Chapter 11.—Whether Memory is Also of Things Present.
14. But some one will say, That is not memory by which the mind, which is ever present to itself, is affirmed to remember itself; for memory is of things past, not of things present. For there are some, and among them Cicero, who, in treating of the virtues, have divided prudence into these three—memory, understanding, forethought: to wit, assigning memory to things past, understanding to things present, forethought to things future; which last is certain only in the case of those who are prescient of the future; and this is no gift of men, unless it be granted from above, as to the prophets. And hence the book of Wisdom, speaking of men, “The thoughts of mortals,” it says, “are fearful, and our forethought uncertain.”872 Wisd. ix. 14 But memory of things past, and understanding of things present, are certain: certain, I mean, respecting things incorporeal, which are present; for things corporeal are present to the sight of the corporeal eyes. But let any one who denies that there is any memory of things present, attend to the language used even in profane literature, where exactness of words was more looked for than truth of things. “Nor did Ulysses suffer such things, nor did the Ithacan forget himself in so great a peril.”873 Æneid, iii. 628, 629. For when Virgil said that Ulysses did not forget himself, what else did he mean, except that he remembered himself? And since he was present to himself, he could not possibly remember himself, unless memory pertained to things present. And, therefore, as that is called memory in things past which makes it possible to recall and remember them; so in a thing present, as the mind is to itself, that is not unreasonably to be called memory, which makes the mind at hand to itself, so that it can be understood by its own thought, and then both be joined together by love of itself.
CAPUT XI.
14. An et praesentium sit memoria. Sed dicet aliquis: Non est ista memoria, qua mens sui meminisse perhibetur, quae sibi semper est praesens. Memoria enim praeteritorum est, non praesentium: nam quidam cum de virtutibus agerent, in quibus est etiam Tullius, in tria ista prudentiam diviserunt, memoriam, intelligentiam, providentiam: memoriam scilicet praeteritis, intelligentiam praesentibus, providentiam rebus tribuentes futuris, quam non habent certam nisi praescii futurorum; quod non est munus hominum, nisi detur desuper, ut Prophetis. Unde Scriptura sapientiae de hominibus aiens : Cogitationes, inquit, mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae (Sap. IX, 14). Memoria vero de praeteritis, et intelligentia de praesentibus certa est, sed praesentibus utique incorporalibus rebus: nam corporales corporalium praesentes sunt aspectibus oculorum. Sed qui dicit memoriam non esse praesentium, attendat quemadmodum dictum sit in ipsis saecularibus litteris, ubi majoris fuit curae verborum integritas quam veritas rerum: Nec talia passus Ulysses, Oblitusve sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto. (Aeneid. lib. 3, vers. 628, 629.)1048 Virgilius enim cum sui non oblitum diceret Ulyssem, quid aliud intelligi voluit, nisi quod meminerit sui? Cum ergo sibi praesens esset, nullo modo sui meminisset, nisi ad res praesentes memoria pertineret. Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit ut valeant recoli et recordari: sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens, memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intelligi, et utrumque sui amore conjungi.