Chapter 7.—The Opinions of Philosophers Respecting the Substance of the Soul. The Error of Those Who are of Opinion that the Soul is Corporeal, Does Not Arise from Defective Knowledge of the Soul, But from Their Adding There to Something Foreign to It. What is Meant by Finding.

9. When, therefore, it thinks itself to be something of this kind, it thinks itself to be a corporeal thing; and since it is perfectly conscious of its own superiority, by which it rules the body, it has hence come to pass that the question has been raised what part of the body has the greater power in the body; and the opinion has been held that this is the mind, nay, that it is even the whole soul altogether. And some accordingly think it to be the blood, others the brain, others the heart; not as the Scripture says, “I will praise Thee, O Lord, with my whole heart;” and, “Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thine heart;”716    Ps. ix., cxi., and cxxxviii., Deut. vi. 5, and Matt. xxii. 37 for this word by misapplication or metaphor is transferred from the body to the soul; but they have simply thought it to be that small part itself of the body, which we see when the inward parts are rent asunder. Others, again, have believed the soul to be made up of very minute and individual corpustules, which they call atoms, meeting in themselves and cohering. Others have said that its substance is air, others fire. Others have been of opinion that it is no substance at all, since they could not think any substance unless it is body, and they did not find that the soul was body; but it was in their opinion the tempering together itself of our body, or the combining together of the elements, by which that flesh is as it were conjoined. And hence all of these have held the soul to be mortal; since, whether it were body, or some combination of body, certainly it could not in either case continue always without death. But they who have held its substance to be some kind of life the reverse of corporeal, since they have found it to be a life that animates and quickens every living body, have by consequence striven also, according as each was able, to prove it immortal, since life cannot be without life.

For as to that fifth kind of body, I know not what, which some have added to the four well-known elements of the world, and have said that the soul was made of this, I do not think we need spend time in discussing it in this place. For either they mean by body what we mean by it, viz., that of which a part is less than the whole in extension of place, and they are to be reckoned among those who have believed the mind to be corporeal: or if they call either all substance, or all changeable substance, body, whereas they know that not all substance is contained in extension of place by any length and breadth and height, we need not contend with them about a question of words.

10. Now, in the case of all these opinions, any one who sees that the nature of the mind is at once substance, and yet not corporeal,—that is, that it does not occupy a less extension of place with a less part of itself, and a greater with a greater,—must needs see at the same time that they who are of opinion that it is corporeal717    [The distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substance is one that Augustin often insists upon. See Confessions VII. i-iii. The doctrine that all substance is extended body, and that there is no such entity as spiritual unextended substance, is combatted by Plato in the Theatetus. For a history of the contest and an able defence of the substantiality of spirit, see Cudworth’s Intellectual System, III. 384 sq. Harrison’s Ed.—W.G.T.S.] do not err from defect of knowledge concerning mind, but because they associate with it qualities without which they are not able to conceive any nature at all. For if you bid them conceive of existence that is without corporeal phantasms, they hold it merely nothing. And so the mind would not seek itself, as though wanting to itself. For what is so present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind? Or what is so present to the mind as the mind itself? And hence what is called “invention,” if we consider the origin of the word, what else does it mean, unless that to find out718    Invenire is to “come into” that which is sought? Those things accordingly which come into the mind as it were of themselves, are not usually said to be found out,719    Inventa although they may be said to be known; since we did not endeavor by seeking to come into them, that is to invent or find them out. And therefore, as the mind itself really seeks those things which are sought by the eyes or by any other sense of the body (for the mind directs even the carnal sense, and then finds out or invents, when that sense comes to the things which are sought); so, too, it finds out or invents other things which it ought to know, not with the medium of corporeal sense, but through itself, when it “comes into” them; and this, whether in the case of the higher substance that is in God, or of the other parts of the soul; just as it does when it judges of bodily images themselves, for it finds these within, in the soul, impressed through the body.

CAPUT VII.

9. Philosophorum opiniones de animae substantia. Error opinantium animam esse corpoream, non venit ex eo quod anima eorum notitiae desit, sed quod alienum quiddam adjungant. Invenire quid. Cum itaque se tale aliquid putat, corpus esse se putat. Et quia sibi bene conscia est principatus sui quo corpus regit; hinc factum est ut quidam quaererent quid corporis amplius valeret in corpore, et hoc esse mentem, vel omnino totam animam existimarent . Itaque alii sanguinem, alii cerebrum, alii cor, non sicut Scriptura dicit, Confitebor tibi, Domine, in toto corde meo; et, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo (Psal. IX, CX, et CXXXVII; Deut. VI, 5, et Matth. XXII, 37): hoc enim abutendo vel transferendo vocabulum ducitur a corpore ad animam: sed ipsam omnino particulam corporis quam in visceribus dilaniatis videmus, eam esse putaverunt. Alii ex minutissimis individuisque corpusculis, quas atomos dicunt, concurrentibus in se atque cohaerentibus, eam confici crediderunt. Alii aerem, alii ignem substantiam ejus esse dixerunt. Alii eam nullam esse substantiam, quia nisi corpus nullam substantiam poterant cogitare, et eam corpus esse non inveniebant: sed ipsam temperationem corporis nostri vel compagem primordiorum, quibus ista caro tanquam connectitur, esse opinati sunt. Eoque hi omnes eam mortalem esse senserunt, quia sive corpus esset, sive aliqua compositio corporis, non posset utique immortaliter permanere. Qui vero ejus substantiam vitam quamdam nequaquam corpoream; quandoquidem vitam omne vivum corpus animantem ac vivificantem esse repererunt; consequenter et immortalem, quia vita carere vita non potest, ut quisque potuit, probare conati sunt. Nam de quinto illo nescio quo corpore, quod notissimis quatuor hujus mundi elementis quidam conjungentes, hinc animam esse dixerunt, hoc loco diu disserendum non puto. Aut enim hoc vocant corpus quod nos, cujus in loci spatio pars toto minor est, et in illis annumerandi sunt qui mentem corpoream esse crediderunt: aut si vel omnem substantiam, vel omnem mutabilem substantiam corpus appellant, cum sciant non omnem locorum spatiis aliqua longitudine et latitudine et altitudine contineri, non cum eis de vocabuli quaestione pugnandum est.

0979 10. In his omnibus sententiis quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, id est, non minore sui parte minus occupare loci spatium, majusque majore; simul oportet videat eos qui opinantur esse corpoream, non ob hoc errare, quod mens desit eorum notitiae, sed quod adjungunt ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam. Sine phantasiis enim corporum quidquid jussi fuerint cogitare, nihil omnino esse arbitrantur. Ideoque non se, tanquam sibi desit, mens requirat. Quid enim tam cognitioni adest, quam id quod menti adest? aut quid tam menti adest, quam ipsa mens? Unde et ipsa quae appellatur inventio, si verbi originem retractemus, quid aliud resonat, nisi quia invenire est in id venire quod quaeritur? Propterea, quae quasi ultro in mentem veniunt, non usitate dicuntur inventa, quamvis cognita dici possint; quia non in ea quaerendo tendebamus, ut in ea veniremus, hoc est, ea inveniremus. Quapropter, sicut ea quae oculis aut ullo alio corporis sensu requiruntur, ipsa mens quaerit (ipsa enim etiam sensum carnis intendit, tunc autem invenit, cum in ea quae requiruntur idem sensus venit): sic alia quae non corporeo sensu internuntio, sed per se ipsam nosse debet, cum in ea venit, invenit; aut in superiore substantia, id est in Deo, aut in caeteris animae partibus, sicut de ipsis imaginibus corporum cum judicat; intus enim in anima eas invenit per corpus impressas.