Chapter 3.—The Unity of the Three Takes Place in Thought, Viz Of Memory, of Ternal Vision, and of Will Combining Both.

6. The rational soul, however, lives in a degenerate fashion, when it lives according to a trinity of the outer man; that is, when it applies to those things which form the bodily sense from without, not a praiseworthy will, by which to refer them to some useful end, but a base desire, by which to cleave to them. Since even if the form of the body, which was corporeally perceived, be withdrawn, its likeness remains in the memory, to which the will may again direct its eye, so as to be formed thence from within, as the sense was formed from without by the presentation of the sensible body. And so that trinity is produced from memory, from internal vision, and from the will which unites both. And when these three things are combined into one, from that combination724    Coactus itself they are called conception.725    Cogitatio And in these three there is no longer any diversity of substance. For neither is the sensible body there, which is altogether distinct from the nature of the living being, nor is the bodily sense there informed so as to produce vision, nor does the will itself perform its office of applying the sense, that is to be informed, to the sensible body, and of retaining it in it when informed; but in place of that bodily species which was perceived from without, there comes the memory retaining that species which the soul has imbibed through the bodily sense; and in place of that vision which was outward when the sense was informed through the sensible body, there comes a similar vision within, while the eye of the mind is informed from that which the memory retains, and the corporeal things that are thought of are absent; and the will itself, as before it applied the sense yet to be informed to the corporeal thing presented from without, and united it thereto when informed, so now converts the vision of the recollecting mind to memory, in order that the mental sight may be informed by that which the memory has retained, and so there may be in the conception a like vision. And as it was the reason that distinguished the visible appearance by which the bodily sense was informed, from the similitude of it, which was wrought in the sense when informed in order to produce vision (otherwise they had been so united as to be thought altogether one and the same); so, although that phantasy also, which arises from the mind thinking of the appearance of a body that it has seen, consists of the similitude of the body which the memory retains, together with that which is thence formed in the eye of the mind that recollects; yet it so seems to be one and single, that it can only be discovered to be two by the judgment of reason, by which we understand that which remains in the memory, even when we think it from some other source, to be a different thing from that which is brought into being when we remember, that is, come back again to the memory, and there find the same appearance. And if this were not now there, we should say that we had so forgotten as to be altogether unable to recollect. And if the eye of him who recollects were not informed from that thing which was in the memory, the vision of the thinker could in no way take place; but the conjunction of both, that is, of that which the memory retains, and of that which is thence expressed so as to inform the eye of him who recollects, makes them appear as if they were one, because they are exceedingly like. But when the eye of the concipient is turned away thence, and has ceased to look at that which was perceived in the memory, then nothing of the form that was impressed thereon will remain in that eye, and it will be informed by that to which it had again been turned, so as to bring about another conception. Yet that remains which it has left in the memory, to which it may again be turned when we recollect it, and being turned thereto may be informed by it, and become one with that whence it is informed.

CAPUT III.

6. Trium unitas in cogitatione fit memoriae, internae visionis, et voluntatis utrumque copulantis. Sed anima rationalis deformiter vivit, cum secundum trinitatem exterioris hominis vivit; id est, cum ad ea quae forinsecus sensum corporis formant, non laudabilem voluntatem, qua haec ad utile aliquid referat, sed turpem cupiditatem qua his inhaerescat, accommodat. Quia etiam detracta specie corporis quae corporaliter sentiebatur, remanet in memoria similitudo ejus, quo rursus voluntas convertat aciem, ut inde formetur intrinsecus, sicut ex corpore objecto sensibili sensus extrinsecus formabatur. Atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria, et interna visione, et quae utrumque copulat voluntate. Quae tria cum in unum coguntur, ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur. Nec jam in his tribus diversa substantia est. Neque enim aut corpus illud sensibile ibi est, quod omnino discretum est ab animantis natura, aut sensus corporis ibi formatur ut fiat visio, aut ipsa voluntas id agit ut formandum sensum sensibili corpori admoveat, in eoque formatum detineat: sed pro illa specie corporis quae sentiebatur extrinsecus, succedit memoria retinens illam speciem quam per corporis sensum combibit anima; proque illa visione quae foris erat cum sensus ex corpore sensibili formaretur, succedit intus similis visio, cum ex eo quod memoria tenet, formatur acies animi, et absentia corpora cogitantur: voluntasque ipsa 0989 quomodo foris corpori objecto formandum sensum admovebat, formatumque jungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi convertit ad memoriam, ut ex eo quod illa retinuit, ista formetur, et sit in cogitatione similis visio. Sicut autem ratione discernebatur species visibilis qua sensus corporis formabatur, et ejus similitudo quae fiebat in sensu formato ut esset visio (alioquin ita erant conjunctae, ut omnino una eademque putaretur): sic illa phantasia, cum animus cogitat speciem visi corporis, cum constet ex corporis similitudine quam memoria tenet, et ex ea quae inde formatur in acie recordantis animi; tamen sic una et singularis apparet, ut duo quaedam esse non inveniantur nisi judicante ratione, qua intelligimus aliud esse illud quod in memoria manet, etiam cum aliunde cogitamus, et aliud fieri cum recordamur, id est, ad memoriam redimus, et illic invenimus eamdem speciem. Quae si jam non ibi esset, ita oblitos nos esse diceremus, ut omnino recolere non possemus. Si autem acies recordantis non formaretur ex ea re quae erat in memoria, nullo modo fieret visio cogitantis: sed utriusque conjunctio, id est, ejus quam memoria tenet, et ejus quae inde exprimitur ut formetur acies recordantis, quia simillimae sunt, veluti unam facit apparere. Cum autem cogitantis acies aversa inde fuerit, atque id quod in memoria cernebatur destiterit intueri, nihil formae quae impressa erat in eadem acie remanebit: atque inde formabitur, quo rursus conversa fuerit ut alia cogitatio fiat. Manet tamen illud quod reliquit in memoria, quo rursus cum id recordamur convertatur, et conversa formetur, atque unum cum eo fiat unde formatur.