to condition,564    Habitus when I say he is armed; I deny according to condition, when I say he is not armed; and it comes to the same thing as if I should say he is unarmed. I affirm according to time, when I say he is of yesterday; I deny according to time, when I say he is not of yesterday. And when I say he is at Rome, I affirm according to place; and I deny according to place, when I say he is not at Rome. I affirm according to the predicament of action, when I say he smites; but if I say he does not smite, I deny according to action, so as to declare that he does not so act. And when I say he is smitten, I affirm according to the predicament of passion; and I deny according to the same, when I say he is not smitten. And, in a word, there is no kind of predicament according to which we may please to affirm anything, without being proved to deny according to the same predicament, if we prefix the negative particle. And since this is so, if I were to affirm according to substance, in saying son, I should deny according to substance, in saying not son. But because I affirm relatively when I say he is a son, for I refer to the father; therefore I deny relatively if I say he is not a son, for I refer the same negation to the father, in that I wish to declare that he has not a parent. But if to be called son is precisely equivalent to the being called begotten (as we said before), then to be called not begotten is precisely equivalent to the being called not son. But we deny relatively when we say he is not son, therefore we deny relatively when we say he is not begotten. Further, what is unbegotten, unless not begotten? We do not escape, therefore, from the relative predicament, when he is called unbegotten. For as begotten is not said in relation to self, but in that he is of a begetter; so when one is called unbegotten, he is not so called in relation to himself, but it is declared that he is not of a begetter. Both meanings, however, turn upon the same predicament, which is called that of relation. But that which is asserted relatively does not denote substance, and accordingly, although begotten and unbegotten are diverse, they do not denote a different substance; because, as son is referred to father, and not son to not father, so it follows inevitably that begotten must be referred to begetter, and not-begotten to not-begetter.565    The terms “unbegotten” and “begotten” are interchangeable with the terms Father and Son. This follows from the relation of a substantive to its adjective. In whatever sense a substantive is employed, in the same sense must the adjective formed from it be employed. Consequently, if the first person of the Trinity may be called Father in a sense that implies deity, he may be called Unbegotten in the same sense. And if the second person may be called Son in a sense implying deity, he may be called Begotten in the same sense. The Ancient church often employed the adjective, and spoke of God the Unbegotten and God the Begotten (Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 25, 53; ii. 12, 13. Clem. Alex. Stromata v. xii.). This phraseology sounds strange to the Modern church, yet the latter really says the same thing when it speaks of God the Father, and God the Son.—W.G.T.S.]

CAPUT VII.

8. Negatio addita non mutat praedicamentum. Hoc exemplis planum faciendum est. Ac primum videndum est hoc significari cum dicitur genitus, quod significatur cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius, quia genitus; et quia filius, utique genitus. Quod ergo dicitur ingenitus, hoc ostenditur, quod non sit filius: sed genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur; filius autem latine dicitur, sed infilius ut dicatur non admittit loquendi consuetudo. Nihil tamen intellectui demitur, si dicatur non filius; quemadmodum etiam si dicatur non genitus, pro eo quod dicitur ingenitus, nihil aliud dicitur. Sic enim et vicinus et amicus relative dicuntur, nec tamen potest invicinus dici quomodo dicitur inimicus. Quamobrem non est in rebus considerandum quid vel sinat vel non sinat dici usus sermonis nostri, sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus eluceat. Non ergo jam dicamus ingenitum, quamvis dici latine possit; sed pro eo dicamus non genitum, quod tantum valet. Num ergo aliud dicimus quam non filium? Negativa porro ista particula non id efficit, ut quod sine illa relative dicitur, eadem praeposita substantialiter dicatur; sed id tantum negatur, quod sine 0916 illa aiebatur, sicut in caeteris praedicamentis. Velut cum dicimus, Homo est, substantiam designamus. Qui ergo dicit, Non homo est, non aliud genus praedicamenti enuntiat, sed tantum illud negat. Sicut ergo secundum substantiam aio, Homo est: sic secundum substantiam nego, cum dico, Non homo est. Et cum quaeritur, quantus sit; et aio, Quadrupedalis est, id est, quatuor pedum, secundum quantitatem aio: qui dicit, Non quadrupedalis est, secundum quantitatem negat. Candidus est, secundum qualitatem aio: Non candidus est, secundum qualitatem nego. Propinquus est, secundum relativum aio: Non propinquus est, secundum relativum nego. Secundum situm aio, cum dico, Jacet: secundum situm nego, cum dico, Non jacet. Secundum habitum aio, cum dico, Armatus est: secundum habitum nego, cum dico, Non armatus est. Tantumdem autem valet si dicam, Inermis est. Secundum tempus aio, cum dico, Hesternus est: secundum tempus nego, cum dico, Non hesternus est. Et cum dico, Romae est, secundum locum aio: et secundum locum nego, cum dico, Non Romae est. Secundum id quod est facere aio, cum dico, Caedit: si autem dicam, Non caedit, secundum id quod est facere nego, ut ostendam non hoc facere. Et cum dico, Vapulat, secundum praedicamentum aio quod pati vocatur: et secundum id nego, cum dico, non vapulat. Et omnino nullum praedicamenti genus est, secundum quod aliquid aiere volumus, nisi ut secundum idipsum praedicamentum negare convincamur, si praeponere negativam particulam voluerimus. Quae cum ita sint, si substantialiter aierem, dicendo, Filius; substantialiter negarem, dicendo, Non Filius. Quia vero relative aio, cum dico, Filius est; ad patrem enim refero: relative nego, si dicam, Non filius est; ad parentem enim eamdem negationem refero, volens ostendere quod ei parens non sit. At si quantum valet quod dicitur filius, tantumdem valet quod dicitur genitus, sicut praelocuti sumus; tantumdem ergo valet quod dicitur non genitus, quantum valet quod dicitur non filius. Relative autem negamus dicendo, Non filius: relative igitur negamus dicendo, Non genitus. Ingenitus porro quid est, nisi non genitus? Non ergo receditur a relativo praedicamento, cum ingenitus dicitur. Sicut enim genitus non ad se ipsum dicitur, sed quod ex genitore sit: ita cum dicitur ingenitus, non ad se ipsum dicitur, sed quod ex genitore non sit ostenditur. In eodem tamen praedicamento, quod Relativum vocatur, utraque significatio vertitur: quod autem relative pronuntiatur, non indicat substantiam: ita quamvis diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, non indicat diversam substantiam: quia sicut filius ad patrem, et non filius ad non patrem refertur; ita genitus ad genitorem, et non genitus ad non genitorem referatur necesse est.