Chapter 10.—Every Mind Knows Certainly Three Things Concerning Itself—That It Understands, that It Is, and that It Lives.

13. Let it not then add anything to that which it knows itself to be, when it is bidden to know itself. For it knows, at any rate, that this is said to itself; namely, to the self that is, and that lives, and that understands. But a dead body also is, and cattle live; but neither a dead body nor cattle understand. Therefore it so knows that it so is, and that it so lives, as an understanding is and lives. When, therefore, for example’s sake, the mind thinks itself air, it thinks that air understands; it knows, however, that itself understands, but it does not know itself to be air, but only thinks so. Let it separate that which it thinks itself; let it discern that which it knows; let this remain to it, about which not even have they doubted who have thought the mind to be this corporeal thing or that. For certainly every mind does not consider itself to be air; but some think themselves fire, others the brain, and some one kind of corporeal thing, others another, as I have mentioned before; yet all know that they themselves understand, and are, and live; but they refer understanding to that which they understand, but to be, and to live, to themselves. And no one doubts, either that no one understands who does not live, or that no one lives of whom it is not true that he is; and that therefore by consequence that which understands both is and lives; not as a dead body is which does not live, nor as a soul lives which does not understand, but in some proper and more excellent manner. Further, they know that they will, and they equally know that no one can will who is not and who does not live; and they also refer that will itself to something which they will with that will. They know also that they remember; and they know at the same time that nobody could remember, unless he both was and lived; but we refer memory itself also to something, in that we remember those things. Therefore the knowledge and science of many things are contained in two of these three, memory and understanding; but will must be present, that we may enjoy or use them. For we enjoy things known, in which things themselves the will finds delight for their own sake, and so reposes; but we use those things, which we refer to some other thing which we are to enjoy. Neither is the life of man vicious and culpable in any other way, than as wrongly using and wrongly enjoying. But it is no place here to discuss this.

14. But since we treat of the nature of the mind, let us remove from our consideration all knowledge which is received from without, through the senses of the body; and attend more carefully to the position which we have laid down, that all minds know and are certain concerning themselves. For men certainly have doubted whether the power of living, of remembering, of understanding, of willing, of thinking, of knowing, of judging, be of air, or of fire, or of the brain, or of the blood, or of atoms, or besides the usual four elements of a fifth kind of body, I know not what; or whether the combining or tempering together of this our flesh itself has power to accomplish these things. And one has attempted to establish this, and another to establish that. Yet who ever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges? Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly. Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything.

15. They who think the mind to be either a body or the combination or tempering of the body, will have all these things to seem to be in a subject, so that the substance is air, or fire, or some other corporeal thing, which they think to be the mind; but that the understanding (intelligentia) is in this corporeal thing as its quality, so that this corporeal thing is the subject, but the understanding is in the subject: viz. that the mind is the subject, which they judge to be a corporeal thing, but the understanding [intelligence], or any other of those things which we have mentioned as certain to us, is in that subject. They also hold nearly the same opinion who deny the mind itself to be body, but think it to be the combination or tempering together of the body; for there is this difference, that the former say that the mind itself is the substance, in which the understanding [intelligence] is, as in a subject; but the latter say that the mind itself is in a subject, viz. in the body, of which it is the combination or tempering together. And hence, by consequence, what else can they think, except that the understanding also is in the same body as in a subject?

16. And all these do not perceive that the mind knows itself, even when it seeks for itself, as we have already shown. But nothing is at all rightly said to be known while its substance is not known. And therefore, when the mind knows itself, it knows its own substance; and when it is certain about itself, it as certain about its own substance. But it is certain about itself, as those things which are said above prove convincingly; although it is not at all certain whether itself is air, or fire, or some body, or some function of body. Therefore it is not any of these. And to that whole which is bidden to know itself, belongs this, that it is certain that it is not any of those things of which it is uncertain, and is certain that it is that only, which only it is certain that it is. For it thinks in this way of fire, or air, and whatever else of the body it thinks of. Neither can it in any way be brought to pass that it should so think that which itself is, as it thinks that which itself is not. Since it thinks all these things through an imaginary phantasy, whether fire, or air, or this or that body, or that part or combination and tempering together of the body: nor assuredly is it said to be all those things, but some one of them. But if it were any one of them, it would think this one in a different manner from the rest viz. not through an imaginary phantasy, as absent things are thought, which either themselves or some of like kind have been touched by the bodily sense; but by some inward, not feigned, but true presence (for nothing is more present to it than itself); just as it thinks that itself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills. For it knows these things in itself, and does not imagine them as though it had touched them by the sense outside itself, as corporeal things are touched. And if it attaches nothing to itself from the thought of these things, so as to think itself to be something of the kind, then whatsoever remains to it from itself that alone is itself.

CAPUT X.

13. Mens omnis tria de se ipsa certo scit, intelligere, esse, et vivere. Non ergo adjungat aliud ad id quod se ipsam cognoscit, cum audit ut se ipsam cognoscat. Certe enim novit sibi dici, sibi scilicet quae est, et vivit, et intelligit. Sed est et cadaver, vivit et pecus: intelligit autem nec cadaver, nec pecus. Sic ergo se esse et vivere scit, quomodo est et vivit intelligentia. Cum ergo, verbi gratia, mens aerem se putat, aerem intelligere putat, se tamen intelligere scit: aerem autem se esse non scit, sed putat. Secernat quod se putat, cernat quod scit: hoc ei remaneat, unde ne illi quidem dubitaverunt, qui aliud atque aliud corpus esse mentem putaverunt. Neque enim omnis mens aerem se esse existimat, sed aliae ignem, aliae cerebrum, aliaeque aliud corpus, et aliud aliae, sicut supra commemoravi: omnes tamen se intelligere noverunt, et esse et vivere; sed intelligere ad id quod intelligunt referunt, esse autem et vivere ad se ipsas. Et nulli est dubium, nec quemquam intelligere qui non vivat, nec quemquam vivere qui non sit. Ergo consequenter et esse et vivere id quod intelligit, non sicuti est cadaver quod non vivit, nec sicuti vivat anima quae non intelligit, sed proprio quodam eodemque praestantiore modo. Item velle se sciunt, neque hoc posse quemquam qui non sit et qui non vivat, pariter sciunt: itemque ipsam voluntatem referunt ad aliquid, quod 0981 ea voluntate volunt. Meminisse etiam se sciunt; simulque sciunt quod nemo meminisset, nisi esset ac viveret: sed et ipsam memoriam ad aliquid referimus, quod ea meminimus. Duobus igitur horum trium, memoria et intelligentia, multarum rerum notitia atque scientia continentur: voluntas autem adest, per quam fruamur eis vel utamur. Fruimur enim cognitis, in quibus voluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit: utimur vero eis quae ad aliud referimus quo fruendum est. Nec est alia vita hominum vitiosa atque culpabilis, quam male utens et male fruens. De qua re non est nunc disserendi locus.

14. Sed quoniam de natura mentis agitur, removeamus a consideratione nostra omnes notitias quae capiuntur extrinsecus per sensus corporis; et ea quae posuimus, omnes mentes de se ipsis nosse certasque esse, diligentius attendamus. Utrum enim aeris sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intelligendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, judicandi; an ignis, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum, an praeter usitata quatuor elementa quinti nescio cujus corporis, an ipsius carnis nostrae compago vel temperamentum haec efficere valeat, dubitaverunt homines: et alius hoc, alius aliud affirmare conatus est. Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit: si dubitat unde dubitet, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat, si dubitat, scit se nescire; si dubitat, judicat non se temere consentire oportere. Quisquis igitur aliunde dubitat, de his omnibus dubitare non debet: quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset.

15. Haec omnia, qui vel corpus vel compositionem seu temperationem corporis esse mentem putant, in subjecto esse volunt videri, ut substantia sit aer, vel ignis, sive aliquod aliud corpus, quod mentem putant; intelligentia vero ita insit huic corpori, sicut qualitas ejus: ut illud subjectum sit, haec in subjecto; subjectum scilicet mens quam corpus esse arbitrantur, in subjecto autem intelligentia, sive quid aliud eorum quae certa nobis esse commemoravimus. Juxta opinantur etiam illi qui mentem ipsam negant esse corpus, sed compaginem aut temperationem corporis. Hoc enim interest, quod illi mentem ipsam dicunt esse substantiam, in quo subjecto sit intelligentia: isti autem ipsam mentem in subjecto esse dicunt, corpore scilicet cujus compositio vel temperatio est. Unde consequenter etiam intelligentiam quid aliud quam in eodem subjecto corpore existimant?

16. Qui omnes non advertunt, mentem nosse se etiam cum quaerit se, sicut jam ostendimus. Nullo modo autem recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum ejus ignoratur substantia. Quapropter, cum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit; et cum de se certa est, de substantia sua certa est. Certa est autem de se, sicut convincunt ea quae supra dicta sunt. Nec omnino certa est, utrum aer, an ignis sit, an aliquod corpus, vel aliquid corporis. Non est igitur aliquid 0982 eorum: totumque illud quod se jubetur ut noverit, ad hoc pertinet ut certa sit non se esse aliquid eorum de quibus incerta est, idque solum esse se certa sit, quod solum esse se certa est. Sic enim cogitat ignem aut aerem, et quidquid aliud corporis cogitat. Neque ullo modo fieri posset ut ita cogitaret id quod ipsa est, quemadmodum cogitat, id quod ipsa non est. Per phantasiam quippe imaginariam cogitat haec omnia, sive ignem, sive aerem, sive illud vel illud corpus, partemve illam, seu compaginem temperationemque corporis; nec utique ista omnia, sed aliquid horum esse dicitur. Si quid autem horum esset, aliter id quam caetera cogitaret, non scilicet per imaginale figmentum, sicut cogitantur absentia, quae sensu corporis tacta sunt, sive omnino ipsa, sive ejusdem generis aliqua; sed quadam interiore, non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius): sicut cogitat vivere se, et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle se. Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit, sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur. Ex quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat, ut tale aliquid esse se putet, quidquid ei de se remanet, hoc solum ipsa est.