Chapter 4.—How It Was Brought About that the Greeks Speak of Three Hypostases, the Latins of Three Persons. Scripture Nowhere Speaks of Three Persons in One God.

7. For the sake, then, of speaking of things that cannot be uttered, that we may be able in some way to utter what we are able in no way to utter fully, our Greek friends have spoken of one essence, three substances; but the Latins of one essence or substance, three persons; because, as we have already said,638    Bk. v. c. 28. essence usually means nothing else than substance in our language, that is, in Latin. And provided that what is said is understood only in a mystery, such a way of speaking was sufficient, in order that there might be something to say when it was asked what the three are, which the true faith pronounces to be three, when it both declares that the Father is not the Son, and that the Holy Spirit, which is the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son. When, then, it is asked what the three are, or who the three are, we betake ourselves to the finding out of some special or general name under which we may embrace these three; and no such name occurs to the mind, because the super-eminence of the Godhead surpasses the power of customary speech. For God is more truly thought than He is altered, and exists more truly than He is thought. For when we say that Jacob was not the same as Abraham, but that Isaac was neither Abraham nor Jacob, certainly we confess that they are three, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But when it is asked what three, we reply three men, calling them in the plural by a specific name; but if we were to say three animals, then by a generic name; for man, as the ancients have defined him, is a rational, mortal animal: or again, as our Scriptures usually speak, three souls, since it is fitting to denominate the whole from the better part, that is, to denominate both body and soul, which is the whole man, from the soul; for so it is said that seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob, instead of saying so many men.639    Gen. xlvi. 27, and Deut. x. 22 Again, when we say that your horse is not mine, and that a third belonging to some one else is neither mine nor yours, then we confess that there are three; and if any one ask what three, we answer three horses by a specific name, but three animals by a generic one. And yet again, when we say that an ox is not a horse, but that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we speak of a three; and if any one questions us what three, we do not speak now by a specific name of three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because the three are not contained under the same species, but by a generic name, three animals; or if under a higher genus, three substances, or three creatures, or three natures. But whatsoever things are expressed in the plural number specifically by one name, can also be expressed generically by one name. But all things which are generically called by one name cannot also be called specifically by one name. For three horses, which is a specific name, we also call three animals; but, a horse, and an ox, and a dog, we call only three animals or substances, which are generic names, or anything else that can be spoken generically concerning them; but we cannot speak of them as three horses, or oxen, or dogs, which are specific names; for we express those things by one name, although in the plural number, which have that in common that is signified by the name. For Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, have in common that which is man; therefore they are called three men: a horse also, and an ox, and a dog, have in common that which is animal; therefore they are called three animals. So three several laurels we also call three trees; but a laurel, and a myrtle, and an olive, we call only three trees, or three substances, or three natures: and so three stones we call also three bodies; but stone, and wood, and iron, we call only three bodies, or by any other higher generic name by which they can be called. Of the Father, therefore, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, seeing that they are three, let us ask what three they are, and what they have in common. For the being the Father is not common to them, so that they should be interchangeably fathers to one another: as friends, since they are so called relatively to each other, can be called three friends, because they are so mutually to each other. But this is not the case in the Trinity, since the Father only is there father; and not Father of two, but of the Son only. Neither are they three Sons, since the Father there is not the Son, nor is the Holy Spirit. Neither three Holy Spirits, because the Holy Spirit also, in that proper meaning by which He is also called the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son. What three therefore? For if three persons, then that which is meant by person is common to them; therefore this name is either specific or generic to them, according to the manner of speaking. But where there is no difference of nature, there things that are several in number are so expressed generically, that they can also be expressed specifically. For the difference of nature causes, that a laurel, and a myrtle, and an olive, or a horse, and an ox, and a dog, are not called by the specific name, the former of three laurels, or the latter of three oxen, but by the generic name, the former of three trees, and the latter of three animals. But here, where there is no difference of essence, it is necessary that these three should have a specific name, which yet is not to be found. For person is a generic name, insomuch that man also can be so called, although there is so great a difference between man and God.

8. Further, in regard to that very generic (generalis) word, if on this account we say three persons, because that which person means is common to them (otherwise they can in no way be so called, just as they are not called three sons, because that which son means is not common to them); why do we not also say three Gods? For certainly, since the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person, therefore there are three persons: since then the Father is God, and the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, why not three Gods? Or else, since on account of their ineffable union these three are together one God, why not also one person; so that we could not say three persons, although we call each a person singly, just as we cannot say three Gods, although we call each singly God, whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit? Is it because Scripture does not say three Gods? But neither do we find that Scripture anywhere mentions three persons. Or is it because Scripture does not call these three, either three persons or one person (for we read of the person of the Lord, but not of the Lord as a person), that therefore it was lawful through the mere necessity of speaking and reasoning to say three persons, not because Scripture says it, but because Scripture does not contradict it: whereas, if we were to say three Gods, Scripture would contradict it, which says, “Hear, O Israel; the Lord thy God is one God?”640    Deut. vi. 4 Why then is it not also lawful to say three essences; which, in like manner, as Scripture does not say, so neither does it contradict? For if essence is a specific (specialis) name common to three, why are They not to be called three essences, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three men, because man is the specific name common to all men? But if essence is not a specific name, but a generic one, since man, and cattle, and tree, and constellation, and angel, are called essences; why are not these called three essences, as three horses are called three animals, and three laurels are called three trees, and three stones three bodies? Or if they are not called three essences, but one essence, on account of the unity of the Trinity, why is it not the case, that on account of the same unity of the Trinity they are not to be called three substances or three persons, but one substance and one person? For as the name of essence is common to them, so that each singly is called essence, so the name of either substance or person is common to them. For that which must be understood of persons according to our usage, this is to be understood of substances according to the Greek usage; for they say three substances, one essence, in the same way as we say three persons, one essence or substance.

9. What therefore remains, except that we confess that these terms sprang from the necessity of speaking, when copious reasoning was required against the devices or errors of the heretics? For when human weakness endeavored to utter in speech to the senses of man what it grasps in the secret places of the mind in proportion to its comprehension respecting the Lord God its creator, whether by devout faith, or by any discernment whatsoever; it feared to say three essences, lest any difference should be understood to exist in that absolute equality. Again, it could not say that there were not three somewhats (tria quædam), for it was because Sabellius said this that he fell into heresy. For it must be devoutly believed, as most certainly known from the Scriptures, and must be grasped by the mental eye with undoubting perception, that there is both Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit; and that the Son is not the same with the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the same with the Father or the Son. It sought then what three it should call them, and answered substances or persons; by which names it did not intend diversity to be meant, but singleness to be denied: that not only unity might be understood therein from the being called one essence, but also Trinity from the being called three substances or persons. For if it is the same thing with God to be (esse) as to subsist (subsistere), they were not to be called three substances, in such sense as they are not called three essences; just as, because it is the same thing with God to be as to be wise, as we do not say three essences, so neither three wisdoms. For so, because it is the same thing to Him to be God as to be, it is not right to say three essences, as it is not right to say three Gods. But if it is one thing to God to be, another to subsist, as it is one thing to God to be, another to be the Father or the Lord (for that which He is, is spoken in respect to Himself, but He is called Father in relation to the Son, and Lord in relation to the creature which serves Him); therefore He subsists relatively, as He begets relatively, and bears rule relatively: so then substance will be no longer substance, because it will be relative. For as from being, He is called essence, so from subsisting, we speak of substance. But it is absurd that substance should be spoken relatively, for everything subsists in respect to itself; how much more God?641    [Augustin’s meaning is, that the term “substance” is not an adequate one whereby to denote a trinitarian distinction, because in order to denote such a distinction it must be employed relatively, while in itself it has an absolute signification. In the next chapter he proceeds to show this.—W.G.T.S.]

CAPUT IV.

7. Qua necessitate Graeci tres hypostases dixerint; Latini, tres personas. Scriptura nullibi dicit tres personas in Deo. Itaque loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquo modo possemus, quod effari nullo modo possumus, dictum est a nostris Graecis una essentia, tres substantiae: a Latinis autem, una essentia vel substantia, tres personae; quia, sicut jam diximus, non aliter in sermone nostro, id est, latino, essentia quam substantia solet intelligi (Lib. 5, capp. 2, 8). Et dum intelligatur saltem in aenigmate quod dicitur, placuit ita dici, ut diceretur aliquid cum quaereretur quid tria sint, quae tria esse fides vera pronuntiat, cum et Patrem non dicit esse Filium, et Spiritum sanctum quod est donum Dei nec Patrem dicit esse nec Filium. Cum ergo quaeritur quid tria, vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod speciale vel generale nomen, quo complectamur haec tria, neque occurrit animo, quia excedit supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur. Cum enim dicimus non eumdem esse Jacob qui est Abraham, Isaac autem nec Abraham esse nec Jacob, tres esse utique fatemur, Abraham, Isaac et Jacob. Sed cum quaeritur quid tres, respondemus tres homines, nomine speciali eos pluraliter appellantes; generali autem, si dicamus tria animalia: homo enim, sicut veteres definierunt, animal est rationale, mortale: aut sicut Scripturae nostrae loqui solent, tres animas, cum a parte meliore totum appellari placet, id est, ab anima, et corpus et animam, quod est totus homo . Ita quippe dictum est in Aegyptum descendisse cum Jacob animas septuaginta quinque, pro tot hominibus (Gen. XLVI, 27, et Deut. X, 22). Item cum dicimus equum tuum non eum esse qui meus est, et tertium alicujus alterius nec meum esse nec tuum, fatemur tres esse: et intorroganti 0940 quid tres, respondemus tres equos nomine speciali, generali autem tria animalia. Item cum dicimus bovem non esse equum, canem vero nec bovem esse nec equum, tria quaedam dicimus: et percontantibus quid tria, non jam speciali nomine dicimus tres equos, aut tres boves, aut tres canes, quia non eadem specie continentur; sed generali, tria animalia; sive superiore genere, tres substantias, vel tres creaturas, vel tres naturas. Quaecumque autem plurali numero enuntiantur specialiter uno nomine, etiam generaliter enuntiari possunt uno nomine. Non autem omnia quae generaliter nomine uno appellantur, etiam specialiter appellare uno nomine possumus. Nam tres equos, quod est nomen speciale, etiam animalia tria dicimus: equum vero et bovem et canem, animalia tria tantum dicimus vel substantias, quae sunt generalia nomina, et si quid aliud de his generaliter dici potest; tres vero equos, aut boves, aut canes, quae specialia vocabula sunt, non ea possumus dicere. Ea quippe uno nomine quamvis pluraliter enuntiamus quae communiter habent illud quod eo nomine significatur. Abraham quippe et Isaac et Jacob commune habent id quod est homo; itaque dicuntur tres homines: equus quoque et bos et canis, commune habent id quod est animal; dicuntur ergo tria animalia. Ita tres aliquas lauros, etiam tres arbores dicimus; laurum vero et myrtum et oleam, tantum tres arbores vel tres substantias, aut tres naturas: atque ita tres lapides, etiam tria corpora; lapidem vero et lignum et ferrum, tantum tria corpora, vel si quo etiam superiore generali nomine dici possunt. Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quoniam tres sunt, quaeramus quid tres sint, et quid commune habeant. Non enim commune illis est id quod Pater est, ut invicem sibi sint patres; sicut amici, cum relative ad alterutrum dicantur, possunt dici tres amici, quod invicem sibi sunt. Non autem hoc ibi, quia tantum Pater ibi pater; nec duorum pater, sed unici Filii. Nec tres filii, cum Pater ibi non sit filius, nec Spiritus sanctus. Nec tres spiritus sancti, quia et spiritus sanctus propria significatione qua etiam donum Dei dicitur, nec Pater nec Filius. Quid igitur tres? Si enim tres personae, commune est eis id quod persona est: ergo speciale hoc aut generale nomen est eis, si consuetudinem loquendi respicimus. Sed ubi est naturae nulla diversitas, ita generaliter enuntiantur aliqua plura, ut etiam specialiter enuntiari possint. Naturae enim differentia facit ut laurus et myrtus et olea, aut equus et bos et canis, non dicantur speciali nomine, istae, tres lauri; aut illi, tres boves: sed generali, et istae, tres arbores; et illa, tria animalia. Hic vero ubi nulla est essentiae diversitas, oportet ut speciale nomen habeant haec tria, quod tamen non invenitur. Nam persona generale nomen est, in tantum ut etiam homo possit hoc dici, cum tantum intersit inter hominem et Deum.

8. Deinde in ipso generali vocabulo, si propterea dicimus tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est (alioquin nullo modo possunt ita dici, 0941 quemadmodum non dicuntur tres filii, quia non commune est eis id quod est filius); cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? Certe enim quia Pater persona, et Filius persona, et Spiritus sanctus persona, ideo tres personae: quia ergo Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus sanctus Deus, cur non tres dii? Aut quoniam propter ineffabilem conjunctionem haec tria simul unus Deus; cur non etiam una persona, ut ita non possimus dicere tres personas, quamvis singulam quamque appellemus personam, quemadmodum non possumus dicere tres deos, quamvis quemque singulum appellemus Deum, sive Patrem, sive Filium, sive Spiritum sanctum? An quia Scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas alicubi Scripturam commemorare invenimus. An quia nec tres, nec unam personam Scriptura dicit haec tria (legimus enim personam Domini, non personam Dominum), propterea licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit: si autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret Scriptura, dicens, Audi, Israel; Dominus Deus tuus, Deus unus est (Deut. VI, 4)? Cur ergo et tres essentias non licet dicere, quod similiter Scriptura, sicut non dicit, ita nec contradicit? Nam essentia si speciale nomen est commune tribus, cur non dicantur tres essentiae, sicut Abraham, Isaac, et Jacob, tres homines, quia homo speciale nomen est commune omnibus hominibus? Si autem speciale nomen non est essentia, sed generale, quia homo, et pecus, et arbor, et sidus, et angelus essentia dicitur; cur non dicuntur istae tres essentiae, sicut tres equi dicuntur tria animalia, et tres lauri dicuntur tres arbores, et tres lapides tria corpora? Aut si propter unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres essentiae, sed una essentia; cur non propter eamdem unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres substantiae vel tres personae, sed una substantia et una persona? Quam enim est illis commune nomen essentiae, ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, tam illis commune est vel substantiae vel personae vocabulum. Quod enim de personis secundum nostram, hoc de substantiis secundum Graecorum consuetudinem, ea quae diximus, oportet intelligi. Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias, unam essentiam, quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam vel substantiam.

9. Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur loquendi necessitate parta haec vocabula, cum opus esset copiosa disputatione adversum insidias vel errores haereticorum? Cum enim conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis pro captu tenet de Domino Deo creatore suo, sive per piam fidem, sive per qualemcumque intelligentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne intelligeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non esse tria quaedam, non poterat dicere, quod Sabellius quia dixit, in haeresim lapsus est. Certissime quippe de Scripturis cognoscitur quod pie 0942 credendum est, et aspectu mentis indubitata perceptione perstringitur, et Patrem esse, et Filium, et Spiritum sanctum; nec Filium esse eumdem qui Pater est, nec Spiritum sanctum eumdem esse vel Patrem vel Filium. Quaesivit quid tria diceret: et dixit substantias sive personas, quibus nominibus non diversitatem intelligi voluit, sed singularitatem noluit; ut non solum ibi unitas intelligatur ex eo quod dicitur una essentia, sed et trinitas ex eo quod dicuntur tres substantiae vel personae. Nam si hoc est Deo esse quod subsistere, ita non erant dicendae tres substantiae, ut non dicuntur tres essentiae: quemadmodum quia hoc est Deo esse quod sapere, sicut non tres essentias, ita nec tres sapientias dicimus. Sic enim quia hoc illi est Deum esse quod est esse, tam tres essentias quam tres deos dici fas non est. Si autem aliud est Deo esse, aliud subsistere, sicut aliud Deo esse, aliud Patrem esse vel Dominum esse; quod enim est, ad se dicitur, Pater autem ad Filium et Dominus ad servientem creaturam dicitur: relative ergo subsistit, sicut relative gignit et relative dominatur. Ita jam substantia non erit substantia, quia relativum erit. Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus. Absurdum est autem ut substantia relative dicatur: omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit; quanto magis Deus?