Chapter 1.—Augustin Returns to the Question, Whether Each Person of the Trinity by Itself is Wisdom. With What Difficulty, or in What Way, the Proposed Question is to Be Solved.

1. Let us now inquire more carefully, so far as God grants, into that which a little before we deferred; whether each person also in the Trinity can also by Himself and not with the other two be called God, or great, or wise, or true, or omnipotent, or just, or anything else that can be said of God, not relatively, but absolutely; or whether these things cannot be said except when the Trinity is understood. For the question is raised,—because it is written, “Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God,”619    1 Cor. i. 24—whether He is so the Father of His own wisdom and His own power, as that He is wise with that wisdom which He begat, and powerful with that power which He begat; and whether, since He is always powerful and wise, He always begat power and wisdom. For if it be so, then, as we have said, why is He not also the Father of His own greatness by which He is great, and of His own goodness by which He is good, and of His own justice by which He is just, and whatever else there is? Or if all these things are understood, although under more names than one, to be in the same wisdom and power, so that that is greatness which is power, that is goodness which is wisdom, and that again is wisdom which is power, as we have already argued; then let us remember, that when I mention any one of these, I am to be taken as if I mentioned all. It is asked, then, whether the Father also by Himself is wise, and is Himself His own wisdom itself; or whether He is wise in the same way as He speaks. For He speaks by the Word which He begat, not by the word which is uttered, and sounds, and passes away, but by the Word which was with God, and the Word was God, and all things were made by Him:620    John i. 1, 3 by the Word which is equal to Himself, by whom He always and unchangeably utters Himself. For He is not Himself the Word, as He is not the Son nor the image. But in speaking (putting aside those words of God in time which are produced in the creature, for they sound and pass away,—in speaking then) by that co-eternal Word, He is not understood singly, but with that Word itself, without whom certainly He does not speak. Is He then in such way wise as He is one who speaks, so as to be in such way wisdom, as He is the Word, and so that to be the Word is to be wisdom, that is, also to be power, so that power and wisdom and the Word may be the same, and be so called relatively as the Son and the image: and that the Father is not singly powerful or wise, but together with the power and wisdom itself which He begat (genuit); just as He is not singly one who speaks, but by that Word and together with that Word which He begat; and in like way great by that and together with that greatness, which He begat? And if He is not great by one thing, and God by another, but great by that whereby He is God, because it is not one thing to Him to be great and another to be God; it follows that neither is He God singly, but by that and together with that deity (deitas) which He begat; so that the Son is the deity of the Father, as He is the wisdom and power of the Father, and as He is the Word and image of the Father. And because it is not one thing to Him to be, another to be God, the Son is also the essence of the Father, as He is His Word and image. And hence also—except that He is the Father [the Unbegotten]—the Father is not anything unless because He has the Son; so that not only that which is meant by Father (which it is manifest He is not called relatively to Himself but to the Son, and therefore is the Father because He has the Son), but that which He is in respect to His own substance is so called, because He begat His own essence. For as He is great, only with that greatness which He begat, so also He is, only with that essence which He begat; because it is not one thing to Him to be, and another to be great. Is He therefore the Father of His own essence, in the same way as He is the Father of His own greatness, as He is the Father of His own power and wisdom? since His greatness is the same as His power, and His essence the same as His greatness.

2. This discussion has arisen from that which is written, that “Christ is the power of God, and the wisdom of God.” Wherefore our discourse is compressed into these narrow limits, while we desire to speak things unspeakable; that either we must say that Christ is not the power of God and the wisdom of God, and so shamelessly and impiously resist the apostle; or we must acknowledge that Christ is indeed the power of God and the wisdom of God, but that His Father is not the Father of His own power and wisdom, which is not less impious; for so neither will He be the Father of Christ, because Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God; or that the Father is not powerful with His own power, or wise with His own wisdom: and who shall dare to say this? Or yet, again, that we must understand, that in the Father it is one thing to be, another thing to be wise, so that He is not by that by which He is wise: a thing usually understood of the soul, which is at some times unwise, at others wise; as being by nature changeable, and not absolutely and perfectly simple. Or, again, that the Father is not anything in respect to His own substance; and that not only that He is the Father, but that He is, is said relatively to the Son. How then can the Son be of the same essence as the Father, seeing that the Father, in respect to Himself, is neither His own essence, nor is at all in respect to Himself, but even His essence is in relation to the Son? But, on the contrary, much more is He of one and the same essence, since the Father and Son are one and the same essence; seeing that the Father has His being itself not in respect to Himself, but to the Son, which essence He begat, and by which essence He is whatever He is. Therefore neither [person] is in respect to Himself alone; and both exist relatively the one to the other. Or is the Father alone not called Father of himself, but whatever He is called, is called relatively to the Son, but the Son is predicated of in reference to Himself? And if it be so, what is predicated of Him in reference to Himself? Is it His essence itself? But the Son is the essence of the Father, as He is the power and wisdom of the Father, as He is the Word of the Father, and the image of the Father. Or if the Son is called essence in reference to Himself, but the Father is not essence, but the begetter of the essence, and is not in respect to Himself, but is by that very essence which He begat; as He is great by that greatness which He begat: therefore the Son is also called greatness in respect to Himself; therefore He is also called, in like manner, power, and wisdom, and word, and image. But what can be more absurd than that He should be called image in respect to Himself? Or if image and word are not the very same with power and wisdom, but the former are spoken relatively, and the latter in respect to self, not to another; then we get to this, that the Father is not wise with that wisdom which He begat, because He Himself cannot be spoken relatively to it, and it cannot be spoken relatively to Him. For all things which are said relatively are said reciprocally; therefore it remains that even in essence the Son is spoken of relatively to the Father. But from this is educed a most unexpected sense: that essence itself is not essence, or at least that, when it is called essence, not essence but something relative is intimated. As when we speak of a master, essence is not intimated, but a relative which has reference to a slave; but when we speak of a man, or any such thing which is said in respect to self not to something else, then essence is intimated. Therefore when a man is called a master, man himself is essence, but he is called master relatively; for he is called man in respect to himself, but master in respect to his slave. But in regard to the point from which we started, if essence itself is spoken relatively, essence itself is not essence. Add further, that all essence which is spoken of relatively, is also something, although the relation be taken away; as e.g. in the case of a man who is a master, and a man who is a slave, and a horse that is a beast of burden, and money that is a pledge, the man, and the horse, and the money are spoken in respect to themselves, and are substances or essences; but master, and slave, and beast of burden, and pledge, are spoken relatively to something. But if there were not a man, that is, some substance, there would be none who could be called relatively a master; and if there were no horse having a certain essence, there would be nothing that could be called relatively a beast of burden; so if money were not some kind of substance, it could not be called relatively a pledge. Wherefore, if the Father also is not something in respect to Himself then there is no one at all that can be spoken of relatively to something. For it is not as it is with color. The color of a thing is referred to the thing colored, and color is not spoken at all in reference to substance, but is always of something that is colored; but that thing of which it is the color, even if it is referred to color in respect to its being colored, is yet, in respect to its being a body, spoken of in respect to substance. But in no way may we think, in like manner, that the Father cannot be called anything in respect to His own substance, but that whatever He is called, He is called in relation to the Son; while the same Son is spoken of both in respect to His own substance and in relation to the Father, when He is called great greatness, and powerful power, plainly in respect to Himself, and the greatness and power of the great and powerful Father, by which the Father is great and powerful. It is not so; but both are substance, and both are one substance. And as it is absurd to say that whiteness is not white, so is it absurd to say that wisdom is not wise; and as whiteness is called white in respect to itself, so also wisdom is called wise in respect to itself. But the whiteness of a body is not an essence, since the body itself is the essence, and that is a quality of it; and hence also a body is said from that quality to be white, to which body to be is not the same thing as to be white. For the form in it is one thing, and the color another; and both are not in themselves, but in a certain bulk, which bulk is neither form nor color, but is formed and colored. True wisdom is both wise, and wise in itself. And since in the case of every soul that becomes wise by partaking of wisdom, if it again becomes foolish, yet wisdom in itself remains; nor when that soul was changed into folly is the wisdom likewise so changed; therefore wisdom is not in him who becomes wise by it, in the same manner as whiteness is in the body which is by it made white. For when the body has been changed into another color, that whiteness will not remain, but will altogether cease to be. But if the Father who begat wisdom is also made wise by it, and to be is not to Him the same as to be wise, then the Son is His quality, not His offspring; and there will no longer be absolute simplicity in the Godhead. But far be it from being so, since in truth in the Godhead is absolutely simple essence, and therefore to be is there the same as to be wise. But if to be is there the same as to be wise, then the Father is not wise by that wisdom which He begat; otherwise He did not beget it, but it begat Him. For what else do we say when we say, that to Him to be is the same as to be wise, unless that He is by that whereby He is wise? Wherefore, that which is the cause to Him of being wise, is itself also the cause to Him that He is; and accordingly, if the wisdom which He begat is the cause to Him of being wise, it is also the cause to Him that He is; and this cannot be the case, except either by begetting or by creating Him. But no one ever said in any sense that wisdom is either the begetter or the creator of the Father; for what could be more senseless? Therefore both the Father Himself is wisdom, and the Son is in such way called the wisdom of the Father, as He is called the light of the Father; that is, that in the same manner as light from light, and yet both one light, so we are to understand wisdom of wisdom, and yet both one wisdom; and therefore also one essence, since, in God, to be, is the same as to be wise. For what to be wise is to wisdom, and to be able is to power, and to be eternal is to eternity, and to be just to justice, and to be great to greatness, that being itself is to essence. And since in the Divine simplicity, to be wise is nothing else than to be, therefore wisdom there is the same as essence.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

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1. Redit ad quaestionem, an quaelibet Trinitatis persona per se sit sapientia. Quam difficile, quave ratione solvatur quaestio proposita. Jam nunc quaeramus diligentius, quantum dat Deus, quod paulo ante distulimus: Utrum et singula quaeque in 0932 Trinitate persona possit et per se ipsam non cum caeteris duabus dici Deus, aut magnus, aut sapiens, aut verus, aut omnipotens, aut justus, et si quid aliud dici de Deo potest, non relative, sed ad se ipsum; an vero non dicantur ista, nisi cum Trinitas intelligitur. 0933 Hoc enim quaestionem facit, quia scriptum est, Christum Dei virtutem. et Dei sapientiam (I Cor. I, 24): utrum ita sit pater sapientiae atque virtutis suae, ut hac sapientia sapiens sit quam genuit, et hac virtute potens quam genuit; et quia semper potens et sapiens, semper genuit virtutem et sapientiam. Dixeramus enim si ita est, cur non et magnitudinis suae pater sit qua magnus est, et bonitatis qua bonus, et justitiae qua justus, et alia si qua sunt? Aut si haec omnia pluribus vocabulis in eadem sapientia et virtute intelliguntur, ut ea sit magnitudo quae virtus, ea bonitas quae sapientia, et ea rursus sapientia quae virtus, sicut jam tractavimus; meminerimus, cum aliquid horum nomino, sic accipiendum esse, ac si omnia commemorem. Quaeritur ergo an Pater etiam singulus sit sapiens, atque ipsa sibi ipse sapientia, an ita sit sapiens quomodo dicens. Verbo enim quod genuit dicens est; non verbo quod profertur, et sonat, et transit; sed Verbo quod erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum, et omnia per ipsum facta sunt (Joan. I, 1, 3): Verbo aequali sibi, quo semper atque incommutabiliter dicit se ipsum. Non est enim ipse verbum, sicut nec filius, nec imago. Dicens autem: exceptis illis temporalibus vocibus Dei, quae in creatura fiunt; nam sonant, et transeunt: dicens ergo illo coaeterno Verbo, non singulus intelligitur, sed cum ipso Verbo, sine quo non est utique dicens. Itane et sapiens sicut dicens, ut ita sit sapientia, sicut Verbum, et hoc sit Verbum esse quod est esse sapientiam; hoc etiam esse virtutem, ut virtus et sapientia et Verbum idem sit, et relative dicatur, sicut Filius et imago: atque ille non singulus potens, vel sapiens, sed cum ipsa virtute et sapientia quam genuit; sicut non singulus dicens, sed eo Verbo, et cum eo Verbo quod genuit; atque ita magnus ea et cum ea magnitudine quam genuit? Et si non alio magnus, alio Deus, sed eo magnus quo Deus, quia non aliud illi est magnum esse, aliud Deum esse; consequens est ut nec Deus singulus, sed ea et cum ea deitate quam genuit, ut sic sit Filius deitas Patris, sicut sapientia et virtus Patris, et sicuti est Verbum et imago Patris. Et quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud Deum esse, ita sit etiam essentia Patris Filius, sicuti est Verbum et imago ejus. Ac per hoc etiam excepto eo quod Pater est, non sit aliquid Pater, nisi quia est ei Filius: ut non tantum id quod dicitur Pater, quod manifestum est eum non ad se ipsum, sed ad Filium relative dici, et ideo Patrem quia est ei Filius; sed omnino ut sit quod ad se ipsum est, ideo sit quia genuit essentiam suam. Sicut enim magnus est, non nisi ea quam genuit magnitudine; ita et est non nisi ea quam genuit essentia; quia non est aliud illi esse, aliud magnum esse. Itane igitur pater est essentiae suae, sicut pater est magnitudinis suae, sicut pater est virtutis ac sapientiae suae? Eadem quippe ejus magnitudo quae virtus, et eadem essentia quae magnitudo.

2. Haec disputatio nata est ex eo quod scriptum est, Christum esse Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Quapropter in eas angustias sermo coarctatur, cum 0934 ineffabilia fari cupimus, ut aut dicamus Christum non esse Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam, atque ita impudenter et impie resistamus Apostolo: aut Christum quidem Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam esse fateamur, sed ejus Patrem non esse patrem virtutis et sapientiae suae, quod non minus impium est; sic enim nec Christi erit pater, quia Christus Dei virtus et Dei sapientia est: aut non esse Patrem virtute sua potentem, neque sapientia sua sapientem; quod quis audeat dicere? aut aliud in Patre intelligi esse, aliud sapientem esse, ut non hoc ipso sit quo sapiens est; quod de anima intelligi solet, quae alias insipiens, alias sapiens est, velut natura mutabilis, et non summe perfecteque simplex: aut Patrem non esse aliquid ad se ipsum, et non solum quod Pater est, sed omnino quod est, ad Filium relative dici. Quomodo ergo ejusdem essentiae Filius cujus Pater, quandoquidem ad se ipsum, nec essentia est, nec omnino est ad se ipsum, sed etiam esse ad Filium illi est? At enim multo magis unius ejusdemque essentiae, quia una eademque essentia Pater et Filius; quandoquidem Patri non ad se ipsum est ipsum esse, sed ad Filium, quam essentiam genuit, et qua essentia est quidquid est. Neuter ergo ad se est, et uterque ad invicem relative dicitur: an Pater solus non solum quod Pater dicitur, sed omnino quidquid dicitur relative ad Filium dicitur; ille autem dicitur et ad se? et si ita est, quid dicitur ad se ? an ipsa essentia? sed Patris essentia est Filius, sicut Patris virtus et sapientia, sicut Verbum Patris et imago Patris: aut si essentia dicitur ad se Filius, Pater autem non est essentia, sed genitor essentiae, non est autem ad se ipsum, sed hac ipsa essentia quam genuit, sicut hac ipsa magnitudine magnus quam genuit; ergo et magnitudo dicitur ad se Filius, ergo et virtus, et sapientia, et Verbum, et imago. Quid autem absurdius, quam imaginem ad se dici? Aut si non idipsum est imago et Verbum, quod est virtus et sapientia, sed illa relative dicuntur, haec autem ad se, non ad aliud; incipit non ea sapientia quam genuit, sapiens esse Pater, quia non potest ipse ad eam relative dici, et illa ad eum relative non dici. Omnia enim quae relative dicuntur, ad invicem dicuntur. Restat itaque ut etiam essentia Filius relative dicatur ad Patrem. Ex quo conficitur inopinatissimus sensus, ut ipsa essentia non sit essentia; vel certe cum dicitur essentia, non essentia, sed relativum indicetur. Quomodo cum dicitur dominus, non essentia indicatur, sed relativum quod refertur ad servum; cum autem homo dicitur, vel aliquid tale, quod ad se, non ad aliud dicitur, tunc indicatur essentia. Homo ergo cum dominus dicitur, ipse homo essentia est, dominus vero relative dicitur: homo enim ad se dicitur, dominus ad servum; hoc autem unde agimus, si essentia ipsa relative dicitur, essentia ipsa non est 0935 essentia. Huc accedit, quia omnis essentia quae relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid excepto relativo: sicut homo dominus, et homo servus, et equus jumentum, et nummus arrha, homo et equus et nummus ad se dicuntur, et substantiae sunt vel essentiae; dominus vero et servus et jumentum et arrha, ad aliquid relative dicuntur. Sed si non esset homo, id est aliqua substantia, non esset qui relative dominus diceretur: et si non esset equus quaedam essentia, non esset quod jumentum relative diceretur: ita si nummus non esset aliqua substantia, nec arrha posset relative dici. Quapropter si et Pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum, non est omnino qui relative dicatur ad aliquid. Non enim, sicut ad aliquid coloratum refertur color ejus, nec omnino ad se dicitur color, sed semper alicujus colorati est; illud autem cujus color est, etiam si eo quod coloratum dicitur, ad colorem refertur, tamen id quod corpus dicitur, ad se dicitur: ullo modo ita putandum est Patrem non dici aliquid ad se ipsum, sed quidquid dicitur ad Filium dici; eumdem vero Filium et ad se ipsum dici, et ad Patrem, cum dicitur magnitudo magna et virtus potens, utique ad se ipsum, et magnitudo atque virtus magni et potentis Patris, qua Pater magnus et potens est. Non ergo ita, sed utrumque substantia, et utrumque una substantia. Sicut autem absurdum est dicere, candidum non esse candorem; sic absurdum est dicere, sapientem non esse sapientiam: et sicut candor ad se ipsum candidus dicitur, ita et sapientia ad se ipsam dicitur sapiens. Sed candor corporis non est essentia; quoniam ipsum corpus essentia est, et illa ejus qualitas: unde et ab ea dicitur candidum corpus, cui non hoc est esse quod candidum esse. Aliud enim ibi forma, et aliud color; et utrumque non in se ipso, sed in aliqua mole, quae moles nec forma, nec color est, sed formata et colorata. Sapientia vera et sapiens est, et se ipsa sapiens est. Et quoniam quaecumque anima participatione sapientiae fit sapiens, si rursus desipiat, manet tamen in se sapientia, nec cum anima fuerit in stultitiam commutata, illa mutatur: non ita est in eo qui ex ea fit sapiens, quemadmodum candor in corpore quod ex illo candidum est. Cum enim corpus in alium colorem fuerit mutatum, non manebit candor ille, sed omnino esse desinet. Quod si et Pater qui genuit sapientiam, ex ea fit sapiens, neque hoc est illi esse quod sapere, qualitas ejus est Filius; non proles ejus, et non ibi erit jam summa simplicitas. Sed absit ut ita sit; quia vere ibi est summe simplex essentia: hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens est Pater; alioquin non ipse illam, sed illa eum genuit. Quid enim aliud dicimus, cum dicimus, Hoc illi est esse quod sapere, nisi, Eo est quo sapiens est? Quapropter quae causa illi est ut sapiens sit, ipsa illi 0936 causa est ut sit: proinde si sapientia quam genuit, causa illi est ut sapiens sit, etiam ut sit ipsa illi causa est. Quod fieri non potest, nisi gignendo eum aut faciendo. Sed neque genitricem, neque conditricem Patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam. Quid enim insanius? Ergo et Pater ipse sapientia est: et ita dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, quomodo dicitur lumen Patris; id est, ut quemadmodum lumen de lumine, et utrumque unum lumen; sic intelligatur sapientia de sapientia, et utrumque una sapientia: ergo et una essentia; quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod enim est sapientiae sapere, et potentiae posse, et aeternitati aeternam esse, justitiae justam esse, magnitudini magnam esse; hoc est essentiae ipsum esse. Et quia in illa simplicitate non est aliud sapere quam esse, eadem ibi sapientia est quae essentia.